(a) This subpart discusses the meaning and scope of the child labor provisions contained in the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the Act). These provisions seek to protect the safety, health, well-being, and opportunities for schooling of youthful workers and authorize the Secretary of Labor to issue legally binding orders or regulations in certain instances and under certain conditions. The child labor provisions are found in sections 3(1), 11(b), 12, 13 (c) and (d), 15(a)(4), 16(a), and 18 of the Act. They are administered and enforced by the Secretary of Labor who has delegated to the Wage and Hour Division the duty of making investigations to obtain compliance, and of developing standards for the issuance of regulations and orders relating to: (1) Hazardous occupations, (2) employment of 14- and 15-year-old children, and (3) age certificates.

(b) The interpretations of the Secretary contained in this subpart indicate the construction of the law which will guide him in performing his duties until he is directed otherwise by authoritative rulings of the courts or until he shall subsequently decide that his prior interpretation is incorrect.

The most important of the child labor provisions are contained in sections 12(a), 12(c), and 3(l) of the Act. Section 12(a) provides that no producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall ship or deliver for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce any goods produced in an establishment in or about which oppressive child labor was employed within 30 days before removal of the goods. The full text of this subsection is set forth in § 570.104 and its terms are discussed in §§ 570.105 to 570.111, inclusive. Section 12(c) prohibits any employer from employing oppressive child labor in interstate or foreign commerce or in the production of goods for such commerce. The text and discussion of this provision appear in §§ 570.112 and 570.113. Section 3(l) of the Act, which defines the term “oppressive child labor,” is set forth in § 570.117 and its provisions are discussed in §§ 570.118 to 570.121, inclusive. It will further be noted that the Act provides various specific exemptions from the foregoing provisions which are set forth and discussed in §§ 570.122 to 570.130, inclusive.

A comparison of the child labor provisions with the so-called wage and hours provisions contained in the Act discloses some important distinctions which should be mentioned.

(a) The child labor provisions contain no requirements in regard to wages. The wage and hours provisions, on the other hand, provide for minimum rates of pay for straight time and overtime pay at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for overtime hours worked. Except as provided in certain exemptions contained in the Act, these rates are required to be paid all employees subject to the wage and hours provisions, regardless of their age or sex. The fact therefore, that the employment of a particular child is prohibited by the child labor provisions or that certain shipments or deliveries may be proscribed on account of such employment, does not relieve the employer of the duties imposed by the wage and hours provisions to compensate the child in accordance with those requirements.

(b) There are important differences between the child labor provisions and the wage and hours provisions with respect to their general coverage. As pointed out in § 570.114, two separate and basically different coverage provisions are contained in section 12 relating to child labor. One of these provisions (section 12(c)), which applies to the employment by an employer of oppressive child labor in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, is similar to the wage and hours coverage provisions, which include employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce or employed in enterprises having employees so engaged. The other provision (section 12(a)), however, differs fundamentally in its basic concepts of coverage from the wage and hours provisions, as will be explained in §§ 570.104 to 570.111.

(c) Another distinction is that the exemptions provided by the Act from the minimum wage and/or overtime provisions are more numerous and differ from the exemptions granted from the child labor provisions. There are only eight specific child labor exemptions of which only two apply to the minimum wage and overtime pay requirements as well. These are the exemptions for employees engaged in the delivery of newspapers to the consumer and homeworkers engaged in the making of wreaths composed principally of evergreens. 3 Apart from these two exceptions, none of the specific exemptions from the minimum wage and/or overtime pay requirements applies to the child labor provisions. However, it should be noted that the exclusion of certain employers by section 3(d) 4 of the Act applies to the child labor provisions as well as the wage and hours provisions.

Section 12(a) of the Act provides as follows:

It will be observed that the prohibition of section 12(a) with respect to certain shipments or deliveries for shipment is confined to those made by producers, manufacturers, and dealers. The terms “producer, manufacturer, or dealer” used in this provision are not expressly defined by the statute. However, in view of the definition of “produced” in section 3(j), for purposes of this section a “producer” is considered to be one who engages in producing, manufacturing, handling or in any other manner working on goods in any State. 5 Since manufacturing is considered a specialized form of production, the word “manufacturer” does not have as broad an application as the word “producer.” Manufacturing generally involves the transformation of raw materials or semifinished goods into new or different articles. A person may be considered a “manufacturer” even though his goods are made by hand, as is often true of products made by homeworkers. Moreover, it is immaterial whether manufacturing is his sole or main business. Thus, the term includes retailers who, in addition to retail selling, engage in such manufacturing activities as the making of slip-covers or curtains, the baking of bread, the making of candy, or the making of window frames. The word “dealer” refers to anyone who deals in goods (as defined in section 3(i) of the Act), 6 including persons engaged in buying, selling, trading, distributing, delivering, etc. It includes middlemen, factors, brokers, commission merchants, wholesalers, retailers and the like.

(a) Section 12(a) forbids producers, manufacturers, and dealers to “ship or deliver for shipment in commerce” the goods referred to therein. A producer, manufacturer, or dealer may “ship” goods in commerce either by moving them himself in interstate or foreign commerce or by causing them to so move, as by delivery to a carrier. 7 Thus, a baker “ships” his bread in commerce whether he carries it in his own truck across State lines or sends it by contract or common carrier to his customers in other States. The word “ship” must be applied in its ordinary meaning. For example, it does not apply to the transmission of telegraphic messages. 8

(b) To “deliver for shipment in commerce” means to surrender the custody of goods to another under such circumstances that the person surrendering the goods knows or has reason to believe that the goods will later be shipped in commerce. 9 Typical is the case of a Detroit manufacturer who delivers his goods in Detroit to a distributor who, as the manufacturer is well aware, will ship the goods into another State. A delivery for shipment in commerce may also be made where raw materials are delivered by their producer to a manufacturer in the same State who converts them into new products which are later shipped across State lines. If the producer in such case is aware or has reason to believe that the finished products will ultimately be sent into another State, his delivery of the raw materials to the manufacturer is a delivery for shipment in commerce. Another example is a paper box manufacturer who ships a carton of boxes to a fresh fruit or vegetable packing shed within the same State, with knowledge or reason to believe that the boxes will there be filled with fruits or vegetables and shipped outside the State. In such case the box manufacturer has delivered the boxes for shipment in commerce.

(a) Section 12(a) prohibits the shipment or delivery for shipment in commerce of “any goods” produced in an establishment which were removed within 30 days of the employment there of oppressive child labor. It should be noted that the statute does not base the prohibition of section 12(a) upon the percentage of an establishment's output which is shipped in commerce.

(b) The Act furnishes its own definition of “goods” in section 3(i), as follows:

The word “produced” as used in the Act is defined by section 3(j) to mean:

(a) The prohibition of section 12(a) cannot apply to a shipment of goods unless those goods (including any part or ingredient thereof) were actually “produced” in and removed from an establishment where oppressive child labor was employed. This provision is applicable even though the under-age employee does not engage in the production of the goods themselves if somewhere in the establishment in or about which he is employed goods are “produced” which are subsequently shipped or delivered for shipment in commerce. In contrast to this restrictive requirement of section 12(a), it will be noted that the employees covered under the wage and hours provisions as engaged in the production of goods for commerce are not limited to those in or about establishments where such goods are being produced. If the requisite relationship 13 to production of such goods is present, an employee is covered for wage and hours purposes regardless of whether his work brings him in or near any establishment where the goods are produced. 14

(b) Since the first word in the definition of “produced” repeats the term being defined, it seems clear that the first word must carry the meaning that it has in everyday language. Goods are commonly spoken of as “produced” if they have been brought into being as a result of the application of work. The words “manufactured” and “mined” in the definition refer to special forms of production. The former term is generally applied to the products of industry where existing raw materials are transformed into new or different articles by the use of industrial methods, either by the aid of machinery or by manual operations. Mining is a type of productive activity involving the taking of materials from the ground, such as coal from a coal mine, oil from oil wells, or stone from quarries. The statute also defines the term “produced” to mean “handled” or “in any other manner work on.” 15 These words relate not only to operations carried on in the course of manufacturing, mining, or production as commonly described, but include as well all kinds of operations which prepare goods for their entry into the stream of commerce, without regard to whether the goods are to be further processed or are so-called “finished goods.” 16 Accordingly, warehouses, fruit and vegetable packing sheds, distribution yards, grain elevators, etc., where goods are sorted, graded, stored, packed, labeled or otherwise handled or worked on in preparation for their shipment out of the State are producing establishments for purposes of section 12(a). 17 However, the handling or working on goods, performed by employees of carriers which accomplishes the interstate transit or movement in commerce itself, does not constitute production under the Act. 18

(a)(1) The statute does not expressly define “establishment.” Accordingly, the term should be given a meaning which is not only consistent with its ordinary usage, but also designed to accomplish the general purposes of the Act. As normally used in business and in Government, the word “establishment” refers to a distinct physical place of business. This is the meaning attributed to the term as it is used in section 13(a)(2) of the Act. 19 Since the establishments covered under section 12(a) of the Act are those in which goods are produced, the term “establishment” there refers to a physical place where goods are produced. Typical producing establishments are industrial plants, mines, quarries, and the like. The producing establishment, however, need not have a permanently fixed location as is the case with a factory or mine. A boat, for instance, where productive activities such as catching or canning fish are carried on is considered a producing establishment for purposes of section 12(a).

(2) Frequently, questions arise as to what should be considered a single establishment. No hard and fast rule can be laid down which will fix the area of all establishments. Accordingly, a determination of the area contained in a single establishment must be based upon the facts of each individual situation. Facts which are particularly pertinent in this connection, however, are those which relate to the physical characteristics and the manner of operation and control of the business. Sometimes, an establishment may extend over an area of several square miles as is common with farms, logging enterprises, mines, and quarries. On the other hand, it may be confined to a few square feet. A typical illustration of this is a loft building that houses the workshops of hundreds of independent manufacturing firms. Each of the workshops is, for purposes of this section, a separate establishment.

(3) Similar principles are applicable in determining whether several buildings located on the same premises constitute one establishment or more than one. For example, where several factory buildings are located on the same premises and owned and operated by the same person, they are generally to be considered as a single establishment. On the other hand, factory buildings located on the same premises, but owned and operated by different persons, will not ordinarily be treated as a single establishment. Where the several factories, however, are engaged in a joint productive enterprise, they may constitute a single establishment. This is the case, for example, where a large shipyard contains the plants of a number of subcontractors who are engaged in making parts or equipment for the boats that are built in the yard.

(b) The phrase “situated in the United States” is construed to include any of the 50 States or the District of Columbia or any Territory or possession of the United States.

(a) Section 12(a) excludes from the channels of interstate commerce goods produced in an establishment “in or about” which oppressive child labor has been employed. In a great many situations it is obviously easy to determine whether a minor is employed “in” an establishment. Thus, he is so employed where he performs his occupational duties on the premises of the producing establishment. Furthermore, a minor is also considered as employed in an establishment where he performs most of his duties off the premises but is regularly required to perform certain occupational duties in the establishment, such as loading or unloading a truck, checking in or out, or washing windows. This is true in such cases even though the minor is employed by someone other than the owner or operator of the particular establishment. On the other hand, a minor is not considered to be employed in an establishment other than his employer's merely because such establishment is visited by him for brief periods of time and for the sole purpose of picking up or delivering a message or other small article.

(b) If, in the light of the statements in paragraph (a) of this section, the minor cannot be considered as employed in the establishment, he may, nevertherless, be employed “about” it if he performs his occupational duties sufficiently close in proximity to the actual place of production to fall within the commonly understood meaning of the term “about.” This would be true in a situation where the foregoing proximity test is met and the occupation of the minor is directly related to the activities carried on in the producing establishment, in this connection, occupations are considered sufficiently related to the activities carried on in the producing establishment to meet the second test above at least where the requisite relationship to production of goods exists within the meaning of section 3(j) of the Act. 20 By way of example, a driver's helper employed to assist in the distribution of the products of a bottling company who regularly boards the delivery truck immediately outside the premises of the bottling plant is considered employed “in or about” such establishment, without regard to whether he ever enters the plant itself. On the other hand, employees working entirely within one establishment are not considered to be employed “in or about” a wholly different establishment occupying separate premises and operated by another employer. This would be true even though the two establishments are contiguous. But in other situations the distance between the producing establishment and the minor's place of employment may be a decisive factor. Thus, a minor employed in clearing rights-of-way for power lines many miles away from the power plant cannot well be said to be employed “in or about” such establishment. In view of the great variety of establishments and employments, however, no hard and fast rule can be laid down which will once and for all distinguish between employments that are “about” an establishment and those that are not. Therefore, each case must be determined on its own merits. In determining whether a particular employment is “about” an establishment, consideration of the following factors should prove helpful:

(1) Actual distance between the producing establishment and the minor's place of employment;

(2) Nature of the establishment;

(3) Ownership or control of the premises involved;

(4) Nature of the minor's activities in relation to the establishment's purpose;

(5) Identity of the minor's employer and the establishment's owner;

(6) Extent of control by the producing establishment's owner over the minor's employment.

According to section 12(a) goods produced in an establishment in or about which oppressive child labor has been employed are barred as “hot goods” from being shipped or delivered for shipment in commerce in the following two situations: First, if they were removed from the establishment while any oppressive child labor was still being employed in or about it; second, if they were removed from an establishment in or about which oppressive child labor was no longer employed but less than 30 days had then elapsed since any such employment of oppressive child labor came to an end. Once any goods have been removed from a producing establishment within the above-mentioned thirty-day period, they are barred at any time theafter from being shipped or delivered for shipment in commerce so long as they remain “goods” for purposes of the Act. 21 Goods are considered removed from an establishment just as soon as they are taken away from the establishment as that term has been defined. 22 The statute does not require that this “removal” from the establishment be made for the purpose or in the course of a shipment or delivery for shipment in commerce. A “removal” within the meaning of the statute also takes place where the goods are removed from the establishment for some other purpose such as storage, the granting of a lien or other security interest, or further processing.

(a) Section 12(c) of the Act provides as follows:

(b) This provision, which was added by amendments of 1949 and 1961 to the Act, broadens child labor coverage to include employment in commerce. Moreover, it establishes a direct prohibition of the employment of oppressive child labor in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. The legislative history pertaining to this provision leads to the conclusion that Congress intend its application to be generally consistent with that of wage and hours coverage provisions. The application of the provision depends on the existence of two necessary elements: (1) The employment of “oppressive child labor” 24 by some employer and (2) the employment of such oppressive child labor in activities or enterprises which are in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the Act.

(a) The term “employ” is broadly defined in section 3(g) of the Act to include “to suffer or permit to work.” The Act expressly provides that the term “employer” includes “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee”. The nature of an employer-employee relationship is ordinarily to be determined not solely on the basis of the contractual relationship between the parties but also in the light of all the facts and circumstances. Moreover, the terms “employer” and “employ” as used in the Act are broader than the common-law concept of employment and must be interpreted broadly in the light of the mischief to be corrected. Thus, neither the technical relationship between the parties nor the fact that the minor is unsupervised or receives no compensation is controlling in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists for purposes of section 12(c) of the Act. However, these are matters which should be considered along with all other facts and circumstances surrounding the relationship of the parties in arriving at such determination. The words “suffer or permit to work” include those who suffer by a failure to hinder and those who permit by acquiescence in addition to those who employ by oral or written contract. A typical illustration of employment of oppressive child labor by suffering or permitting an under-aged minor to work is that of an employer who knows that his employee is utilizing the services of such a minor as a helper or substitute in performing his employer's work. If the employer acquiesces in the practice or fails to exercise his power to hinder it, he is himself suffering or permitting the helper to work and is, therefore, employing him, within the meaning of the Act. Where employment does exist within the meaning of the Act, it must, of course, be in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce or in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce in order for section 12(c) to be applicable.

(b) As previously indicated, the scope of coverage of section 12(c) of the Act is, in general, coextensive with that of the wage and hours provisions. The basis for this conclusion is provided by the similarity in the language used in the respective provisions and by statements appearing in the legislative history concerning the intended effect of the addition of section 12(c). Accordingly, it may be generally stated that employees considered to be within the scope of the phrases “in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” for purposes of the wage and hours provisions are also included within the identical phrases used in section 12(c). To avoid needless repetition, reference is herein made to the full discussion of principles relating to the general coverage of the wage and hours provisions contained in parts 776 and 779 of this chapter. In this connection, however, it should be borne in mind that lack of coverage under the wage and hours provisions or under section 12(c) does not necessarily preclude the applicability of section 12(a) of the Act. 26

It should be noted that section 12(a) does not directly outlaw the employment of oppressive child labor. Instead, it prohibits the shipment or delivery for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce of goods produced in an establishment where oppressive child labor has been employed within 30 days before removal of the goods. Section 12(c), on the other hand, is a direct prohibition against the employment of oppressive child labor in commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce. Moreover, the two subsections provide different methods for determining the employees who are covered thereby. Thus, subsection (a) may be said to apply to young workers on an “establishment” basis. If the standards for child labor are not observed in the employment of minors in or about an establishment where goods are produced and from which such goods are removed within the statutory 30-day period, it becomes unlawful for any producer, manufacturer, or dealer (other than an innocent purchaser who is in compliance with the requirements for a good faith defense as provided in the subsection) to ship or deliver those goods for shipment in commerce. It is not necessary for the minor himself to have been employed by the producer of such goods or in their production in order for the ban to apply. On the other hand, whether the employment of a particular minor below the applicable age standard will subject his employer to the prohibition of subsection (c) is dependent upon the minor himself being employed in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the Act. If such a minor is so employed by his employer and is not specifically exempt from the child labor provisions then his employment under such circumstances constitutes a violation of section 12(c) regardless of where he may be employed or what his employer may do. Moreover, a violation of section 12(c) occurs under the foregoing circumstances without regard to whether there is a “removal” of goods or a shipment or delivery for shipment in commerce.

The child labor coverage provisions contained in sections 12(a) and 12(c) of the Act may be jointly applicable in certain situations. For example, a manufacturer of women's dresses who ships them in interstate commerce, employs a minor under 16 years of age who gathers and bundles scraps of material in the cutting room of the plant. Since the employment of the minor under such circumstances constitutes oppressive child labor and involves the production of goods for commerce, the direct prohibition of section 12(c) is applicable to the case. In addition, section 12(a) also applies to the manufacturer if the dresses are removed from the establishment during the course of the minor's employment or within 30 days thereafter. To illustrate further, suppose that a transportation company employs a 17-year-old boy as helper on a truck used for hauling materials between railroads and the plants of its customers who are engaged in producing goods for shipment in commerce. The employment of the minor as helper on a truck is oppressive child labor because such occupation has been declared particularly hazardous by the Secretary for children between 16 and 18 years of age. Since his occupation involves the transportation of goods which are moving in interstate commerce, his employment in such occupation by the transportation company is, therefore, directly prohibited by the terms of section 12(c). If the minor's duties in this case should, for example, include loading and unloading the truck at the establishments of the customers of his employer, then the provisions of section 12(a) might be applicable with respect to such customers. This would be true where any goods which they produce and ship in commerce are removed from the producing establishment within 30 days after the minor's employment there.

There are situations where section 12(c) does not apply because the minor himself is not considered employed in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. This does not exclude the possibility of coverage under the provisions of section 12(a), however. In those cases where oppressive child labor is employed in commerce but not in or about a producing establishment, coverage exists under section 12(c) but not under the provisions of section 12(a). The employment of telegraph messengers under 16 years of age would normally involve this type of situation. 27 There may also be cases where oppressive child labor is employed in occupations closely related and directly essential to the production of goods in a separate establishment and therefore covered by section 12(c) but due to the fact that none of the goods produced in the establishment where the minors work are ever shipped or delivered for shipment in commerce either in the same form or as a part or ingredient of other goods, coverage of section 12(a) is lacking. An illustration of this type of situation would be the employment of a minor under the applicable age minimum in a plant engaged in the production of electricity which is sold and consumed exclusively within the same State and some of which is used by establishments in the production of goods for commerce.

(a) Section 3(1) of the Act defines “oppressive child labor” as follows:

(b) It will be noted that the term includes generally the employment of young workers under the age of 16 years in any occupation. In addition, the term includes employment of minors 16 and 17 years of age by an employer in any occupation which the Secretary finds and declares to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children of such ages or detrimental to their health or well-being. Authority is also given the Secretary to issue orders or regulations permitting the employment of children 14 and 15 years of age in nonmanufacturing and nonmining occupations where he determines that such employment is confined to periods which will not interfere with their schooling and to conditions which will not interfere with their health and well-being. The subsection further provides for the issuance of age certificates pursuant to regulations of the Secretary which will protect an employer from unwitting employment of oppressive child labor.

The Act sets a 16-year-age minimum for employment in manufacturing or mining occupations, although under FLSA section 13(c)(7), certain youth between the ages of 14 and 18 may, under specific conditions, be employed inside and outside of places of business that use power-driven machinery to process wood products. Furthermore, the 16-year-age minimum for employment is applicable to employment in all other occupations unless otherwise provided by regulation or order issued by the Secretary.

With respect to employment in occupations other than manufacturing and mining and in accordance with the provisions of FLSA section 13(c)(7), the Secretary is authorized to issue regulations or orders lowering the age minimum to 14 years where he or she finds that such employment is confined to periods that will not interfere with the minors' schooling and to conditions that will not interfere with their health and well-being. Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary has detailed in § 570.34 all those occupations in which 14- and 15-year-olds may be employed when the work is performed outside school hours and is confined to other specified limits. The Secretary, in order to provide clarity and assist employers in attaining compliance, has listed in § 570.33 certain prohibited occupations that, over the years, have been the frequent subject of questions or violations. The list of occupations in § 570.33 is not exhaustive. The Secretary has also set forth, in § 570.35, additional conditions that limit the periods during which 14- and 15-year-olds may be employed. The employment of minors under 14 years of age is not permissible under any circumstances if the employment is covered by the child labor provisions and not specifically exempt.

To protect young workers from hazardous employment, the FLSA provides for a minimum age of 18 years in occupations found and declared by the Secretary to be particularly hazardous or detrimental to the health or well-being for minors 16 and 17 years of age. Hazardous occupations orders are the means through which occupations are declared to be particularly hazardous for minors. Since 1995, the promulgation and amendment of the hazardous occupations orders have been effectuated under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. The effect of these orders is to raise the minimum age for employment to 18 years in the occupations covered. Seventeen orders, published in subpart E of this part, have thus far been issued under the FLSA and are now in effect.

(a) To protect an employer from unwitting violation of the minimum age standards, it is provided in section 3(1)(2) of the Act that “oppressive child labor shall not be deemed to exist by virtue of the employment in any occupation of any person with respect to whom the employer shall have on file an unexpired certificate issued and held pursuant to regulations of the Secretary of Labor certifying that such person is above the oppressive child labor age.” An age certificate is a statement of a minor's age issued under regulations of the Secretary (Child Labor Regulation No. 1), 31 based on the best available documentary evidence of age, and carrying the signatures of the minor and the issuing officer. Its purpose is to furnish an employer with reliable proof of the age of a minor employee in order that he may, as specifically provided by the act, protect himself against unintentional violation of the child labor provisions. Pursuant to the regulations of the Secretary, State employment or age certificates are accepted as proof of age in 45 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and Federal certificates of age in Idaho, Mississippi, South Carolina and Texas. If there is a possibility that the minor whom he intends to employ is below the applicable age minimum for the occupation in which he is to be employed, the employer should obtain an age certificate for him.

(b) It should be noted that the age certificate furnishes protection to the employer as provided by the act only if it shows the minor to be above the minimum age applicable thereunder to the occupation in which he is employed. Thus, a State certificate which shows a minor's age to be above the minimum required by State law for the occupation in which he is employed does not protect his employer for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act unless the age shown on such certificate is also above the minimum provided under that act for such occupation.

(a) Specific exemptions from the child labor requirements of the Act are provided for:

(1) Employment of children in agriculture outside of school hours for the school district where they live while so employed;

(2) Employment of employees engaged in the delivery of newspapers to the consumer;

(3) Employment of children as actors or performers in motion pictures or in theatrical, radio, or television productions;

(4) Employment by a parent or a person standing in a parent's place of his own child or a child in his custody under the age of sixteen years in any occupation other than manufacturing, mining, or an occupation found by the Secretary to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years or detrimental to their health or well-being.

(5) Employment of homeworkers engaged in the making of evergreen wreaths, including the harvesting of the evergreens or other forest products used in making such wreaths.

(6) Employment of 16- and 17-year-olds to load, but not operate or unload, certain scrap paper balers and paper box compactors under specified conditions.

(7) Employment of 17-year-olds to perform limited driving of cars and trucks during daylight hours under specified conditions.

(8) Employment of youths between the ages of 14 and 18 years who, by statute or judicial order, are excused from compulsory school attendance beyond the eighth grade, under specified conditions, in places of business that use power-driven machinery to process wood products.

(b) When interpreting these provisions, the Secretary will be guided by the principle that such exemptions should be narrowly construed and their application limited to those employees who are plainly and unmistakably within their terms. Thus, the fact that a child's occupation involves the performance of work which is considered exempt from the child labor provisions will not relieve his employer from the requirements of section 12(c) or the producer, manufacturer, or dealer from the requirements of section 12(a) if, during the course of his employment, the child spends any part of his time doing work which is covered but not so exempt.

(a) Section 13(c) of the Act provides an exemption from the child labor provisions for “any employee employed in agriculture outside of school hours for the school district where such employee is living while he is so employed.” This is the only exemption from the child labor provisions relating to agriculture or the products of agriculture. The various agricultural exemptions provided by sections 7(b)(3), 7(c), 13(a)(6), 13(a)(10) and 13(b)(5) from all or part of the minimum wage and overtime pay requirements are not applicable to the child labor provisions. This exemption, it will be noted, is limited to periods outside of school hours in contrast to the complete exemption for employment in “agriculture” under the wage and hours provisions. Under the original act, the exemption became operative whenever the applicable State law did not require the minor to attend school. The legislative history clearly indicates that in amending this provision, Congress sought to establish a clearer and simpler test for permissive employment which could be applied without the necessity of exploring State legal requirements regarding school attendance in the particular State. It recognized that the original provision fell short of achieving the objective of permitting agricultural work only so long as it did not infringe upon the opportunity of children for education. By recasting the exemption on an “outside of school hours” basis, Congress intended to provide a test which could be more effectively applied toward carrying out this purpose.

(b) The applicability of the exemption to employment in agriculture as defined in section 3(f) 32 of the Act depends in general upon whether such employment conflict with school hours for the locality where the child lives. Since the phrase “school hours” is not defined in the Act, it must be given the meaning that it has in ordinary speech. Moreover, it will be noted that the statute speaks of school hours “for the school district” rather than for the individual child. Thus, the provision does not depend for its application upon the individual student's requirements for attendance at school. For example, if an individual student is excused from his studies for a day or a part of a day by the superintendent or the school board, the exemption would not apply if school was in session then. “Outside of school hours” generally may be said to refer to such periods as before or after school hours, holidays, summer vacation, Sundays, or any other days on which the school for the district in which the minor lives does not assemble. Since “school hours for the school district” do not apply to minors who have graduated from high school, the entire year would be considered “outside of school hours” and, therefore, their employment in agriculture would be permitted at any time. While it is the position of the Department that a minor who leaves one district where schools are closed and who moves into and lives in another district where schools are in session may not work during the hours that schools are in session in the new district, it will not be asserted that this position prevents the employment of a minor in a district where schools are in session, if the school last attended by the minor has closed for summer vacation. As a reasonable precaution, however, no employer should employ a child under such circumstances before May 15, and after that date he should do so only if he is shown by the minor satisfactory evidence in the form of a written statement signed by a school official stating that the school with which he is connected is the one last attended by the minor and that the school is closed for summer vacation. Such statement should contain the minor's name, the name and address of the school, the date the school closed for the current year, the date the statement was signed, and the title of the school official signing the statement.

(c) Attention is directed to the fact that by virtue of the parental exemption provided in section 3(1) of the Act, children under 16 years of age are permitted to work, for their parents on their parents' farms at any time provided they are not employed in a manufacturing or mining occupation.

(d) The orders (subpart E of this part) declaring certain occupations to be particularly hazardous for the employment of minors between 16 and 18 years of age or detrimental to their health or well-being do not apply to employment in agriculture, pending study as to the hazardous or detrimental nature of occupations in agriculture. 33

Section 13(d) of the Act provides an exemption from the child labor as well as the wage and hours provisions for employees engaged in the delivery of newspapers to the consumer. This provision applies to carriers engaged in making deliveries to the homes of subscribers or other consumers of newspapers (including shopping news). It also includes employees engaged in the street sale or delivery of newspapers to the consumer. However, employees engaged in hauling newspapers to drop stations, distributing centers, newsstands, etc., do not come within the exemption because they do not deliver to the consumer.

Section 13(c) of the Act provides an exemption from the child labor provisions for “any child employed as an actor or performer in motion pictures or theatrical productions, or in radio or television productions.” The term “performer” used in this provision is obviously more inclusive than the term “actor.” In regulations issued pursuant to section 7(d)(3) of the Act, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division has defined a “performer” on radio and television programs for purposes of that section. 34 The Secretary will follow this definition in determining whether a child is employed as a “* * * performer * * * in radio or television productions” for purposes of this exemption. Moreover, in many situations the definition will be helpful in determining whether a child qualifies as a “* * * performer in motion pictures or theatrical productions * * *” within the meaning of the exemption.

By the parenthetical phrase included in section 3(l)(1) of the Act, a parent or a person standing in place of a parent may employ his own child or a child in his custody under the age of 16 years in any occupation other than the following: (a) Manufacturing; (b) mining; (c) an occupation found by the Secretary to be particularly hazardous or detrimental to health or well-being for children between the ages of 16 and 18 years. This exemption may apply only in those cases where the child is exclusively employed by his parent or a person standing in his parents' place. Thus, where a child assists his father in performing work for the latter's employer and the child is considered to be employed both by his father and his father's employer, the parental exemption would not be applicable. The words “parent” or a “person standing in place of a parent” include natural parents, or any other person, where the relationship between that person and a child is such that the person may be said to stand in place of a parent. For example, one who takes a child into his home and treats it as a member of his own family, educating and supporting the child as if it were his own, is generally said to stand to the child in place of a parent. It should further be noted that occupations found by the Secretary to be hazardous or detrimental to health or well-being for children between 16 and 18 years of age, as well as manufacturing and mining occupations, are specifically excluded from the scope of the exemption.

FLSA section 13(d) provides an exemption from the child labor provisions, as well as the minimum wage and overtime provisions, for homeworkers engaged in the making of wreaths composed principally of natural holly, pine, cedar, or other evergreens (including the harvesting of the evergreens or other forest products used in making such wreaths).

(a) Section 13(c)(5) of the FLSA provides for an exemption from the child labor provisions for the employment of 16- and 17-year-olds to load, but not operate or unload, certain power-driven scrap paper balers and paper box compactors under certain conditions. The provisions of this exemption, which are contained in HO 12 (§ 570.63) include that the scrap paper baler or compactor meet an applicable standard established by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and identified in the statute, or a more recent ANSI standard that the Secretary of Labor has found, incorporated by reference (see § 570.63), and declared to be as protective of the safety of young workers as the ANSI standard named in the statute.

(b) These standards have been incorporated into these regulations by reference by the Federal Register as discussed in § 570.63. In addition, the scrap paper baler or paper box compactor must include an on-off switch incorporating a key-lock or other system and the control of the system must be maintained in the custody of employees who are at least 18 years of age. The on-off switch of the scrap paper baler or paper box compactor must be maintained in an off position when the machine is not in operation. Furthermore, the employer must also post a notice on the scrap paper baler or paper box compactor that conveys certain information, including the identification of the applicable ANSI standard that the equipment meets, that 16- and 17-year-old employees may only load the scrap paper baler or paper box compactor, and that no employee under the age of 18 may operate or unload the scrap paper baler or paper box compactor.

Section 13(c)(6) of the FLSA provides an exemption for 17-year-olds, but not 16-year-olds, who, as part of their employment, perform the occasional and incidental driving of automobiles and trucks on public highways under specified conditions. These specific conditions, which are contained in HO 2 (§ 570.52), include that the automobile or truck may not exceed 6,000 pounds gross vehicle weight, the driving must be restricted to daylight hours, the vehicle must be equipped with a seat belt or similar restraining device for the driver and for any passengers, and the employer must instruct the employee that such belts or other devices must be used. In addition, the 17-year-old must hold a State license valid for the type of driving involved in the job, have successfully completed a State-approved driver education course, and have no records of any moving violations at the time of his or her hire. The exemption also prohibits the minor from performing any driving involving the towing of vehicles; route deliveries or route sales; the transportation for hire of property, goods, or passengers; urgent, time-sensitive deliveries; or the transporting of more than three passengers at any one time. The exemption also places limitations on the number of trips the 17-year-old may make each day and restricts the driving to a 30-mile radius of the minor's place of employment.

Section 13(c)(7) of the FLSA provides a limited exemption from the child labor provisions for certain youths between the ages of 14 and 18 years who, by statute or judicial order, are excused from compulsory school attendance beyond the eighth grade, that permits their employment inside and outside of places of business that use power-driven machinery to process wood products. The provisions of this exemption are contained in subpart C of this part (§ 570.34(m)) and HO 4 (§ 570.54). Although the exemption allows certain youths between the ages of 14 and 18 years to be employed inside and outside of places of business that use power-driven machines to process wood products, it does so only if such youths do not operate or assist in the operation of power-driven woodworking machines. The exemption also requires that the youth be supervised by an adult relative or by an adult member of the same religious sect as the youth. The youth must also be protected from wood particles or other flying debris within the workplace by a barrier appropriate to the potential hazard of such wood particles or flying debris or by maintaining a sufficient distance from machinery in operation. For the exemption to apply, the youth must also be required to use personal protective equipment to prevent exposure to excessive levels of noise and sawdust.

(a) Section 15(a)(4) of the Act makes any violation of the provisions of sections 12(a) or 12(c) unlawful. Any such unlawful act or practice may be enjoined by the United States District Courts under section 17 upon court action, filed by the Secretary pursuant to section 12(b) and, if willful will subject the offender to the criminal penalties provided in section 16(a) of the Act. Section 16(a) provides that any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of section 15 shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000, or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. No person shall be imprisoned under this subsection except for an offense committed after the conviction of such person for a prior offense under this subsection.

(b) In addition, FLSA section 16(e) states that any person who violates the provisions of FLSA sections 12 or 13(c), relating to child labor, or any regulations issued under those sections, shall be subject to a civil penalty, not to exceed:

(1) $15,629 for each employee who was the subject of such a violation; or

(2) $71,031 with regard to each such violation that causes the death or serious injury of any employee under the age of 18 years, which penalty may be doubled where the violation is repeated or willful.

(c) Part 579 of this chapter, Child Labor Violations—Civil Money Penalties, provides for the issuance of the notice of civil money penalties for any violation of FLSA sections 12 or 13(c) relating to child labor. Part 580 of this chapter, Civil Money Penalties—Procedures for Assessing and Contesting Penalties, describes the administrative process for assessment and resolution of the civil money penalties. When a civil money penalty is assessed against an employer for a child labor violation, the employer has the right, within 15 days after receipt of the notice of such penalty, to file an exception to the determination that the violation or violations occurred. When such an exception is filed with the office making the assessment, the matter is referred to the Chief Administrative Law Judge, and a formal hearing is scheduled. At such a hearing, the employer or an attorney retained by the employer may present such witnesses, introduce such evidence and establish such facts as the employer believes will support the exception. The determination of the amount of any civil money penalty becomes final if no exception is taken to the administrative assessment thereof, or if no exception is filed to the decision and order of the administrative law judge.

A provision is contained in section 12(a) of the Act relieving any purchaser from liability thereunder who ships or delivers for shipment in commerce goods which he acquired in good faith in reliance on written assurance from the producer, manufacturer, or dealer that the goods were produced in compliance with section 12, and which he acquired for value without notice of any violation. 36

Section 18 provides, in part, that “no provision of this act relating to the employment of child labor shall justify noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a higher standard than the standard established under this act.” The child labor requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, must be complied with as to the employment of minors within their general coverage and not excepted from their operation by special provision of the act itself regardless of any State, local, or other Federal law that may be applicable to the same employment. Furthermore, any administrative action pursuant to other laws, such as the issuance of a work permit to a minor or the referral by an employment agency of a minor to an employer does not necessarily relieve a person of liability under this act. Where such other legislation is applicable and does not contravene the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, however, nothing in the act, the regulations or the interpretations announced by the Secretary should be taken to override or nullify the provisions of these laws. Although compliance with other applicable legislation does not constitute compliance with the act unless the requirements of the act are thereby met, compliance with the act, on the other hand, does not relieve any person of liability under other laws that establish higher child labor standards than those prescribed by or pursuant to the act. Moreover, such laws, if at all applicable, continue to apply to the employment of all minors who either are not within the general coverage of the child labor provisions of the act or who are specifically excepted from their requirements.