Subpart A of this part 780, this subpart B and subparts C, D, and E of this part together constitute the official interpretative bulletin of the Department of Labor with respect to the meaning and application of sections 3(f), 13(a)(6), and 13(b)(12) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended. Section 3(f) defines “agriculture” as the term is used in the Act. Section 13(a)(6) provides exemption from the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the Act for certain employees employed in “agriculture,” as so defined. Section 13(b)(12) provides an overtime exemption for any employee employed in agriculture. As appears more fully in subpart A of this part 780, interpretations in this bulletin with respect to the provisions of the Act discussed are official interpretations upon which reliance may be placed and which will guide the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator in the performance of their duties under the Act.

Section 3(f) defines “agriculture” as this term is used in the Act. Those principles and rules which govern the interpretation of the meaning and application of the Act's definition of “agriculture” in section 3(f) and of the terms used in it are set forth in this subpart B. Included is a discussion of the application of the definition in section 3(f) to the employees of farmers' cooperative associations. In addition, the official interpretations of section 3(f) of the Act and the terms which appear in it are to be taken into consideration in determining the meaning intended by the use of like terms in particular related exemptions which are provided by the Act.

Section 6(a)(5) of the Act provides that any employee employed in agriculture must be paid at least $1.30 an hour beginning February 1, 1969. However, there are certain exemptions provided in the Act for agricultural workers, as previously mentioned. (See §§ 780.3 and 780.4.)

Section 3(f) of the Act defines “agriculture” as follows:

The effect of modern specialization on agriculture has been discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows:

(a) Section 3(f) of the Act contains a very comprehensive definition of the term “agriculture.” The definition has two distinct branches (see Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755). One has relation to the primary meaning of agriculture; the other gives to the term a somewhat broader secondary meaning for purposes of the Act (NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714).

(b) First, there is the primary meaning. This includes farming in all its branches. Listed as being included “among other things” in the primary meaning are certain specific farming operations such as cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying the production, cultivation, growing and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodities and the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals or poultry. If an employee is employed in any of these activities, he is engaged in agriculture regardless of whether he is employed by a farmer or on a farm. (Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, supra; Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398.)

(c) Then there is the secondary meaning of the term. The second branch includes operations other than those which fall within the primary meaning of the term. It includes any practices, whether or not they are themselves farming practices, which are performed either by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with “such” farming operations (Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, supra; NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714; Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254).

(d) Employment not within the scope of either the primary or the secondary meaning of “agriculture” as defined in section 3(f) is not employment in agriculture. In other words, employees not employed in farming or by a farmer or on a farm are not employed in agriculture.

When an employee is engaged in direct farming operations included in the primary definition of “agriculture,” the purpose of the employer in performing the operations is immaterial. For example, where an employer owns a factory and a farm and operates the farm only for experimental purposes in connection with the factory, those employees who devote all their time during a particular workweek to the direct farming operations, such as the growing and harvesting of agricultural commodities, are considered as employed in agriculture. It is also immaterial whether the agricultural or horticultural commodities are grown in enclosed houses, as in greenhouses or mushroom cellars, or in an open field. Similarly, the mere fact that production takes place in a city or on industrial premises, such as in hatcheries, rather than in the country or on premises possessing the normal characteristics of a farm makes no difference (see Jordan v. Stark Brothers Nurseries, 45 F. Supp. 769; Miller Hatcheries v. Boyer, 131 F. 2d 283; Damutz v. Pinchbeck, 158 F. 2d 882).

The language “farming in all its branches” includes all activities, whether listed in the definition or not, which constitute farming or a branch thereof under the facts and circumstances.

Section 3(f), in defining the practices included as “agriculture” in its statutory secondary meaning, refers to the activities specifically listed in the earlier portion of the definition (the “primary” meaning) as “farming” operations. They may therefore be considered as illustrative of “farming in all its branches” as used in the definition.

Unlike the specifically enumerated operations, the phrase “farming in all its branches” does not clearly indicate its scope. In determining whether an operation constitutes “farming in all its branches,” it may be necessary to consider various circumstances such as the nature and purpose of the operations of the employer, the character of the place where the employee performs his duties, the general types of activities there conducted, and the purpose and function of such activities with respect to the operations carried on by the employer. The determination may involve a consideration of the principles contained in § 780.104. For example, fish farming activities fall within the scope of the meaning of “farming in all its branches” and employers engaged in such operations would be employed in agriculture. On the other hand, so-called “bird dog” operations of the citrus fruit industry consisting of the purchase of fruit unsuitable for packing and of the transportation and sale of the fruit to canning plants do not qualify as “farming” and, consequently, employees engaged in such operations are not employed in agriculture. (See Chapman v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 360 cert. denied 348 U.S. 897; Fort Mason Fruit Co. v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 363 cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897.) However, employees gathering the fruit at the groves are considered agricultural workers because they are engaged in harvesting operations. (For exempt transportation, see subpart J of this part.)

“Cultivation and tillage of the soil” includes all the operations necessary to prepare a suitable seedbed, eliminate weed growth, and improve the physical condition of the soil. Thus, grading or leveling land or removing rock or other matter to prepare the ground for a proper seedbed or building terraces on farmland to check soil erosion are included. The application of water, fertilizer, or limestone to farmland is also included. (See in this connection §§ 780.128 et seq. Also see Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755.) Other operations such as the commercial production and distribution of fertilizer are not included within the scope of agriculture. (McComb v. Super-A Fertilizer Works, 165 F. 2d 824; Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755.)

“Dairying” includes the work of caring for and milking cows or goats. It also includes putting the milk in containers, cooling it, and storing it where done on the farm. The handling of milk and cream at receiving stations is not included. Such operations as separating cream from milk, bottling milk and cream, or making butter and cheese may be considered as “dairying” under some circumstances, or they may be considered practices under the “secondary” meaning of the definition when performed by a farmer or on a farm, if they are not performed on milk produced by other farmers or produced on other farms. (See the discussions in §§ 780.128 et seq.)

Section 3(f) of the Act defines as “agriculture” the “production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting” of “agricultural or horticultural commodities,” and employees employed in such operations are engaged in agriculture. In general, within the meaning of the Act, “agricultural or horticultural commodities” refers to commodities resulting from the application of agricultural or horticultural techniques. Insofar as the term refers to products of the soil, it means commodities that are planted and cultivated by man. Among such commodities are the following: Grains, forage crops, fruits, vegetables, nuts, sugar crops, fiber crops, tobacco, and nursery products. Thus, employees engaged in growing wheat, corn, hay, onions, carrots, sugar cane, seed, or any other agricultural or horticultural commodity are engaged in “agriculture.” In addition to such products of the soil, however, the term includes domesticated animals and some of their products such as milk, wool, eggs, and honey. The term does not include commodities produced by industrial techniques, by exploitation of mineral wealth or other natural resources, or by uncultivated natural growth. For example, peat humus or peat moss is not an agricultural commodity. Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat Humus Co., 373 f(2d) 209 (C.A.4).

Seeds and seedlings of agricultural and horticultural plants are considered “agricultural or horticultural commodities.” Thus, since mushrooms and beans are considered “agricultural or horticultural commodities,” the spawn of mushrooms and bean sprouts are also so considered and the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of mushroom spawn or bean sprouts is “agriculture” within the meaning of section 3(f).

Employees engaged in the gathering or harvesting of wild commodities such as mosses, wild rice, burls and laurel plants, the trapping of wild animals, or the appropriation of minerals and other uncultivated products from the soil are not employed in “the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of agricultural or horticultural commodities.” However, the fact that plants or other commodities actually cultivated by men are of a species which ordinarily grows wild without being cultivated does not preclude them from being classed as “agricultural or horticultural commodities.” Transplanted branches which were cut from plants growing wild in the field or forest are included within the term. Cultivated blueberries are also included.

Trees grown in forests and the lumber derived therefrom are not “agricultural or horticultural commodities.” Christmas trees, whether wild or planted, are also not so considered. It follows that employment in the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of such trees or timber products is not sufficient to bring an employee within section 3(f) unless the operation is performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with his or its farming operations. On the latter point, see §§ 780.160 through 780.164 which discuss the question of when forestry or lumbering operations are incident to or in conjunction with farming operations so as to constitute “agriculture.” For a discussion of the exemption in section 13(a)(13) of the Act for certain forestry and logging operations in which not more than eight employees are employed, see part 788 of this chapter.

(a) Section 3(f) expressly provides that the term “agricultural or horticultural commodities” shall include the commodities defined as agricultural commodities in section 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1141-1141j). Section 15(g) of that Act provides: “As used in this act, the term ‘agricultural commodity’ includes, in addition to other agricultural commodities, crude gum (oleoresin) from a living tree, and the following products as processed by the original producers of the crude gum (oleoresin) from which derived: Gum spirits of turpentine, and gum resin, as defined in the Naval Stores Act, approved March 3, 1923” (7 U.S.C. 91-99). As defined in the Naval Stores Act, “ ‘gum spirits of turpentine’ means spirits of turpentine made from gum (oleoresin) from a living tree” and “ ‘gum rosin’ means rosin remaining after the distillation of gum spirits of turpentine.” The production of these commodities is therefore within the definition of “agriculture.”

(b) Since the only oleoresin included within section 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act is that derived from a living tree, the production of oleoresin from stumps or any sources other than living trees is not within section 3(f). If turpentine or rosin is produced in any manner other than the processing of crude gum from living trees, as by digging up pine stumps and grinding them or by distilling the turpentine with steam from the oleoresin within or extracted from the wood, the production of the turpentine or rosin is not included in section 3(f).

(c) Similarly, the production of gum turpentine or gum rosin is not included when these are produced by anyone other than the original producer of the crude gum from which they are derived. Thus, if a producer of turpentine or rosin from oleoresin from living trees makes such products not only from oleoresin produced by him but also from oleoresin delivered to him by others, he is not producing a product defined as an agricultural commodity and employees engaged in his production operations are not agricultural employees. (For an explanation of the inclusion of the word “production” in section 3(f), see § 780.117(b).) It is to be noted, however, that the production of gum turpentine and gum rosin from crude gum (oleoresin) derived from a living tree is included within section 3(f) when performed at a central still for and on account of the producer of the crude gum. But where central stills buy the crude gum they process and are the owners of the gum turpentine and gum rosin that are derived from such crude gum and which they market for their own account, the production of such gum turpentine and gum rosin is not within section 3(f).

(a) The words “production, cultivation, growing” describe actual raising operations which are normally intended or expected to produce specific agricultural or horticultural commodities. The raising of such commodities is included even though done for purely experimental purposes. The “growing” may take place in growing media other than soil as in the case of hydroponics. The words do not include operations undertaken or conducted for purposes not concerned with obtaining any specific agricultural or horticultural commodity. Thus operations which are merely preliminary, preparatory or incidental to the operations whereby such commodities are actually produced are not within the terms “production, cultivation, growing”. For example, employees of a processor of vegetables who are engaged in buying vegetable plants and distributing them to farmers with whom their employer has acreage contracts are not engaged in the “production, cultivation, growing” of agricultural or horticultural commodities. The furnishing of mushroom spawn by a canner of mushrooms to growers who supply the canner with mushrooms grown from such spawn does not constitute the “growing” of mushrooms. Similarly, employees of the employer who is engaged in servicing insecticide sprayers in the farmer's orchard and employees engaged in such operations as the testing of soil or genetics research are not included within the terms. (However, see §§ 780.128, et seq., for possible exemption on other grounds.) The word “production,” used in conjunction with “cultivation, growing, and harvesting,” refers, in its natural and unstrained meaning, to what is derived and produced from the soil, such as any farm produce. Thus, “production” as used in section 3(f) does not refer to such operations as the grinding and processing of sugarcane, the milling of wheat into flour, or the making of cider from apples. These operations are clearly the processing of the agricultural commodities and not the production of them (Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11).

(b) The word “production” was added to the definition of “agriculture” in order to take care of a special situation—the production of turpentine and gum rosins by a process involving the tapping of living trees. (See S. Rep. No. 230, 71st Cong., second sess. (1930); H.R. Rep. No. 2738, 75th Cong., third sess. p. 29 (1938).) To insure the inclusion of this process within the definition, the word “production” was added to section 3(f) in conjunction with the words “including commodities defined as agricultural commodities in section 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, as amended” (Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11). It is clear, therefore, that “production” is not used in section 3(f) in the artificial and special sense in which it is defined in section 3(j). It does not exempt an employee merely because he is engaged in a closely related process or occupation directly essential to the production of agricultural or horticultural commodities. To so construe the term would render unnecessary the remainder of what Congress clearly intended to be a very elaborate and comprehensive definition of “agriculture.” The legislative history of this part of the definition was considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in reaching these conclusions in Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755.

(a) The term “Harvesting” as used in section 3(f) includes all operations customarily performed in connection with the removal of the crops by the farmer from their growing position (Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398; NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714). Examples include the cutting of grain, the picking of fruit, the stripping of bluegrass seed, and the digging up of shrubs and trees grown in a nursery. Employees engaged on a plantation in gathering sugarcane as soon as it has been cut, loading it, and transporting the cane to a concentration point on the farm are engaged in “Harvesting” (Vives v. Serralles, 145 F. 2d 552).

(b) The combining of grain is exempt either as harvesting or as a practice performed on a farm in conjunction with or as an incident to farming operations. (See in this connection Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398.) “Harvesting” does not extend to operations subsequent to and unconnected with the actual process whereby agricultural or horticultural commodities are severed from their attachment to the soil or otherwise reduced to possession. For example, the processing of sugarcane into raw sugar (Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11, and see Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254), or the vining of peas are not included. For a further discussion on vining employees, see § 780.139. While transportation to a concentration point on the farm may be included, “harvesting” never extends to transportation or other operations off the farm. Off-the-farm transportation can only be “agriculture” when performed by the farmer as an incident to his farming operations (Chapman v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 360 cert. denied 348 U.S. 897; Fort Mason Fruit Co. v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 363 cert. denied 348 U.S. 897). For further discussion of this point, see §§ 780.144 through 780.147; §§ 780.152 through 780.157.

Employees are employed in the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals or poultry only if their operations relate to animals of the type named and constitute the “raising” of such animals. If these two requirements are met, it makes no difference for what purpose the animals are raised or where the operations are performed. For example, the fact that cattle are raised to obtain serum or virus or that chicks are hatched in a commercial hatchery does not affect the status of the operations under section 3(f).

The meaning of the term “livestock” as used in section 3(f) is confined to the ordinary use of the word and includes only domestic animals ordinarily raised or used on farms. That Congress did not use this term in its generic sense is supported by the specific enumeration of activities, such as the raising of fur-bearing animals, which would be included in the generic meaning of the word. The term includes the following animals, among others: Cattle (both dairy and beef cattle), sheep, swine, horses, mules, donkeys, and goats. It does not include such animals as albino and other rats, mice, guinea pigs, and hamsters, which are ordinarily used by laboratories for research purposes (Mitchell v. Maxfield, 12 WH Cases 792 (S.D. Ohio), 29 Labor Cases 68, 781). Fish are not “livestock” (Dunkly v. Erich, 158 F. 2d 1), but employees employed in propagating or farming of fish may qualify for exemption under section 13(a)(6) or 13(b)(12) of the Act as stated in § 780.109 as well as under section 13(a)(5), as explained in part 784 of this chapter.

The term “raising” employed with reference to livestock in section 3(f) includes such operations as the breeding, fattening, feeding, and general care of livestock. Thus, employees exclusively engaged in feeding and fattening livestock in stock pens where the livestock remains for a substantial period of time are engaged in the “raising” of livestock. The fact that the livestock is purchased to be fattened and is not bred on the premises does not characterize the fattening as something other than the “raising” of livestock. The feeding and care of livestock does not necessarily or under all circumstances constitute the “raising” of such livestock, however. It is clear, for example, that animals are not being “raised” in the pens of stockyards or the corrals of meat packing plants where they are confined for a period of a few days while en route to slaughter or pending their sale or shipment. Therefore, employees employed in these places in feeding and caring for the constantly changing group of animals cannot reasonably be regarded as “raising” livestock (NLRB v. Tovrea Packing Co., 111 F. 2d 626, cert. denied 311 U.S. 668; Walling v. Friend, 156 F. 2d 429). Employees of a cattle raisers' association engaged in the publication of a magazine about cattle, the detection of cattle thefts, the location of stolen cattle, and apprehension of cattle thieves are not employed in raising livestock and are not engaged in agriculture.

Employees engaged in the breeding, raising, and training of horses on farms for racing purposes are considered agricultural employees. Included are such employees as grooms, attendants, exercise boys, and watchmen employed at the breeding or training farm. On the other hand, employees engaged in the racing, training, and care of horses and other activities performed off the farm in connection with commercial racing are not employed in agriculture. For this purpose, a training track at a racetrack is not a farm. Where a farmer is engaged in both the raising and commercial racing of race horses, the activities performed off the farm by his employees as an incident to racing, such as the training and care of the horses, are not practices performed by the farmer in his capacity as a farmer or breeder as an incident to his raising operations. Employees engaged in the feeding, care, and training of horses which have been used in commercial racing and returned to a breeding or training farm for such care pending entry in subsequent races are employed in agriculture.

The term “raising of * * * bees” refers to all of those activities customarily performed in connection with the handling and keeping of bees, including the treatment of disease and the raising of queens.

(a) The term “fur-bearing animals” has reference to animals which bear fur of marketable value and includes, among other animals, rabbits, silver foxes, minks, squirrels, and muskrats. Animals whose fur lacks marketable value, such as albino and other rats, mice, guinea pigs, and hamsters, are not “fur-bearing animals” which within the meaning of section 3(f).

(b) The term “raising” of fur-bearing animals includes all those activities customarily performed in connection with breeding, feeding and caring for fur-bearing animals, including the treatment of disease. Such treatment of disease has reference only to disease of the animals being bred and does not refer to the use of such animals or their fur in experimenting with disease or treating diseases in others. The fact that muskrats or other fur-bearing animals are propagated in open water or marsh areas rather than in pens does not prevent the raising of such animals from constituting the “raising of fur-bearing animals.” Where wild fur-bearing animals propagate in their native habitat and are not raised as above described, the trapping or hunting of such animals and activities incidental thereto are not included within section 3(f).

(a) The term “poultry” includes domesticated fowl and game birds. Ducks and pigeons are included. Canaries and parakeets are not included.

(b) The “raising” of poultry includes the breeding, hatching, propagating, feeding, and general care of poultry. Slaughtering, which is the antithesis of “raising,” is not included. To constitute “agriculture,” slaughtering must come within the secondary meaning of the term “agriculture.” The temporary feeding and care of chickens and other poultry for a few days pending sale, shipment or slaughter is not the “raising” of poultry. However, feeding, fattening and caring for poultry over a substantial period may constitute the “raising” of poultry.

Feed dealers and processors sometimes enter into contractual arrangements with farmers under which the latter agree to raise to marketable size baby chicks supplied by the former who also undertake to furnish all the required feed and possibly additional items. Typically, the feed dealer or processor retains title to the chickens until they are sold. Under such an arrangement, the activities of the farmers and their employees in raising the poultry are clearly within section 3(f). The activities of the feed dealer or processor, on the other hand, are not “raising of poultry” and employees engaged in them cannot be considered agricultural employees on that ground. Employees of the feed dealer or processor who perform work on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with the raising of poultry on the farm are employed in “secondary” agriculture (see §§ 780.137 et seq. and Johnston v. Cotton Producers Assn., 244 F. 2d 553).

Hatchery operations incident to the breeding of poultry, whether performed in a rural or urban location, are the “raising of poultry” (Miller Hatcheries v. Boyer, 131 F. 2d 283). The application of section 3(f) to employees of hatcheries is further discussed in §§ 780.210 through 780.214.

The discussion in §§ 780.106 through 780.127 relates to the direct farming operations which come within the “primary” meaning of the definition of “agriculture.” As defined in section 3(f) “agriculture” includes not only the farming activities described in the “primary” meaning but also includes, in its “secondary” meaning, “any practices (including any forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for market delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market.” The legislative history makes it plain that this language was particularly included to make certain that independent contractors such as threshers of wheat, who travel around from farm to farm to assist farmers in what is recognized as a purely agricultural task and also to assist a farmer in getting his agricultural goods to market in their raw or natural state, should be included within the definition of agricultural employees (see Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11; 81 Cong. Rec. 7876, 7888).

To come within this secondary meaning, a practice must be performed either by a farmer or on a farm. It must also be performed either in connection with the farmer's own farming operations or in connection with farming operations conducted on the farm where the practice is performed. In addition, the practice must be performed “as an incident to or in conjunction with” the farming operations. No matter how closely related it may be to farming operations, a practice performed neither by a farmer nor on a farm is not within the scope of the “secondary” meaning of “agriculture.” Thus, employees employed by commission brokers in the typical activities conducted at their establishments, warehouse employees at the typical tobacco warehouses, shop employees of an employer engaged in the business of servicing machinery and equipment for farmers, plant employees of a company dealing in eggs or poultry produced by others, employees of an irrigation company engaged in the general distribution of water to farmers, and other employees similarly situated do not generally come within the secondary meaning of “agriculture.” The inclusion of industrial operations is not within the intent of the definition in section 3(f), nor are processes that are more akin to manufacturing than to agriculture (see Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11; Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d 52; Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398; Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254; Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473).

Among other things, a practice must be performed by a farmer or on a farm in order to come within the secondary portion of the definition of “agriculture.” No precise lines can be drawn which will serve to delimit the term “farmer” in all cases. Essentially, however, the term is an occupational title and the employer must be engaged in activities of a type and to the extent that the person ordinarily regarded as a “farmer” is engaged in order to qualify for the title. If this test is met, it is immaterial for what purpose he engages in farming or whether farming is his sole occupation. Thus, an employer's status as a “farmer” is not altered by the fact that his only purpose is to obtain products useful to him in a non-farming enterprise which he conducts. For example, an employer engaged in raising nursery stock is a “farmer” for purposes of section 3(f) even though his purpose is to supply goods for a separate establishment where he engages in the retail distribution of nursery products. The term “farmer” as used in section 3(f) is not confined to individual persons. Thus an association, a partnership, or a corporation which engages in actual farming operations may be a “farmer” (see Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473). This is so even where it operates “what might be called the agricultural analogue of the modern industrial assembly line” (Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254).

Generally, an employer must undertake farming operations of such scope and significance as to constitute a distinct activity, for the purpose of yielding a farm product, in order to be regarded as a “farmer.” It does not necessarily follow, however, that any employer is a “farmer” simply because he engages in some actual farming operations of the type specified in section 3(f). Thus, one who merely harvests a crop of agricultural commodities is not a “farmer” although his employees who actually do the harvesting are employed in “agriculture” in those weeks when exclusively so engaged. As a general rule, a farmer performs his farming operations on land owned, leased, or controlled by him and devoted to his own use. The mere fact, therefore, that an employer harvests a growing crop, even under a partnership agreement pursuant to which he provides credit, advisory or other services, is not generally considered to be sufficient to qualify the employer so engaged as a “farmer.” Such an employer would stand, in packing or handling the product, in the same relationship to the produce as if it were from the fields or groves of an independent grower. One who engaged merely in practices which are incidental to farming is not a “farmer.” For example, a company which merely prepares for market, sells, and ships flowers and plants grown and cultivated on farms by affiliated corporations is not a “farmer.” The fact that one has suspended actual farming operations during a period in which he performs only practices incidental to his part or prospective farming operations does not, however, preclude him from qualifying as a “farmer.” One otherwise qualified as a farmer does not lose his status as such because he performs farming operations on land which he does not own or control, as in the case of a cattleman using public lands for grazing.

“Farmer” includes the employees of a farmer. It does not include an employer merely because he employs a farmer or appoints a farmer as his agent to do the actual work. Thus, the stripping of tobacco, i.e., removing leaves from the stalk, by the employees of an independent warehouse is not a practice performed “by a farmer” even though the warehouse acts as agent for the tobacco farmer or employs the farmer in the stripping operations. One who merely performs services or supplies materials for farmers in return for compensation in money or farm products is not a “farmer.” Thus, a person who provides credit and management services to farmers cannot qualify as a “farmer” on that account. Neither can a repairman who repairs and services farm machinery qualify as a “farmer” on that basis. Where crops are grown under contract with a person who provides a market, contributes counsel and advice, make advances and otherwise assists the grower who actually produces the crop, it is the grower and not the person with whom he contracts who is the farmer with respect to that crop (Mitchell v. Huntsville Nurseries, 267 F. 2d 286).

(a) The phrase “by a farmer” covers practices performed either by the farmer himself or by the farmer through his employees. Employees of a farmers' cooperative association, however, are employed not by the individual farmers who compose its membership or who are its stockholders, but by the cooperative association itself. Cooperative associations whether in the corporate form or not, are distinct, separate entities from the farmers who own or compose them. The work performed by a farmers' cooperative association is not work performed “by a farmer” but for farmers. Therefore, employees of a farmers' cooperative association are not generally engaged in any practices performed “by a farmer” within the meaning of section 3(f) (Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755; Goldberg v. Crowley Ridge Ass'n., 295 F. 2d 7; McComb v. Puerto Rico Tobacco Marketing Co-op Ass'n., 80 F. Supp. 953, 181 F. 2d 697). The legislative history of the Act supports this interpretation. Statutes usually cite farmers' cooperative associations in express terms if it is intended that they be included. The omission of express language from the Fair Labor Standards Act is significant since many unsuccessful attempts were made on the floor of Congress to secure special treatment for such cooperatives.

(b) It is possible that some farmers' cooperative associations may themselves engage in actual farming operations to an extent and under circumstances sufficient to qualify as a “farmer.” In such case, any of their employees who perform practices as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations are employed in “agriculture.”

If a practice is not performed by a farmer, it must, among other things, be performed “on a farm” to come within the secondary meaning of “agriculture” in section 3(f). Any practice which cannot be performed on a farm, such as “delivery to market,” is necessarily excluded, therefore, when performed by someone other than a farmer (see Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755; Chapman v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 360, cert. denied 348 U.S. 897; Fort Mason Fruit Co. v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 363, cert. denied 348 U.S. 897). Thus, employees of an alfalfa dehydrator engaged in hauling chopped or unchopped alfalfa away from the farms to the dehydrating plant are not employed in a practice performed “on a farm.”

A “farm” is a tract of land devoted to the actual farming activities included in the first part of section 3(f). Thus, the gathering of wild plants in the woods for transplantation in a nursery is not an operation performed “on a farm.” (For a further discussion, see § 780.207.) The total area of a tract operated as a unit for farming purposes is included in the “farm,” irrespective of the fact that some of this area may not be utilized for actual farming operations (see NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714; In re Princeville Canning Co., 14 WH Cases 641 and 762). It is immaterial whether a farm is situated in the city or in the country. However, a place in a city where no primary farming operations are performed is not a farm even if operated by a farmer (Mitchell v. Huntsville Nurseries, 267 F. 2d 286).

Employees engaged in building terraces or threshing wheat and other grain, employees engaged in the erection of silos and granaries, employees engaged in digging wells or building dams for farm ponds, employees engaged in inspecting and culling flocks of poultry, and pilots and flagmen engaged in the aerial dusting and spraying of crops are examples of the types of employees of independent contractors who may be considered employed in practices performed “on a farm.” Whether such employees are engaged in “agriculture” depends, of course, on whether the practices are performed as an incident to or in conjunction with the farming operations on the particular farm, as discussed in §§ 780.141 through 780.147; that is, whether they are carried on as a part of the agricultural function or as a separately organized productive activity (§§ 780.104 through 780.144). Even though an employee may work on several farms during a workweek, he is regarded as employed “on a farm” for the entire workweek if his work on each farm pertains solely to farming operations on that farm. The fact that a minor and incidental part of the work of such an employee occurs off the farm will not affect this conclusion. Thus, an employee may spend a small amount of time within the workweek in transporting necessary equipment for work to be done on farms. Field employees of a canner or processor of farm products who work on farms during the planting and growing season where they supervise the planting operations and consult with the grower on problems of cultivation are employed in practices performed “on a farm” so long as such work is done entirely on farms save for an incidental amount of reporting to their employer's plant. Other employees of the above employers employed away from the farm would not come within section 3(f). For example, airport employees such as mechanics, loaders, and office workers employed by a crop dusting firm would not be agriculture employees (Wirtz v. Boyls dba Boyls Dusting and Spraying Service 230 F. Supp. 246, aff'd per curiam 352 F. 2d 63; Tobin v. Wenatchee Air Service, 10 WH Cases 680, 21 CCH Lab Cas. Paragraph 67,019 (E.D. Wash.)).

“Practices * * * performed by a farmer” must be performed as an incident to or in conjunction with “such farming operations” in order to constitute “agriculture” within the secondary meaning of the term. Practices performed by a farmer in connection with his nonfarming operations do not satisfy this requirement (see Calaf v. Gonzalez, 127 F. 2d 934; Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473). Furthermore, practices performed by a farmer can meet the above requirement only in the event that they are performed in connection with the farming operations of the same farmer who performs the practices. Thus, the requirement is not met with respect to employees engaged in any practices performed by their employer in connection with farming operations that are not his own (see Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755; Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F. 2d 913; NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714; Mitchell v. Huntsville Nurseries, 267 F. 2d 286; Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11). The processing by a farmer of commodities of other farmers, if incident to or in conjunction with farming operations, is incidental to or in conjunction with the farming operations of the other farmers and not incidental to or in conjunction with the farming operations of the farmer doing the processing (Mitchell v. Huntsville Nurseries, supra; Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, supra; Bowie v. Gonzalez, supra).

Some examples will serve to illustrate the above principles. Employees of a fruit grower who dry or pack fruit not grown by their employer are not within section (f). This is also true of storage operations conducted by a farmer in connection with products grown by someone other than the farmer. Employees of a grower-operator of a sugarcane mill who transport cane from fields to the mill are not within section 3(f), where such cane is grown by independent farmers on their land as well as by the mill operator (Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11). Employees of a tobacco grower who strip tobacco (i.e., remove the leaves from the stalk) are not agricultural employees when performing this operation on tobacco not grown by their employer. On the other hand, where a farmer rents some space in a warehouse or packinghouse located off the farm and the farmer's own employees there engage in handling or packing only his own products for market, such operations by the farmers are within section 3(f) if performed as an incident to or in conjunction with his farming operations. Such arrangements are distinguished from those where the employees are not actually employed by the farmer. The fact that a packing shed is conducted by a family partnership, packing products exclusively grown on lands owned and operated by individuals constituting the partnership, does not alter the status of the packing activity. Thus, if in a particular case an individual farmer is engaged in agriculture, a family partnership which performs the same operations would also be engaged in agriculture. (Dofflemeyer v. NLRB, 206 F. 2d 813.) However, an incorporated association of farmers that does not itself engage in farming operations is not engaged in agriculture though it processes at its packing shed produce grown exclusively by the farmer members of the association. (Goldberg v. Crowley Ridge and Fruit Growers Association, 295 F. 2d 7 (C.A. 8).)

Vining employees of a pea vinery located on a farm, who vine only the peas grown on that particular farm, are engaged in agriculture. If they also vine peas grown on other farms, such operations could not be within section 3(f) unless the farmer-employer owns or operates the other farms and vines his own peas exclusively. However, the work of vining station employees in weeks in which the stations vine only peas grown by a canner on farms owned or leased by him is considered part of the canning operations. As such, the cannery operations, including the vining operations, are within section 3(f) only if the canners can crops which he grows himself and if the canning operations are subordinate to the farming operations.

So long as the farming operations to which a farmer's practice pertains are performed by him in his capacity as a farmer, the status of the practice is not necessarily altered by the fact that the farming operations take place on more than one farm or by the fact that some of the operations are performed off his farm (NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714). Thus, where the practice is performed with respect to products of farming operations, the controlling consideration is whether the products were produced by the farming operations of the farmer who performs the practice rather than at what place or on whose land he produced them. Ordinarily, a practice performed by a farmer in connection with farming operations conducted on land which he owns or leases will be considered as performed in connection with the farming operations of such farmer in the absence of facts indicating that the farming operations are actually those of someone else. Conversely, a contrary conclusion will ordinarily be justified if such farmer is not the owner or a bona fide lessee of such land during the period when the farming operations take place. The question of whose farming operations are actually being conducted in cases where they are performed pursuant to an agreement or arrangement, not amounting to a bona fide lease, between the farmer who performs the practice and the landowner necessarily involves a careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrangement. Where commodities are grown on the farm of the actual grower under contract with another, practices performed by the latter on the commodities, off the farm where they were grown, relate to farming operations of the grower rather than to any farming operations of the contract purchaser. This is true even though the contract purports to lease the land to the latter, give him the title to the crop at all times, and confer on him the right to supervise the growing operations, where the facts as a whole show that the contract purchaser provides a farm market, cash advances, and advice and counsel but does not really perform growing operations (Mitchell v. Huntsville Nurseries, 267 F. 2d 286).

“Practices * * * performed * * * on a farm” must be performed as an incident to or in conjunction with “such farming operations” in order to constitute “agriculture” within the secondary meaning of the term. No practice performed with respect to farm commodities is within the language under discussion by reason of its performance on a farm unless all of such commodities are the products of that farm. Thus, the performance on a farm of any practice, such as packing or storing, which may be incidental to farming operations cannot constitute a basis for considering the employees engaged in agriculture if the practice is performed upon any commodities that have been produced elsewhere than on such farm (see Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F. 2d 913). The construction by an independent contractor of granary on a farm is not connected with “such” farming operations if the farmer for whom it is built intends to use the structure for storing grain produced on other farms. Nor is the requirement met with respect to employees engaged in any other practices performed on a farm, but not by a farmer, in connection with farming operations that are not conducted on that particular farm. The fact that such a practice pertains to farming operations generally or to those performed on a number of farms, rather than to those performed on the same farm only, is sufficient to take it outside the scope of the statutory language. Area soil surveys and genetics research activities, results of which are made available to a number of farmers, are typical of the practices to which this principle applies and which are not within section 3(f) under this provision.

Practices performed on a farm in connection with nonfarming operations performed on or off such farm do not meet the requirement stated in § 780.141. For example, if a farmer operates a gravel pit on his farm, none of the practices performed in connection with the operation of such gravel pit would be within section 3(f). Whether or not some practices are performed in connection with farming operations conducted on the farm where they are performed must be determined with reference to the purpose of the farmer for whom the practice is performed. Thus, land clearing operations may or may not be connected with such farming operations depending on whether or not the farmer intends to devote the cleared land to farm use.

The fact that a practice performed on a farm is not performed by or for the farmer is a strong indication that it is not performed in connection with the farming operations there conducted. Thus, where such an employer other than the farmer performs certain work on a farm solely for himself in furtherance of his own enterprise, the practice cannot ordinarily be regarded as performed in connection with farming operations conducted on the farm. For example, it is clear that the work of employees of a utility company in trimming and cutting trees for power and communications lines is part of a nonfarming enterprise outside the scope of agriculture. When a packer of vegetables or dehydrator of alfalfa buys the standing crop from the farmer, harvests it with his own crew of employees, and transports the harvested crop to his off-the-farm packing or dehydrating plant, the transporting and plant employees, who are not engaged in “primary” agriculture as are the harvesting employees (see NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714), are clearly not agricultural employees. Such an employer cannot automatically become an agricultural employer by merely transferring the plant operations to the farm so as to meet the “on a farm” requirement. His employees will continue outside the scope of agriculture if the packing or dehydrating is not in reality done for the farmer. The question of for whom the practices are performed is one of fact. In determining the question, however, the fact that prior to the performance of the packing or dehydrating operations, the farmer has relinquished title and divested himself of further responsibility with respect to the product, is highly significant.

In order for practices other than actual farming operations to constitute “agriculture” within the meaning of section 3(f) of the Act, it is not enough that they be performed by a farmer or on a farm in connection with the farming operations conducted by such farmer or on such farm, as explained in §§ 780.129 through 780.143. They must also be performed “as an incident to or in conjunction with” these farming operations. The line between practices that are and those that are not performed “as an incident to or in conjunction with” such farming operations is not susceptible of precise definition. Generally, a practice performed in connection with farming operations is within the statutory language only if it constitutes an established part of agriculture, is subordinate to the farming operations involved, and does not amount to an independent business. Industrial operations (Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398) and processes that are more akin to manufacturing than to agriculture (Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254; Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473) are not included. This is also true when on-the-farm practices are performed for a farmer. As to when practices may be regarded as performed for a farmer, see § 780.143.

The character of a practice as a part of the agricultural activity or as a distinct business activity must be determined by examination and evaluation of all the relevant facts and circumstances in the light of the pertinent language and intent of the Act. The result will not depend on any mechanical application of isolated factors or tests. Rather, the total situation will control (Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254; Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473). Due weight should be given to any available criteria which may indicate whether performance of such a practice may properly be considered an incident to farming within the intent of the Act. Thus, the general relationship, if any, of the practice to farming as evidenced by common understanding, competitive factors, and the prevalence of its performance by farmers (see § 780.146), and similar pertinent matters should be considered. Other factors to be considered in determining whether a practice may be properly regarded as incidental to or in conjunction with the farming operations of a particular farmer or farm include the size of the operations and respective sums invested in land, buildings and equipment for the regular farming operations and in plant and equipment for performance of the practice, the amount of the payroll for each type of work, the number of employees and the amount of time they spend in each of the activities, the extent to which the practice is performed by ordinary farm employees and the amount of interchange of employees between the operations, the amount of revenue derived from each activity, the degree of industrialization involved, and the degree of separation established between the activities. With respect to practices performed on farm products (see § 780.147) and in the consideration of any specific practices (see §§ 780.148-780.158 and 780.205-780.214), there may be special factors in addition to those above mentioned which may aid in the determination.

The inclusion of incidental practices in the definition of agriculture was not intended to include typical factory workers or industrial operations, and the sponsors of the bill made it clear that the erection and operation on a farm by a farmer of a factory, even one using raw materials which he grows, “would not make the manufacturing * * * a farming operation” (see 81 Cong. Rec. 7658; Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254). Accordingly, in determining whether a given practice is performed “as an incident to or in conjunction with” farming operations under the intended meaning of section 3(f), the nature of the practice and the circumstances under which it is performed must be considered in the light of the common understanding of what is agricultural and what is not, or the facts indicating whether performance of the practice is in competition with agricultural or with industrial operations, and of the extent to which such a practice is ordinarily performed by farmers incidentally to their farming operations (see Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11; Calaf v. Gonzalez, 127 F. 2d 934; Vives v. Seralles, 145 F. 2d 552; Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F. 2d 913; Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398; Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473; Maneja v. Waialua, supra). Such an inquiry would appear to have a direct bearing on whether a practice is an “established” part of agriculture. The fact that farmers raising a commodity on which a given practice is performed do not ordinarily perform such a practice has been considered a significant indication that the practice is not “agriculture” within the secondary meaning of section 3(f) (Mitchell v. Budd, supra; Maneja v. Waialua, supra). The test to be applied is not the proportion of those performing the practice who produce the commodities on which it is performed but the proportion of those producing such commodities who perform the practice (Maneja v. Waialua, supra). In Mitchell v. Budd, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the following two factors tipped the scales so as to take the employees of tobacco bulking plants outside the scope of agriculture: Tobacco farmers do not ordinarily perform the bulking operation; and, the bulking operation is a process which changes tobacco leaf in many ways and turns it into an industrial product.

In determining whether a practice performed on agricultural or horticultural commodities is incident to or in conjunction with the farming operations of a farmer or a farm, it is also necessary to consider the type of product resulting from the practice—as whether the raw or natural state of the commodity has been changed. Such a change may be a strong indication that the practice is not within the scope of agriculture (Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473); the view was expressed in the legislative debates on the Act that it marks the dividing line between processing as an agricultural function and processing as a manufacturing operation (Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254, citing 81 Cong. Rec. 7659-7660, 7877-7879). Consideration should also be given to the value added to the product as a result of the practice and whether a sales organization is maintained for the disposal of the product. Seasonality of the operations involved in the practice would not be very helpful as a test to distinguish between operations incident to agriculture and operations of commercial or industrial processors who handle a similar volume of the same seasonal crop. But the length of the period during which the practice is performed might cast some light on whether the operations are conducted as a part of agriculture or as a separate undertaking when considered together with the amount of investment, payroll, and other factors. In some cases, the fact that products resulting from the practice are sold under the producer's own label rather than under that of the purchaser may furnish an indication that the practice is conducted as a separate business activity rather than as a part of agriculture.

The language of section 3(f) of the Act, in defining the “secondary” meaning of “agriculture,” provides that any practices performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such (his or its) farming operations are within the definition. The practices which may be exempt as “agriculture” if so performed are stated to include forestry or lumbering operations, preparation for market, and delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market. The specification of these practices is illustrative rather than limiting in nature. The broad language of the definition clearly includes all practices thus performed and not merely those named (see Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254).

The specific practices named in section 3(f) must, like any others, be performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, for this condition applies to “any” practices brought within the secondary meaning of agriculture as defined in that section of the Act. Thus the preparation for market, by a farmer's employees on a farm of animals to be sold at a livestock auction is not within section 3(f) if animals from other farmers and other farms are also handled. The practice is not performed as an incident to or in conjunction with “such” farming operations, that is, the operations of the farmer by whom, or of the farm on which, the livestock is raised (Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F. 2d 913).

“Preparation for market” is also named as one of the practices which may be included in “agriculture.” The term includes the operations normally performed upon farm commodities to prepare them for the farmer's market. The farmer's market normally means the wholesaler, processor, or distributing agency to which the farmer delivers his products. “Preparation for market” clearly has reference to activities which precede “delivery to market.” It is not, however, synonymous with “preparation for sale.” The term must be treated differently with respect to various commodities. It is emphasized that “preparation for market,” like other practices, must be performed “by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations” in order to be within section 3(f).

Subject to the rules heretofore discussed, the following activities are, among others, activities that may be performed in the “preparation for market” of the indicated commodities and may come within section 3(f):

(a) Grain, seed, and forage crops. Weighing, binning, stacking, drying, cleaning, grading, shelling, sorting, packing, and storing.

(b) Fruits and vegetables. Assembling, ripening, cleaning, grading, sorting, drying, preserving, packing, and storing. (See In the Matter of J. J. Crosetti, 29 LRRM 1353, 98 NLRB 268; In the Matter of Imperial Garden Growers, 91 NLRB 1034, 26 LRRM 1632; Lenroot v. Hazelhurst Mercantitle Co., 59 F. Supp. 595; North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass'n v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 76; Dofflemeyer v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 813.)

(c) Peanuts and nuts (pecans, walnuts, etc.). Grading, cracking, shelling, cleaning, sorting, packing, and storing.

(d) Eggs. Handling, cooling, grading, candling, and packing.

(e) Wool. Grading and packing.

(f) Dairy products. Separating, cooling, packing, and storing.

(g) Cotton. Weighing, ginning, and storing cotton; hulling, delinting, cleaning, sacking, and storing cottonseed.

(h) Nursery stock. Handling, sorting, grading, trimming, bundling, storing, wrapping, and packing. (See Jordan v. Stark Brothers Nurseries, 45 F. Supp. 769; Mitchell v. Huntsville Nurseries, 267 F.2d 286.)

(i) Tobacco. Handling, grading, drying, stripping from stalk, tying, sorting, storing, and loading.

(j) Livestock. Handling and loading.

(k) Poultry. Culling, grading, cooping, and loading.

(l) Honey. Assembling, extracting, heating, ripening, straining, cleaning, grading, weighing, blending, packaging, and storing.

(m) Fur. Removing the pelt, scraping, drying, putting on boards, and packing.

Employment in “secondary” agriculture, under section 3(f), includes employment in “delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market” when performed by a farmer as an incident to or in conjunction with his own farming operations. To the extent that such deliveries may be accomplished without leaving the farm where the commodities delivered are grown, the exemption extends also to employees of someone other than the farmer who raised them if they are performing such deliveries for the farmer. However, normally such deliveries require travel off the farm, and where this is the case, only employees of a farmer engaged in making them can come within section 3(f). Such employees would not be engaged in agriculture in any workweek when they delivered commodities of other farmers, however, because such deliveries would not be performed as an incident to or in conjunction with “such” farming operations, as explained previously. If the “delivery” trip is within section 3(f) the necessary return trip to the farm is also included.

The term “delivery to storage” includes taking agricultural or horticultural commodities, dairy products, livestock, bees or their honey, fur-bearing animals or their pelts, or poultry to the places where they are to be stored or held pending preparation for or delivery to market. The fact that the commodities have been subjected to some other practice “by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations” does not preclude the inclusion of “delivery to storage” within section 3(f). The same is true with respect to “delivery to market” and “delivery to carriers for transporation to market.”

The term “delivery * * * to market” includes taking agricultural or horticultural commodities, dairy products, livestock, bees or their honey, fur-bearing animals or their pelts, or poultry to market. It ordinarily refers to the initial journey of the farmer's products from the farm to the market. The market referred to is the farmer's market which normally means the distributing agency, cooperative marketing agency, wholesaler or processor to which the farmer delivers his products. Delivery to market ends with the delivery of the commodities at the receiving platform of such a farmer's market (Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473). When the delivery involves travel off the farm (which would normally be the case) the delivery must be performed by the employees employed by the farmer in order to constitute an agricultural practice. Delivery by an independent contractor for the farmer or a group of farmers or by a “bird-dog” operator who has purchased the commodities on the farm from the farmer is not an agricultural practice (see Chapman v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 360, cert. denied 348 U.S. 897; Fort Mason Fruit Co. v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 363, cert. denied 348 U.S. 897). However, in the case of fruits or vegetables, the Act provides a special overtime pay exemption for intrastate transportation of the freshly harvested commodities from the farm to a place of first marketing or first processing, which may apply to employees engaged in such transportation regardless of whether they are employed by the farmer. See subpart J of this part 780, discussing the exemption provided by section 13(b)(16).

The term “delivery * * * to carriers for transportation to market” includes taking agricultural or horticultural commodities, dairy products, livestock, bees or their honey, fur-bearing animals or their pelts, and poultry to any carrier (including carriers by truck, rail, water, etc.) for transportation by such carrier to market. The market referred to is the farmer's market which normally means the distributing agency, cooperative marketing agency, wholesaler, or processor to which the farmer delivers his products. As in the case of “delivery to market,” when it involves travel off the farm (as would normally be the case) the delivery must be performed by the farmer's own employees in order to constitute an agricultural practice. Employees of the carrier who transport to market the commodities which are delivered to it are not within the scope of agriculture.

Transportation of farm products from the fields where they are grown or from the farm to other places may be within the “secondary” meaning of agriculture, regardless of whether the transportation is included as “delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market”: Provided only, That it is performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with the farming operations of that farmer or that farm. Of course, any transportation operations which are part of, and not subsequent to, the “primary” farming operations are also within section 3(f). These principles have been recognized by the courts in the following cases, among others: Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254; NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714; Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11; Calaf v. Gonzales, 127 F. 8d 934; Vives v. Serralles, 145 F. 2d 552; Holtville Alfalfa Mills v. Wyatt, 230 F. 2d 398. If not performed by the farmer, transportation beyond the limits of the farm is not within section 3(f), even when performed by a purchaser of the unharvested commodities who has harvested the crop. The scope of section 3(f) includes the harvesting employees but does not extend to the employees transporting the commodities off the farm (Chapman v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 360, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897; Fort Mason Fruit Co. v. Durkin, 214 F. 2d 363, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 897).

(a) Transportation by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with the farming operations of the farmer or of that farm is within the scope of agriculture even though things other than farm commodities raised by the farmer or on the farm are being transported. As previously indicated, transportation of commodities raised by other farmers or on other farms would not be within section 3(f). The definition of agriculture clearly covers the transportation by the farmer, as an incident to or in conjunction with his farming activities, of farm implements, supplies, and fieldworkers to and from the fields, regardless of whether such transportation involves travel on or off the farm and regardless of the method used. The Supreme Court of the United States so held in Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254. Transportation of fieldworkers to or from the farm by persons other than the farmer does not come within section 3(f). However, under section 13(b)(16) of the Act, discussed in subpart J of this part 780, an overtime pay exemption is provided for transportation, whether or not performed by the farmer, of fruit or vegetable harvest workers to and from the farm, within the same State where the farm is located. In the case of transportation to the farm of materials or supplies, it seems clear that transportation to the farm by the farmer of materials and supplies for use in his farming operations, such as seed, animal or poultry feed, farm machinery or equipment, etc., would be incidental to the farmer's actual farming operations. Thus, truckdrivers employed by a farmer to haul feed to the farm for feeding pigs are engaged in “agriculture.”

(b) With respect to the practice of transporting farm products from farms to a processing establishment by employees of a person who owns both the farms and the establishment, such practice may or may not be incident to or in conjunction with the employer's farming operations depending on all the pertinent facts. For example, the transportation is clearly incidental to milling operations, rather than to farming, where the employees engaged in it are hired by the mill, carried on its payroll, do no agricultural work on the farms, and report for and end their daily duties at the mill where the transportation vehicles are kept (Calaf v. Gonzales, 127 F. 2d 934). On the other hand, a different result is reached where the facts show that the transportation workers are farm employees whose work is closely integrated with harvesting and other direct farming operations (NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714; and see Vives v. Serralles, 145 F. 2d 552). The method by which the transportation is accomplished is not material (Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254).

(a) As has been noted above, the term “agriculture” includes other practices performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with the farming operations conducted by such farmer or on such farm in addition to the practices listed in section 3(f). The selling (including selling at roadside stands or by mail order and house to house selling) by a farmer and his employees of his agricultural commodities, dairy products, etc., is such a practice provided it does not amount to a separate business. Other such practices are office work and maintenance and protective work. Section 3(f) includes, for example, secretaries, clerks, bookkeepers, night watchmen, maintenance workers, engineers, and others who are employed by a farmer or on a farm if their work is part of the agricultural activity and is subordinate to the farming operations of such farmer or on such farm. (Damutz v. Pinchbeck, 66 F. Supp. 667, aff'd. 158 F. 2d 882). Employees of a farmer who repair the mechanical implements used in farming, as a subordinate and necessary task incident to their employer's farming operations, are within section 3(f). It makes no difference that the work is done by a separate labor force in a repair shop maintained for the purpose, where the size of the farming operations is such as to justify it. Only employees engaged in the repair of equipment used in performing agricultural functions would be within section 3(f), however; employees repairing equipment used by the employer in industrial or other nonfarming activities would be outside the scope of agriculture. (Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254.) The repair of equipment used by other farmers in their farming operations would not qualify as an agricultural practice incident to the farming operations of the farmer employing the repair workers.

(b) The following are other examples of practices which may qualify as “agriculture” under the secondary meaning in section 3(f), when done on a farm, whether done by a farmer or by a contractor for the farmer, so long as they do not relate to farming operations on any other farms: The operation of a cook camp for the sole purpose of feeding persons engaged exclusively in agriculture on that farm; artificial insemination of the farm animals; custom corn shelling and grinding of feed for the farmer; the packing of apples by portable packing machines which are moved from farm to farm packing only apples grown on the particular farm where the packing is being performed; the culling, catching, cooping, and loading of poultry; the threshing of wheat; the shearing of sheep; the gathering and baling of straw.

(c) It must be emphasized with respect to all practices performed on products for which exemption is claimed that they must be performed only on the products produced or raised by the particular farmer or on the particular farm (Mitchell v. Huntsville Nurseries, 267 F. 2d 286; Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11; Mitchell v. Hunt, 263 F. 2d 913; NLRB v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F. 2d 714; Farmers Reservoir Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755; Walling v. Peacock Corp., 58 F. Supp. 880; Lenroot v. Hazelhurst Mercantile Co., 153 F. 2d 153; Jordan v. Stark Bros. Nurseries, 45 F. Supp. 769).

Trees grown in forests and the lumber derived therefrom are not agricultural or horticultural commodities, for the purpose of the FLSA. (See § 780.205 regarding production of Christmas trees.) It follows that employment in the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of such trees or timber products is not sufficient to bring an employee within sec. 3(f) unless the operation is performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with his or its farming operations. On the latter point, see §§ 780.200 through 780.209 discussing the question of when forestry or lumbering operations are incident to or in conjunction with farming operations so as to constitute agriculture. For a discussion of the exemption in sec. 13(b)(28) of the Act for certain forestry and logging operations in which not more than eight employees are employed, see part 788 of this chapter.