Section 401(e) provides that in any election of officers required by the Act which is held by secret ballot, every member in good standing with the exceptions explained in sections following shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office. This provision is applicable not only to the election of officers in local labor organizations, but also to elections of officers in national or international and intermediate labor organizations where those elections are held by secret ballot referendum among the members, and to the election of delegates to conventions at which officers will be elected.

Where elections of national or international labor organizations or of intermediate bodies are held at a convention of delegates elected by secret ballot, protection of the right to be a candidate and to hold office is afforded by the requirement in section 401(f) that the convention be conducted in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of title IV. If members in good standing are denied the right to be candidates by the imposition of unreasonable qualifications on eligibility for office such qualifications would be inconsistent with the provisions of title IV.

The eligibility of members of labor organizations to be candidates and to hold office in such organizations is subject only to the provisions of section 504(a), which bars individuals convicted of certain crimes from holding office in labor organizations 23 and to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed. A person who is barred from serving in union office by section 504(a) is not eligible to be a candidate. However, a labor organization may permit a person who is barred from holding union office by section 504(a) to be a candidate for office if the section 504 disability will terminate by the customary date for the installation of officers. A labor organization may within reasonable limits adopt stricter standards than those contained in section 504(a) by extending the period of disability or by barring from union office persons who have been convicted of crimes other than those specified.

It is recognized that labor organizations may have a legitimate institutional interest in prescribing minimum standards for candidacy and officeholding in the organization. On the other hand, a dominant purpose of the Act is to ensure the right of members to participate fully in governing their union and to make its officers responsive to the members. A basic assumption underlying the concept of “free and democratic elections,” is that voters will exercise common sense and good judgment in casting their ballots. In union elections as in political elections, the good judgment of the members in casting their votes should be the primary determinant of whether a candidate is qualified to hold office. Therefore, restrictions placed on the right of members to be candidates must be closely scrutinized to determine whether they serve union purposes of such importance, in terms of protecting the union as an institution, as to justify subordinating the right of the individual member to seek office and the interest of the membership in a free, democratic choice of leaders.

(a) The question of whether a qualification is reasonable is a matter which is not susceptible of precise definition, and will ordinarily turn on the facts in each case. However, court decisions in deciding particular cases have furnished some general guidelines. The Supreme Court in Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 at 499 (1968) held that:

(b) Some factors to be considered, therefore, in assessing the reasonableness of a qualification for union office are:

(1) The relationship of the qualification to the legitimate needs and interests of the union;

(2) The relationship of the qualification to the demands of union office;

(3) The impact of the qualification, in the light of the Congressional purpose of fostering the broadest possible participation in union affairs;

(4) A comparison of the particular qualification with the requirements for holding office generally prescribed by other labor organizations; and

(5) The degree of difficulty in meeting a qualification by union members.

Ordinarily the following types of requirements may be considered reasonable, depending on the circumstances in which they are applied and the effect of their application:

(a) Period of prior membership. It would ordinarily be reasonable for a local union to require a candidate to have been a member of the organization for a reasonable period of time, not exceeding two years, before the election. However, if a member is involuntarily compelled to transfer from one local to another, such a requirement would not be reasonable if he is not given credit for his prior period of membership.

(b) Continuity of good standing. A requirement of continuous good standing based on punctual payment of dues will be considered a reasonable qualification only if (1) it provides a reasonable grace period during which members may make up missed payments without loss of eligibility for office, 24 and (2) the period of time involved is reasonable. What are reasonable periods of time for these purposes will depend upon the circumstances. Section 401(e) of the Act provides that a member whose dues have been withheld by the employer for payment to the labor organization pursuant to his voluntary authorization provided for in a collective bargaining agreement may not be declared ineligible to vote or be a candidate for office by reason of alleged delay or default in the payment of dues. If during the period allowed for payment of dues in order to remain in good standing, a member on a dues checkoff system has no earnings from which dues can be withheld, section 401(e) does not relieve the member of the responsibility of paying his dues in order to remain in good standing.

(a) It may be reasonable for a labor organization to establish a requirement of attendance at a specified number of its regular meetings during the period immediately preceding an election, in order to insure that candidates have a demonstrated interest in and familiarity with the affairs of the organization. In the past, it was ordinarily considered reasonable to require attendance at no more than 50 percent of the meetings over a period not exceeding two years. Experience has demonstrated that it is not feasible to establish arbitrary guidelines for judging the reasonableness of such a qualification. Its reasonableness must be gauged in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case, including not only the frequency of meetings, the number of meetings which must be attended and the period of time over which the requirement extends, but also such factors as the nature, availability and extent of excuse provisions, whether all or most members have the opportunity to attend meetings, and the impact of the rule, i.e., the number or percentage of members who would be rendered ineligible by its application. 25

(a—1) In Steelworkers, Local 3489 v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 94 LRRM 2203, 79 L.C. ¶ 11,806 (1977), the Supreme Court found that this standard for determining validity of meeting attendance qualifications was the type of flexible result that Congress contemplated when it used the word “reasonable.” The Court concluded that Congress, in guaranteeing every union member the opportunity to hold office, subject only to “reasonable qualifications,” disabled unions from establishing eligibility qualifications as sharply restrictive of the openness of the union political process as the Steelworkers' attendance rule. The rule required attendance at fifty percent of the meetings for three years preceding the election unless prevented by union activities or working hours, with the result that 96.5 percent of the members were ineligible.

(b) Other guidance is furnished by lower court decisions which have held particular meeting attendance requirements to be unreasonable under the following circumstances: One meeting during each quarter for the three years preceding nomination, where the effect was to disqualify 99 percent of the membership (Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union of Florida, 65 LRRM 2104, 55 L.C. par. 11,857 (M.D. Fla., 1967)); 75 percent of the meetings held over a two-year period, with absence excused only for work or illness, where over 97 percent of the members were ineligible (Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 244 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Pa., 1965), order vacating decision as moot, 372 F. 2d 86 (C.A. 3 1966), reversed 389 U.S. 463; decision on remand, 405 F.2d 176 (C.A. 3 1968)); Wirtz v. Local 262, Glass bottle Blowers Ass'n., 290 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal., 1968)); attendance at each of eight meetings in the two months between nomination and election, where the meetings were held at widely scattered locations within the State (Hodgson v. Local Union No. 624 A-B, International Union of Operating Engineers, 80 LRRM 3049, 68 L.C. par. 12,816 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 1972)); attendance at not less than six regular meetings each year during the twenty-four months prior to an election which has the effect of requiring attendance for a period that must begin no later than eighteen months before a biennial election (Usery v. Local Division 1205, Amalgamated Transit Union, 545 F. 2d 1300 (C.A. 1, 1976)).

In certain circumstances, in which the duties of a particular office require supervision of an insurance plan in more than the formal sense, a union may require candidates for such office to belong to the plan.

A requirement that candidates for office have some prior service in a lower office is not considered reasonable. 26

(a) It would ordinarily be reasonable for a union to require candidates to be employed at the trade or even to have been so employed for a reasonable period. In applying such a rule an unemployed member is considered to be working at the trade if he is actively seeking such employment. Such a requirement should not be so inflexible as to disqualify those members who are familiar with the trade but who because of illness, economic conditions, or other good reasons are temporarily not working.

(b) It would be unreasonable for a union to prevent a person from continuing his membership rights on the basis of failure to meet a qualification which the union itself arbitrarily prevents the member from satisfying. If a member is willing and able to pay his union dues to maintain his good standing and his right to run for office, it would be unreasonable for the union to refuse to accept such dues merely because the person is temporarily unemployed. Where a union constitution requires applicants for membership to be actively employed in the industry served by the union, a person who becomes a member would not be considered to forfeit his membership in the union or any of the attendant rights of membership merely because he is discharged or laid off.

(c) Ordinarily members working part-time at the trade may not for that reason alone be denied the right to run for office.

(d) A labor organization may postpone the right to run for office of members enrolled in a bona fide apprenticeship program until such members complete their apprenticeship.

A labor organization may not limit eligibility for office to particular branches or segments of the union where such restriction has the effect of depriving those members who are not in such branch or segment of the right to become officers of the union. 27

In the case of a position which is representative of a unit defined on a geographic, craft, shift, or similar basis, a labor organization may by its constitution or bylaws limit eligibility for candidacy and for holding office to members of the represented unit. For example, a national or international labor organization may establish regional vice-presidencies and require that each vice-president be a member of his respective region. This kind of limitation would not be considered reasonable, however, if applied to general officers such as the president, vice-president, recording secretary, financial secretary, and treasurer. If eligibility of delegates to a convention which will elect general officers is limited to special categories of members, all such categories within the organization must be represented.

While the Act does not prohibit a person from maintaining membership or holding office in more than one labor organization, it would be considered reasonable for a union to bar from candidacy for office persons who hold membership in a rival labor organization.

An officer may hold more than one office in a labor organization so long as this is consistent with the constitution and bylaws of the organization.

A labor organization may establish certain restrictions on the right to be a candidate on the basis of personal characteristics which have a direct bearing on fitness for union office. A union may, for example, require a minimum age for candidacy. However, a union may not establish such rules if they would be inconsistent with any other Federal law. Thus, it ordinarily may not limit eligibility for office to persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin since this would be inconsistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 28 Nor may it establish a general compulsory retirement age or comparable age restriction on candidacy since this would be inconsistent with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended. A union may not require candidates for office to be registered voters and to have voted in public elections during the year preceding their nominations. Nor may it require that candidates have voted in the previous union election to be eligible. Such restrictions may not be said to be relevant to the members' fitness for office.

Inasmuch as it is an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) for any employer (including persons acting in that capacity) to dominate or interfere with the administration of any labor organization, it follows that employers, while they may be members, may not be candidates for office or serve as officers. Thus, while it is recognized that in some industries, particularly construction, members who become supervisors, or contractors traditionally keep their union membership as a form of job security or as a means of retaining union benefits, such persons may not be candidates for or hold office. 29 Whether a restriction on officeholding by members who are group leaders or others performing some supervisory duties is reasonable depends on the particular circumstances. For instance, if such persons might be considered “supervisors” 30 under the LMRA, their right to be candidates under the Act may be limited. Another factor in determining the reasonableness of a ban on such persons is the position (if any) of the NLRB on the status of the particular employees involved. If, for example, the NLRB has determined that certain group leaders are part of the bargaining unit, it might be unreasonable for the union to prohibit them from running for office. An overall consideration in determining whether a member may fairly be denied the right to be a candidate for union office as an employer or supervisor is whether there is a reasonable basis for assuming that the person involved would be subject to a conflict of interest in carrying out his representative duties for employees and rank and file union members.

A labor organization may in its constitution and bylaws prohibit members who are also its full-time non-elective employees from being candidates for union office, because of the potential conflict of interest arising from the employment relationship which could be detrimental to the union as an institution.

(a) Unions may establish such other reasonable rules as are necessary to protect the members against leaders who may have committed serious offenses against the union. For example, a union may, after appropriate proceedings, bar from office persons who have misappropriated union funds, even if such persons were never indicted and convicted in a court of law for their offenses. Of course, the union would have to provide reasonable precautions to insure that no member is made ineligible to hold office on the basis of unsupported allegations and that any rights guaranteed him by the constitution and bylaws are protected. Similarly, a union may require an elected officer to sign an affidavit averring that he is not barred from serving as an officer by the provisions of section 504 of the Act since the union and its officers may not permit a person to serve as an officer if he is so barred (see footnote 23).

(b) It would not violate the Act for a union to prohibit successive terms in office or to limit the number of years an officer may serve. Such rules are intended to encourage as many members as possible to seek positions of leadership in the organization.

Section 401(e) was not intended to limit the right of a labor organization to take disciplinary action against members guilty of misconduct. So long as such action is conducted in accordance with section 101(a)(5), a union may, for example, if its constitution and bylaws so provide, bar from office for a period of time any member who is guilty of specific acts, such as strikebreaking, detrimental to the union as an institution. However, if a union has improperly disciplined a member and barred him from candidacy, the Secretary may, in an appropriate case, treat him as a member in good standing entitled to all of the rights of members guaranteed by title IV.

A union may not adopt rules which in their effect discourage or paralyze any opposition to the incumbent officers. Therefore, it would not be a reasonable qualification to require members to file a declaration of candidacy several months in advance of the nomination meeting since such a requirement would have such effect and “serves no reasonable purpose which cannot otherwise be satisfied without resort to this procedure.” 31

It would be unreasonable to require candidates for office to pay a filing fee because a fee limits the right of members to a reasonable opportunity to nominate the candidates of their choice and there is no objective relationship between the requirement and the ability to perform the duties of the office.

Qualifications for office which may seem reasonable on their face may not be proper if they are applied in an unreasonable manner or if they are not applied in a uniform way. An essential element of reasonableness is adequate advance notice to the membership of the precise terms of the requirement. A qualification which is not part of the constitution and bylaws or other duly enacted rules of the organization may not be the basis for denial of the right to run for office, unless required by Federal or State law. 32 Qualifications must be specific and objective. They must contain specific standards of eligibility by which any member can determine in advance whether or not he is qualified to be a candidate. For example, a constitutional provision which states that “a candidate shall not be eligible to run for office who intends to use his office as a cloak to effect purposes inimical to the scope and policies of the union” would not be a reasonable qualification within the meaning of section 401(e) because it is so general as to preclude a candidate from ascertaining whether he is eligible and would permit determinations of eligibility based on subjective judgments. Further, such a requirement is by its nature not capable of being uniformly imposed as required by section 401(e).

(a) The reasonableness of applying a newly adopted restriction on candidacy retroactively depends in part upon the nature of the requirement. It would be unreasonable for a labor organization to enforce eligibility requirements which the members had no opportunity to satisfy. For example, it would not be reasonable for a union to apply a newly adopted meeting attendance requirement retroactively since members would have no opportunity to comply with such requirement prior to its effective date. 33 When such a rule is in effect the membership is entitled to advance notice of the requirements of the rule and of the means to be used in verifying attendance. It would not be unreasonable, however, for a union to adopt and enforce a rule disqualifying persons convicted of a felony from being candidates or holding office.

(b) It would not be proper for a labor organization to amend its constitution after an election to make eligible a person who had been elected but who was not eligible at the time of the election.