When considering the use of a quality, performance, or schedule incentive, the following guidance applies:

(1) A positive incentive is generally not appropriate unless—

(i) Performance above the target (or minimum, if there are no negative incentives) level is of significant value to the Government;

(ii) The value of the higher level of performance is worth the additional cost/fee;

(iii) The attainment of the higher level of performance is clearly within the control of the contractor; and

(iv) An upper limit is identified, beyond which no further incentive is earned.

(2) A negative incentive is generally not appropriate unless—

(i) A target level of performance can be established, which the contractor can reasonably be expected to reach with a diligent effort, but a lower level of performance is also minimally acceptable;

(ii) The value of the negative incentive is commensurate with the lower level of performance and any additional administrative costs; and

(iii) Factors likely to prevent attainment of the target level of performance are clearly within the control of the contractor.

(3) When a negative incentive is used, the contract must indicate a level below which performance is not acceptable.

(a) Pursuant to the guidelines in 1816.402, NASA has determined that a performance incentive shall be included in all contracts that are based on performance-oriented documents (see FAR 11.101(a)), except those awarded under the commercial item procedures of FAR Part 12, where the primary deliverable(s) is (are) hardware with a total value (including options) greater than $25 million. Any exception to this requirement shall be approved in writing by the head of the contracting activity. Performance incentives may be included in supply and service contracts valued under $25 million, acquired under procedures other than Part 12, at the discretion of the contracting officer upon consideration of the guidelines in 1816.402. Performance incentives, which are objective and measure performance after delivery and acceptance, are separate from other incentives, such as cost or delivery incentives.

(b) When a performance incentive is used, it shall be structured to be both positive and negative based on performance after acceptance, unless the contract type requires complete contractor liability for product performance (e.g., fixed price). In this latter case, a negative incentive is not required. In structuring the incentives, the contract shall establish a standard level of performance based on the salient performance requirement. This standard performance level is normally the contract's target level of performance. No performance incentive amount is earned at this standard performance level. Discrete units of measurement based on the same performance parameter shall be identified for performance above and, when a negative incentive is used, below the standard. Specific incentive amounts shall be associated with each performance level from maximum beneficial performance (maximum positive incentive) to, when a negative incentive is included, minimal beneficial performance or total failure (maximum negative incentive). The relationship between any given incentive, either positive or negative, and its associated unit of measurement should reflect the value to the Government of that level of performance. The contractor should not be rewarded for above-standard performance levels that are of no benefit to the Government.

(c) The final calculation of the performance incentive shall be done when performance, as defined in the contract, ceases or when the maximum positive incentive is reached. When performance ceases below the standard established in the contract and a negative incentive is included, the Government shall calculate the amount due and the contractor shall pay the Government that amount. Once performance exceeds the standard, the contractor may request payment of the incentive amount associated with a given level of performance, provided that such payments shall not be more frequent than monthly. When performance ceases above the standard level of performance, or when the maximum positive incentive is reached, the Government shall calculate the final performance incentive earned and unpaid and promptly remit it to the contractor.

(d) When the deliverable supply or service lends itself to multiple, meaningful measures of performance, multiple performance incentives may be established. When the contract requires the sequential delivery of several items (e.g., multiple spacecraft), separate performance incentive structures may be established to parallel the sequential delivery and use of the deliverables.

(e) In determining the value of the maximum performance incentives available, the contracting officer shall follow the following rules:

(1) For a CPFF contract, the sum of the maximum positive performance incentive and fixed fee shall not exceed the limitations in FAR 15.404-4(c)(4)(i).

(2) For an award fee contract.

(i) The individual values of the maximum positive performance incentive and the total potential award fee (including any base fee) shall each be at least one-third of the total potential contract fee. The remaining one-third of the total potential contract fee may be divided between award fee and the maximum performance incentive at the discretion of the contracting officer.

(ii) The maximum negative performance incentive for research and development hardware (e.g., the first and second units) shall be equal in amount to the total earned award fee (including any base fee). The maximum negative performance incentives for production hardware (e.g., the third and all subsequent units of any hardware items) shall be equal in amount to the total potential award fee (including any base fee). Where one contract contains both cases described above, any base fee shall be allocated reasonably among the items.

(3) For cost reimbursement contracts other than award fee contracts, the maximum negative performance incentives shall not exceed the total earned fee under the contract.

Section 1816.405-2 applies to the use of FPAF contracts as if they were CPAF contracts. However, neither base fee (see 1816.405-271) nor evaluation of cost control (see 1816.405-274) apply to FPAF contracts.

(a) In addition to the items identified in FAR 16.401(e)(1), D&Fs will include a discussion of the other types of contracts considered and shall indicate why an award fee incentive is the appropriate choice. Award fee incentives should not be used on contracts with a total estimated cost and fee less than $2 million per year. Use of award fee incentive for lower-valued acquisitions may be authorized in exceptional situations such as contract requirements having direct health or safety impacts, where the judgmental assessment of the quality of contractor performance is critical.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, an award fee incentive may be used in conjunction with other contract types for aspects of performance that cannot be objectively assessed. In such cases, the cost incentive is based on objective formulas inherent in the other contract types (e.g., FPI, CPIF), and the award fee provision should not separately incentivize cost performance.

(c) Award fee incentives shall not be used with a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract.

(a) A base fee shall not be used on CPAF contracts for which the periodic award fee evaluations are final (1816.405-273(a)). In these circumstances, contractor performance during any award fee period is independent of and has no effect on subsequent performance periods or the final results at contract completion. For other contracts, such as those for hardware or software development, the procurement officer may authorize the use of a base fee not to exceed 3 percent. Base fee shall not be used when an award fee incentive is used in conjunction with another contract type (e.g., CPIF/AF).

(b) When a base fee is authorized for use in a CPAF contract, it shall be paid only if the final award fee evaluation is “satisfactory” or better. (See 1816.405-273 and 1816.405-275) Pending final evaluation, base fee may be paid during the life of the contract at defined intervals on a provisional basis. If the final award fee evaluation is “unsatisfactory”, all provisional base fee payments shall be refunded to the Government.

(a) Award fee evaluation periods, including those for interim evaluations, should be at least 6 months in length. When appropriate, the procurement officer may authorize shorter evaluation periods after ensuring that the additional administrative costs associated with the shorter periods are offset by benefits accruing to the Government. Where practicable, such as developmental contracts with defined performance milestones (e.g., Preliminary Design Review, Critical Design Review, initial system test), establishing evaluation periods at conclusion of the milestones rather than calendar dates, or in combination with calendar dates should be considered. In no case shall an evaluation period be longer than 12 months.

(b) A portion of the total available award fee contract shall be allocated to each of the evaluation periods. This allocation may result in an equal or unequal distribution of fee among the periods. The contracting officer shall consider the nature of each contract and the incentive effects of fee distribution in determining the appropriate allocation structure.

(a) Service contracts. On contracts where the contract deliverable is the performance of a service over any given time period, contractor performance is definitively measurable within each evaluation period. In these cases, all evaluations are final, and the contractor keeps the fee earned in any period regardless of the evaluations of subsequent periods. Unearned award fee in any given period in a service contract is lost and shall not be carried forward, or “rolled-over,” into subsequent periods.

(b) End item contracts. On contracts, such as those for end item deliverables, where the true quality of contractor performance cannot be measured until the end of the contract, only the last evaluation is final. At that point, the total contract award fee pool is available, and the contractor's total performance is evaluated against the award fee plan to determine total earned award fee. In addition to the final evaluation, interim evaluations are done to monitor performance prior to contract completion, provide feedback to the contractor on the Government's assessment of the quality of its performance, and establish the basis for making interim award fee payments (see 1816.405-276(a)). These interim evaluations and associated interim award fee payments are superseded by the fee determination made in the final evaluation at contract completion. However, if the final award fee adjectival rating is higher or lower than the average adjectival rating of all the interim award fee periods, or if the final award fee score is eight base percentage points higher or lower than the average award fee score of all interim award fee periods (e.g. 80% to 88%), then the Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA) or the Deputy Chief Acquisition Officer (if the HCA is the Fee Determination Official) shall review and concur in the final award fee determination. The Government will then pay the contractor, or the contractor will refund to the Government, the difference between the final award fee determination and the cumulative interim fee payments.

(c) Control of evaluations. Interim and final evaluations may be used to provide past performance information during the source selection process in future acquisitions and should be marked and controlled as “Source Selection Information—see FAR 3.104”. See FAR 42.1503(h) regarding the requirements for releasing Source Selection Information included in the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS).

(a) Explicit evaluation factors shall be established for each award fee period. Factors shall be linked to acquisition objectives which shall be defined in terms of contract cost, schedule, and technical performance. If used, subfactors should be limited to the minimum necessary to ensure a thorough evaluation and an effective incentive.

(b) Evaluation factors will be developed by the contracting officer based upon the characteristics of an individual procurement. Cost control, schedule, and technical performance considerations shall be included as evaluation factors in all CPAF contracts, as applicable. When explicit evaluation factor weightings are used, cost control shall be no less than 25 percent of the total weighted evaluation factors. The predominant consideration of the cost control evaluation should be a measurement of the contractor's performance against the negotiated estimated cost of the contract. This estimated cost may include the value of undefinitized change orders when appropriate.

(c)(1) The technical factor must include consideration of risk management (including mission success, safety, security, health, export control, and damage to the environment, as appropriate) unless waived at a level above the contracting officer, with the concurrence of the project manager. The rationale for any waiver shall be documented in the contract file. When safety, export control, or security are considered under the technical factor, the award fee plan shall allow the following fee determinations, regardless of contractor performance in other evaluation factors, when there is a major breach of safety or security.

(i) For evaluation of service contracts under 1816.405-273(a), an overall fee rating of unsatisfactory for any evaluation period in which there is a major breach of safety or security.

(ii) For evaluation of end item contracts under 1816.405-273(b), an overall fee rating of unsatisfactory for any interim evaluation period in which there is a major breach of safety or security. To ensure that the final award fee evaluation at contract completion reflects any major breach of safety or security, in an interim period, the overall award fee pool shall be reduced by the amount of the fee available for the period in which the major breach occurred if an unsatisfactory fee rating was assigned because of a major breach of safety or security.

(2) A major breach of safety must be related directly to the work on the contract. A major breach of safety is an act or omission of the Contractor that consists of an accident, incident, or exposure resulting in a fatality or mission failure; or in damage to equipment or property equal to or greater than $1 million; or in any “willful” or “repeat” violation cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or by a state agency operating under an OSHA approved plan.

(3) A major breach of security may occur on or off Government installations, but must be directly related to the work on the contract. A major breach of security is an act or omission by the contractor that results in compromise of classified information, illegal technology transfer, workplace violence resulting in criminal conviction, sabotage, compromise or denial of information technology services, equipment or property damage from vandalism greater than $250,000, or theft greater than $250,000.

(4) The Assistant Administrator for Procurement shall be notified prior to the determination of an unsatisfactory award fee rating because of a major breach of safety or security.

(d) In rare circumstances, contract costs may increase for reasons outside the contractor's control and for which the contractor is not entitled to an equitable adjustment. One example is a weather-related launch delay on a launch support contract. The Government shall take such situations into consideration when evaluating contractor cost control.

(e) Emphasis on cost control should be balanced against other performance requirement objectives. The contractor should not be incentivized to pursue cost control to the point that overall performance is significantly degraded. For example, incentivizing an underrun that results in direct negative impacts on technical performance, safety, or other critical contract objectives is both undesirable and counterproductive. Therefore, evaluation of cost control shall conform to the following guidelines:

(1) Normally, the contractor should be given an unsatisfactory rating for cost control when there is a significant overrun within its control. However, the contractor may receive a satisfactory or higher rating for cost control if the overrun is insignificant. Award fee ratings should decrease sharply as the size of the overrun increases. In any evaluation of contractor overrun performance, the Government shall consider the reasons for the overrun and assess the extent and effectiveness of the contractor's efforts to control or mitigate the overrun.

(2) The contractor should normally be rewarded for an underrun within its control, up to the maximum award fee rating allocated for cost control, provided the adjectival rating for all other award fee evaluation factors is very good or higher (see FAR 16.401(e)(iv)).

(3) The contractor should be rewarded for meeting the estimated cost of the contract, but not to the maximum rating allocated for cost control, to the degree that the contractor has prudently managed costs while meeting contract requirements. No award fee shall be given in this circumstance unless the average adjectival rating for all other award fee evaluation factors is satisfactory or higher.

(f) When an AF arrangement is used in conjunction with another contract type, the award fee's cost control factor will only apply to a subjective assessment of the contractor's efforts to control costs and not the actual cost outcome incentivized under the basic contract type (e.g. CPIF, FPIF).

(g)(1) The contractor's performance against the subcontracting plan incorporated in the contract shall be evaluated. Emphasis may be placed on the contractor's accomplishment of its goals for subcontracting with small business, small disadvantaged business, HUBZone small business, women-owned small business, veteran-owned small business, service-disabled veteran-owned small business concerns, and Historically Black Colleges and Universities—Minority Institutions (HBCU/MIs). The evaluation should consider both goals as a percentage of subcontracting dollars as well as a percentage of the total contract value.

(2) The contractor's achievements in subcontracting high technology efforts as well as the contractor's performance under the Mentor-Protégé Program, if applicable, may also be evaluated.

(3) The evaluation weight given to the contractor's performance against the considerations in paragraphs (g)(1) and (2) of this section shall be 10 percent of available award fee and shall be separate from all other factors.

(h) When contract changes are anticipated, the contractor's responsiveness to requests for change proposals should be evaluated. This evaluation should include the contractor's submission of timely, complete proposals and cooperation in negotiating the change.

(i) Only the award fee performance evaluation factors set forth in the performance evaluation plan shall be used to determine award fee scores.

(j) The Government may unilaterally modify the applicable award fee performance evaluation factors and performance evaluation areas prior to the start of an evaluation period. The contracting officer shall notify the contractor in writing of any such changes 30 days prior to the start of the relevant evaluation period.

(a) All award fee contracts shall utilize the adjectival rating categories and associated descriptions as well as the award fee pool available to be earned percentages for each adjectival rating category contained in FAR 16.401(e)(3)(iv). Contracting officers may supplement these descriptions with more specifics relative to their procurement but they cannot alter or delete the FAR adjectival rating descriptions.

(b) The following numerical scoring system shall be used in conjunction with the FAR adjectival rating categories and associated descriptions (see FAR 16401(e)(3)(iv)).

(1) Excellent (100-91)

(2) Very good (90-76)

(3) Good (75-51)

(4) Satisfactory (50)

(5) Unsatisfactory (less than 50) No award fee shall be paid for an unsatisfactory rating.

(c) As a benchmark for evaluation, in order to be rated “Excellent” overall, the contractor would typically be under cost, on or ahead of schedule, and providing outstanding technical performance.

(d) A weighted scoring system appropriate for the circumstances of the individual contract requirement should be developed. In this system, each evaluation factor (e.g., technical, schedule, cost control) is assigned a specific percentage weighting with the cumulative weightings of all factors totaling 100. During the award fee evaluation, each factor is scored from 0-100 according to the ratings defined in 1816.405-275(b). The numerical score for each factor is then multiplied by the weighting for that factor to determine the weighted score. For example, if the technical factor has a weighting of 60 percent and the numerical score for that factor is 80, the weighted technical score is 48 (80 × 60 percent). The weighted scores for each evaluation factor are then added to determine the total award fee score.

(a) Interim award fee payments. The amount of an interim award fee payment (see 1816.405-273(b)) is limited to the lesser of the interim evaluation score or 80 percent of the fee allocated to that interim period less any provisional payments (see paragraph (b) of this subsection) made during the period.

(b) Provisional award fee payments. Provisional award fee payments are payments made within evaluation periods prior to an interim or final evaluation for that period. Provisional payments may be included in the contract and should be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. For a service contract, the total amount of award fee available in an evaluation period that may be provisionally paid is the lesser of a percentage stipulated in the contract (but not exceeding 80 percent) or the prior period's evaluation score. For an end item contract, the total amount of provisional payments in a period is limited to a percentage not to exceed 80 percent of the prior interim period's evaluation score, except for the first evaluation period which is limited to 80 percent of the available award fee for that evaluation period.

(c) Fee payment. The Fee Determination Official's rating for both interim and final evaluations will be provided to the contractor within 45 calendar days of the end of the period being evaluated. Any fee, interim or final, due the contractor will be paid no later than 60 calendar days after the end of the period being evaluated.

(a) An award term enables a contractor to become eligible for additional periods of performance or ordering periods under a service contract (as defined in FAR 37.101) by achieving and sustaining the prescribed performance levels under the contract. It incentivizes the contractor for maintaining superior performance by providing an opportunity for extensions of the contract term.

(b) Award terms are best suited for acquisitions where a longer term relationship (generally more than five years) between the Government and a contractor would provide significant benefits to both. Motivating excellent performance, fostering contractor capital investment, and increasing the desirability of the award, thus potentially increasing competition, are benefits that may justify the use of award terms.

(c) While the administrative burden and cost of more frequent procurements to both the Government and potential offerors should be considered when determining whether to use award terms, this decision must be weighed against market stability, the potential changes and advancements in technology, and flexibility to change direction with mission changes and associated frequent procurements.

(d) Award terms may be used in conjunction with contract options under FAR 17.2. Award terms are similar to contract options in that they are conditioned on the Government's continuing need for the contract and the availability of funds. However, FAR 17.207(c)(7) states the contracting officer must determine that the contractor's performance has been acceptable, e.g., received satisfactory ratings. In contrast, to become eligible for an award term, the contractor must maintain a level of performance above acceptable as specified in the Award Term Plan (see 1816.405-277(i)). In contracts with both option periods and award terms, the award term period of performance or ordering period shall begin after completion of any option period of performance or ordering period.

(e) Contracts with award terms shall include a base period of performance or ordering period and may include a designated number of option periods during which the Government will observe and evaluate the contractor's performance allowing the contractor to earn an award term. Additionally, as specified in the Award Term Plan, the contractor may also be evaluated for additional award terms during performance of an earned award term. If the contractor meets or exceeds the performance requirements, there is an on-going need for and desire to continue the contract, funds are available, and the contractor is not listed in the System for Award Management Exclusions, then the contractor may be eligible for contract extension for the period of the award term.

(f) Contracts with award terms shall comply with FAR and NFS restrictions on the overall contract length, such as the 5-year period of performance limitation found at NFS 1817.204.

(g) Award terms may only be used in acquisitions for services exceeding $20 million dollars. Use of award terms for lower-valued acquisitions may be authorized in exceptional situations such as contract requirements having direct health or safety impacts, where the judgmental assessment of the quality of contractor performance is critical.

(h) Consistent with the Competition in Contracting Act and general procurement principles, the potential award term periods in a procurement must be priced, evaluated, and considered in the initial contract selection process in order to be valid.

(i) All contracts including award terms shall be supported by an Award Term Plan that establishes criteria for earning an award term and the methodology and schedule for evaluating contractor performance. A copy of the Award Term Plan shall be included in the contract. The contracting officer may unilaterally revise the Award Term Plan. Award Term Plans shall—

(1) Identify the officials to include Term-Determining Official involved in the award term evaluation and their function;

(2) Identify and describe each evaluation factor, any subfactors, related performance standards, adjectival ratings, and numerical ranges or weights to be used. The contracting officer should follow the guidance at 1816.405-274 in establishing award term evaluation factors and 1816.405-275 in establishing adjectival rating categories, associated descriptions, numerical scoring system, and weighted scoring system;

(3) Specify the annual overall rating required for the contractor to be eligible for an award term that reflects a level of performance above acceptable and the number of award terms the contractor may qualify for based on the rating score;

(4) Identify the evaluation period(s) and the evaluation schedule to be conducted at stated intervals during the contract period of performance or ordering period so that the contractor will periodically be informed of the quality of its performance and the areas in which improvement is expected (e.g., six months, nine months, twelve months, or at other specific milestones), and when the decision points are for the determination that the contractor is eligible for an award term; and

(5) Identify the contract's base period of performance or ordering period, any option period(s), and total award-term periods(s). Award term periods shall not exceed one year.

(j)(1) The Government has the unilateral right not to grant or to cancel award term periods and the associated Award Term Plans if—

(i) The contractor has failed to achieve the required performance measures for the corresponding evaluation period;

(ii) After earning an award term, the contractor fails to earn an award term in any succeeding year of contract performance, the contracting officer may cancel any award terms that the contractor has earned, but that have not begun;

(iii) The contracting officer notifies the contractor that the Government no longer has a need for the award term period before the time an award term period is to begin;

(iv) The contractor represented that it was a small business concern prior to award of the contract, the contract was set-aside for small businesses, and the contractor rerepresents in accordance with FAR clause 52.219-28 Post-Award Small Business Program Rerepresentation, that it is no longer a small business; or

(v) The contracting officer notifies the contractor that funds are not available for the award term.

(2) When an award term period is not granted or cancelled, any—

(i) Prior award term periods for which the contractor remains otherwise eligible are unaffected.

(ii) Subsequent award term periods are also cancelled.

(k) Cancellation of an award term period that has not yet commenced for any of the reasons set forth in paragraph (j) of this section shall not be considered either a termination for convenience or termination for default, and shall not entitle the contractor to any termination settlement or any other compensation. If the award term is cancelled, a unilateral modification will cite the clause as the authority.

(a) As authorized by FAR 16.406(e), the contracting officer shall insert the clause at 1852.216-76, Award Fee for Service Contracts, in solicitations and contracts when an award fee contract is contemplated and the contract deliverable is the performance of a service.

(b) As authorized by FAR 16.406(e), the contracting officer shall insert the clause at 1852.216-77, Award Fee for End Item Contracts, in solicitations and contracts when an award fee contract is contemplated and the contract deliverables are hardware or other end items for which total contractor performance cannot be measured until the end of the contract. When the clause is used in a fixed-price award fee contract, it shall be modified by deleting references to base fee in paragraphs (a), and by deleting paragraph (c)(1), the last sentence of (c)(4), and the first sentence of (c)(5).

(c) The contracting officer may insert a clause substantially as stated at 1852.216-83, Fixed Price Incentive, in fixed-price-incentive solicitations and contracts utilizing firm or successive targets. For items subject to incentive price revision, identify the target cost, target profit, target price, and ceiling price for each item.

(d) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 1852.216-84, Estimated Cost and Incentive Fee, in cost-plus-incentive-fee solicitations and contracts.

(e) The contracting officer may insert the clause at 1852.216-85, Estimated Cost and Award Fee, in award fee solicitations and contracts. When the contract includes performance incentives, use Alternate I. When the clause is used in a fixed-price award fee contract, it shall be modified to delete references to base fee and to reflect the contract type.

(f) As provided at 1816.402-270, the contracting officer shall insert a clause substantially as stated at 1852.216-88, Performance Incentive, when the primary deliverable(s) is (are) hardware and total estimated cost and fee is greater than $25 million. A clause substantially as stated at 1852.216-88 may be included in lower dollar value supply or service contracts at the discretion of the contracting officer.

(g) Insert the clause at 1852.216-72, Award Term in solicitations and contracts for services exceeding $20 million when award terms are contemplated.