It is the purpose of this part to provide an official statement of the views of the Department of Labor with respect to the meaning and application of sections 13(a)(5) and 13(b)(4) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which govern the application of the minimum wage and overtime pay requirements of the Act to employees engaged in fishing and related activities and in operations on aquatic products. It is an objective of this part to make available in one place, the interpretations of law relating to such employment which will guide the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator in carrying out their responsibilities under the Act.

The Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, is a Federal statute of general application which establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, equal pay, and child labor requirements that apply as provided in the Act. Employers and employees in enterprises engaged in fishing and related activities, or in operations on aquatic products on shore, need to know how the Act applies to employment in these enterprises so that they may understand their rights and obligations under the law. All employees whose employment has the relationship to interstate or foreign commerce which the Act specifies are subject to the prescribed labor standards unless specifically exempted from them. Employers having such employees are required to comply with the Act's provisions in this regard and with specified recordkeeping requirements contained in part 516 of this chapter. The law authorizes the Department of Labor to investigate for compliance and, in the event of violations, to supervise the payment of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee. The law also provides for enforcement in the courts.

This part discusses generally the provisions of the Act which govern its application to employers and employees in enterprises and establishments of the fisheries, seafood processing, and related industries. It discusses in some detail those exemption provisions of the Act in sections 13(a)(5) and 13(b)(4) which refer specifically to employees employed in described activities with respect to seafood and other forms of aquatic life.

Interpretations having general application to others subject to the law, as well as to fishermen and seafood canners, processors, or distributors and their employees, have been issued on a number of subjects of general interest. These will be found in other parts of this chapter. Reference should be made to them for guidance on matters which they discuss in detail, which this part does not undertake to do. They include part 776 of this chapter, discussing coverage; part 531 of this chapter, discussing payment of wages; part 778 of this chapter, discussing computation and payment of overtime compensation; part 785 of this chapter, discussing the calculation of hours worked; and part 800 of this chapter, discussing equal pay for equal work. Reference should also be made to subpart G of part 570 of this chapter, which contains the official interpretations of the child labor provisions of the Act.

The regulations in this part contain the official interpretations of the Department of Labor pertaining to the exemptions provided in sections 13(a)(5) and 13(b)(4) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended. It is intended that the positions stated will serve as “a practical guide to employers and employees as to how the office representing the public interest in its enforcement will seek to apply it” (Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 138). These interpretations indicate the construction of the law which the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator believe to be correct and which will guide them in the performance of their duties under the Act, unless and until they are otherwise directed by authoritative decisions of the courts or conclude upon re-examination of an interpretation that it is incorrect. The interpretations contained herein may be relied upon in accordance with section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act (29 U.S.C. 251-262), so long as they remain effective and are not modified, amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial authority to be incorrect.

The ultimate decisions on interpretations of the Act are made by the courts (Mitchell v. Zachry, 362 U.S. 310; Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517). Court decisions supporting interpretations contained in this part are cited where it is believed they may be helpful. On matters which have not been determined by the courts, it is necessary for the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator to reach conclusions as to the meaning and the application of provisions of the law in order to carry out their responsibilities of administration and enforcement (Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134). In order that these positions may be made known to persons who may be affected by them, official interpretations are issued by the Administrator on the advice of the Solicitor of Labor, as authorized by the Secretary (Reorganization Plan 6 of 1950, 64 Stat. 1263; Gen. Ord. 45 A, May 24, 1950; 15 FR 3290). As included in the regulations in this part, these interpretations are believed to express the intent of the law as reflected in its provisions and as construed by the courts and evidenced by its legislative history. References to pertinent legislative history are made in this part where it appears that they will contribute to a better understanding of the interpretations.

On and after publication of this part 784 in the Federal Register, the interpretations contained therein shall be in effect, and shall remain in effect until they are modified, rescinded, or withdrawn. This part supersedes and replaces the interpretations previously published in the Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations as part 784 of this chapter. Prior opinions, rulings, and interpretations and prior enforcement policies which are not inconsistent with the interpretations in this part or with the Fair Labor Standards Act as amended are continued in effect; all other opinions, rulings, interpretations, and enforcement policies on the subjects discussed in the interpretations in this part are rescinded and withdrawn. The interpretations in this part provide statements of general principles applicable to the subjects discussed and illustrations of the application of these principles to situations that frequently arise. They do not and cannot refer specifically to every problem which may be met by employers and employees in the application of the Act. The omission to discuss a particular problem in this part or in interpretations supplementing it should not be taken to indicate the adoption of any position by the Secretary of Labor or the Administrator with respect to such problem or to constitute an administrative interpretation or practice or enforcement policy. Questions on matters not fully covered by this bulletin may be addressed to the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC 20210, or to any Regional Office of the Division.

The meaning and application of the provisions of law discussed in this part depend in large degree on the definitions of terms used in these provisions. The Act itself defines some of these terms. Others have been defined and construed in decisions of the courts. In the following sections some of these basic definitions are set forth for ready reference in connection with the part's discussion of the various provisions in which they appear. These definitions and their application are further considered in other interpretative bulletins to which reference is made, and in the sections of this part where the particular provisions containing the defined terms are discussed.

The Act's major provisions impose certain requirements and prohibitions on every “employer” subject to their terms. The employment by an “employer” of an “employee” is, to the extent specified in the Act, made subject to minimum wage and overtime pay requirements and to prohibitions against the employment of oppressive child labor. The Act provides its own definitions of “employer,” “employee” and “employ,” under which “economic reality” rather than “technical concepts” determines whether there is employment subject to its terms (Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, 366 U.S. 28; United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704; Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722). An “employer,” as defined in section 3(d) of the Act, “includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United States or any State or political subdivision of a State or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.” An “employee,” as defined in section 3(e) of the Act, “includes any individual employed by an employer,” and “employ,” as used in the Act, is defined in section 3(g) to include “to suffer or permit to work.” It should be noted, as explained in part 791 of this chapter, dealing with joint employment that in appropriate circumstances two or more employers may be jointly responsible for compliance with the statutory requirements applicable to employment of a particular employee. It should also be noted that “employer,” “enterprise,” and “establishment” are not synonymous terms, as used in the Act. An employer may have an enterprise with more than one establishment, or he may have more than one enterprise in which he employs employees within the meaning of the Act. Also, there may be different employers who employ employees in a particular establishment or enterprise.

As used in the Act (including the definition of “enterprise” set forth below in § 784.10), “person” is defined as meaning “an individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons” (Act, section 3(a)).

The term “enterprise” which may, in some situations, be pertinent in determining coverage of this Act to employees employed by employers engaged in the procurement, processing, or distribution of aquatic products, is defined in section 3(r) of the Act, section 3(r) states:

As used in the Act, the term “establishment”, which is not specially defined therein, refers to a “distinct physical place of business” rather than to “an entire business or enterprise” which may include several separate places of business. This is consistent with the meaning of the term as it is normally used in business and in government, is judicially settled, and has been recognized in the Congress in the course of enactment of amendatory legislation (Phillips v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490; Mitchell v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 352 U.S. 1027; 95 Cong. Rec. 12505, 12579, 14877; H. Rept. No. 1453, 81st Cong., first session, p. 25). This is the meaning of the term as used in sections 3(r) and 3(s) of the Act.

“Commerce” as used in the Act includes interstate and foreign commerce. It is defined in section 3(b) of the Act to mean “trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and any place outside thereof.” (For the definition of “State,” see § 784.15.) The application of this definition and the kinds of activities which it includes are discussed at length in part 776 of this chapter dealing with the general coverage of the Act.

To understand the meaning of “production” of goods for commerce as used in the Act it is necessary to refer to the definition in section 3(j) of the term “produced.” A detailed discussion of the application of the term as defined is contained in part 776 of this chapter, dealing with the general coverage of the Act. Section 3(j) provides that “produced” as used in the Act “means produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on in any State; and for the purposes of this Act an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of goods if such employee was employed in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, or in any closely related process or occupation directly essential to the production thereof, in any State.” (For the definition of “State” see § 784.15.)

The definition in section 3(i) of the Act states that “goods,” as used in the Act, means “goods (including ships and marine equipment), wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof, but does not include goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof.” Part 776 of this chapter, dealing with the general coverage of the Act, contains a detailed discussion of the application of this definition and what is included in it.

As used in the Act, “State” means “any State of the United States or the District of Columbia or any Territory or possession of the United States” (Act, section 3(c)). The application of this definition in determining questions of “coverage under the Act's definition of “commerce” and “produced” (see §§ 784.12, 784.13) is discussed in part 776 of this chapter, dealing with general coverage.

As explained in part 778 of this chapter, dealing with overtime compensation, employees subject to the overtime pay provisions of the Act must generally receive for their overtime work in any workweek as provided in the Act not less than one and one-half times their regular rates of pay. Section 7(e) of the Act defines the term “regular rate” “to include all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee” except certain payments which are expressly described in and excluded by the statutory definition. This definition, which is discussed at length in part 778 of this chapter, determines the regular rate upon which time and one-half overtime compensation must be computed under section 7(a) of the Act for employees within its general coverage who are not exempt from the overtime provisions under either of the fishery and seafood exemptions provided by sections 13(a)(5) and 13(b)(4) or under some other exemption contained in the Act.

Except as otherwise provided in specific exemptions, the minimum wage, overtime pay, and child labor standards of the Act are generally applicable to employees who engage in specified activities concerned with interstate or foreign commerce. The employment of oppressive child labor in or about establishments producing goods for such commerce is also restricted by the Act. The monetary and child labor standards of the Act are also generally applicable to other employees, not specifically exempted, who are employed in specified enterprises engaged in such commerce or in the production of goods for such commerce. The employer must observe the monetary standards with respect to all such employees in his employ except those who may be denied one or both of these benefits by virtue of some specific exemption provision of the Act, such as section 13(a)(5) or 13(b)(4). It should be noted that enterprises having employees subject to these exemptions may also have other employees who may be exempt under section 13(a)(1) of the Act, subject to conditions specified in regulations, as employees employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity, or in the capacity of outside salesman. The regulations governing these exemptions are set forth and explained in part 541 of this chapter.

The Fair Labor Standards Act has applied since 1938 to all employees, not specifically exempted, who are engaged (a) in interstate or foreign commerce or (b) in the production of goods for such commerce, which is defined to include any closely related process or occupation directly essential to such production (29 U.S.C. 206(a), 207(a); and see §§ 784.12 to 784.15 for definitions governing the scope of this coverage). In general, employees of businesses concerned with fisheries and with operations on seafood and other aquatic products are engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the production of goods for such commerce, as defined in the Act, and are subject to the Act's provisions except as otherwise provided in sections 13(a)(5) and 13(b)(4) or other express exemptions. A detailed discussion of the activities in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce which will bring an employee under the Act is contained in part 776 of this chapter, dealing with general coverage.

Under amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act employees not covered by reason of their personal engagement in interstate commerce activities, as explained in § 784.18, are nevertheless brought within the coverage of the Act if they are employed in an enterprise which is defined in section 3(s) of the Act as an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. Such employees, if not exempt from minimum wages and overtime pay under section 13(a)(5) or exempt from overtime pay under section 13(b)(4), will have to be paid in accordance with the monetary standards of the Act unless expressly exempt under some other provision. This would generally be true of employees employed in enterprises and by establishments engaged in the procurement, processing, marketing, or distribution of seafood and other aquatic products, where the enterprise has an annual gross sales volume of not less than $250,000. Enterprise coverage is more fully discussed in part 776 of this chapter, dealing with general coverage.

The Act provides a number of specific exemptions from the general requirements previously described. Some are exemptions from the overtime provisions only. Several are exemptions from both the minimum wage and the overtime requirements of the Act. Finally, there are some exemptions from all three—minimum wage, overtime pay, and child labor requirements. An examination of the terminology in which the exemptions from the general coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act are stated discloses language patterns which reflect congressional intent. Thus, Congress specified in varying degree the criteria for application of each of the exemptions and in a number of instances differentiated as to whether employees are to be exempt because they are employed by a particular kind of employer, employed in a particular type of establishment, employed in a particular industry, employed in a particular capacity or occupation or engaged in a specified operation. (See 29 U.S.C. 203(d); 207 (b), (c), (i); 213 (a), (b), (c), (d). And see Addison v. Holly Hill, 322 U.S. 607; Mitchell v. Trade Winds, Inc., 289 F. 2d 278; Mitchell v. Stinson, 217 F. 2d (210). In general there are no exemptions from the child labor requirements that apply in enterprises or establishments engaged in fishing or in operations on aquatic products (see part 570, subpart G, of this chapter). Such enterprises or establishments will, however, be concerned with the exemption from overtime pay in section 13(b)(4) of the Act for employees employed in specified “on-shore” operations (see § 784.101), and the exemption from minimum wages and overtime pay provided by section 13(a)(5) for employees employed in fishing, fish-farming, and other specified “off-shore” operations on aquatic products. These exemptions, which are subject to the general rules stated in § 784.21, are discussed at length in subpart B of this part 784.

It is clear that Congress intended the Fair Labor Standards Act to be broad in its scope. “Breadth of coverage is vital to its mission” (Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497). An employer who claims an exemption under the Act has the burden of showing that it applies (Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U.S. 545; Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290: Tobin v. Blue Channel Corp., 198 F. 2d 245, approved in Mitchell v. Myrtle Grove Packing Co., 350 U.S. 891; Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d 52). Conditions specified in the language of the Act are “explicit prerequisites to exemption” (Arnold v. Kanowsky, 361 U.S. 388). In their application, the purpose of the exemption as shown in its legislative history as well as its language should be given effect. However, “the details with which the exemptions in this Act have been made preclude their enlargement by implication” and “no matter how broad the exemption, it is meant to apply only to” the specified activities (Addison v. Holly Hill, 322 U.S. 607; Maneja v. Waialua, 349 U.S. 254). Exemptions provided in the Act “are to be narrowly construed against the employer seeking to assert them” and their application limited to those who come “plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” This construction of the exemptions is necessary to carry out the broad objectives for which the Act was passed (Phillips v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490; Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., supra; Arnold v. Kanowsky, supra; Calaf v. Gonzales, 127 F. 2d 934; Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. 2d 11; Mitchell v. Stinson, 217 F. 2d 210; Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. 2d 52).