(a) An application for authorization to engage in activities for which specific authorization is required under § 810.7 should be made to the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC 20585, Attention: Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC).

(b) The Secretary will approve an application for specific authorization if it is determined, with the concurrence of the Department of State and after consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Commerce, and Department of Defense, that the activity will not be inimical to the interest of the United States. In making such a determination, the Secretary will take into account the following factors:

(1) Whether the United States has an agreement for cooperation in force covering exports to the country or entity involved;

(2) Whether the country is a party to, or has otherwise adhered to, the NPT;

(3) Whether the country is in good standing with its acknowledged nonproliferation commitments;

(4) Whether the country is in full compliance with its obligations under the NPT;

(5) Whether the country has accepted IAEA safeguards obligations on all nuclear materials used for peaceful purposes and has them in force;

(6) Whether other nonproliferation controls or conditions exist on the proposed activity, including that the recipient is duly authorized by the country to receive and use the technology sought to be transferred;

(7) Significance of the assistance or transferred technology relative to the existing nuclear capabilities of the country;

(8) Whether the transferred technology is part of an existing cooperative enrichment enterprise or the supply chain of such an enterprise;

(9) The availability of comparable assistance or technology from other sources; and

(10) Any other factors that may bear upon the political, economic, competitiveness, or security interests of the United States, including the obligations of the United States under treaties or other international agreements, and the obligations of the country under treaties or other international agreements.

(c) If the proposed activity involves the export of sensitive nuclear technology, the requirements of sections 127 and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act and of any applicable United States international commitments must also be met. For the export of sensitive nuclear technology, in addition to the factors in paragraph (b) of this section, the Secretary will take into account:

(1) Whether the country has signed, ratified, and is implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA and has in force an Additional Protocol based on the Model Additional Protocol, or, pending this, in the case of a regional accounting and control arrangement for nuclear materials, is implementing, in cooperation with the IAEA, a safeguards agreement approved by the IAEA Board of Governors prior to the publication of INFCIRC/540 (September 1997); or alternatively whether comprehensive safeguards, including the measures of the Model Additional Protocol, are being applied in the country;

(2) Whether the country has not been identified in a report by the IAEA Secretariat that is under consideration by the IAEA Board of Governors, as being in breach of obligations to comply with the applicable safeguards agreement, nor continues to be the subject of Board of Governors decisions calling upon it to take additional steps to comply with its safeguards obligations or to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, nor as to which the IAEA Secretariat has reported that it is unable to implement the applicable safeguards agreement. This criterion would not apply in cases where the IAEA Board of Governors or the United Nations Security Council subsequently decides that adequate assurances exist as to the peaceful purposes of the country's nuclear program and its compliance with the applicable safeguards agreements. For the purposes of this paragraph, “breach” refers only to serious breaches of proliferation concern;

(3) Whether the country is adhering to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines and, where applicable, has reported to the Security Council of the United Nations that it is implementing effective export controls as identified by Security Council Resolution 1540; and

(4) Whether the country adheres to international safety conventions relating to nuclear or other radioactive materials or facilities.

(d) Unless otherwise prohibited by U.S. law, the Secretary may grant an application for specific authorization for activities related to the enrichment of source material and special nuclear material, provided that:

(1) The U.S. Government has received written nonproliferation assurances from the government of the country;

(2) That it/they accept(s) the sensitive enrichment equipment and enabling technologies or an operable enrichment facility under conditions that do not permit or enable unauthorized replication of the facilities;

(3) That the subject enrichment activity will not result in the production of uranium enriched to greater than 20% in the isotope uranium-235; and

(4) That there are in place appropriate security arrangements to protect the activity from use or transfer inconsistent with the country's national laws.

(e) Approximately 30 calendar days after the Secretary's grant of a specific authorization, a copy of the Secretary's determination may be provided to any person requesting it at DOE's Public Reading Room, unless the applicant submits information demonstrating that public disclosure will cause substantial harm to its competitive position. This provision does not affect any other authority provided by law for the non-disclosure of information.