(a) Under 13(c), an agent, broker or surety or other company is disqualified from having a bond placed through or with it if a “party in interest” in the plan has any significant control or financial interest in such agent, broker, surety or other company. Section 3(13) of the Act defines the term “party in interest” to mean “any administrator, officer, trustee, custodian, counsel, or employee of any employee welfare benefit plan or a person providing benefit plan services to any such plan, or an employer any of whose employees are covered by such a plan or officer or employee or agent of such employer, or an officer or agent or employee of an employee organization having members covered by such plan.”
(b) A basic question presented is whether the effect of 13(c) is to prohibit persons from placing a bond through or with any “party in interest” in the plan. The language used in 13(c) appears to indicate that in this connection the intent of Congress was to eliminate those instances where the existing financial interest or control held by the “party in interest” in the agent, broker, surety or other company is incompatible with an unbiased exercise of judgment in regard to procuring the bond or bonding the plan's personnel. Accordingly, not all parties in interest are disqualified from procuring or providing bonds for the plan. Thus where a “party in interest” or its affiliate provides multiple benefit plan services to plans, persons are not prohibited from availing themselves of the bonding services provided by the “party in interest” or its affiliate merely because the plan has already availed itself, or will avail itself, of other services provided by the “party in interest.” In this case, it is inherent in the nature of the “party in interest” or its affiliate as an individual or organization providing multiple benefit plan services, one of which is a bonding service, that the existing financial interest or control held is not, in and of itself, incompatible with an unbiased exercise of judgment in regard to procuring the bond or bonding the plan's personnel. In short, there is no distinction between this type of relationship and the ordinary arm's length business relationship which may be established between a plan-customer and an agent, broker or surety company, a relationship which Congress could not have intended to disturb. On the other hand, where a “party in interest” in the plan or an affiliate does not provide a bonding service as part of its general business operations, 13(c) would prohibit any person from procuring the bond through or with any agent, broker, surety or other company, with respect to which the “party in interest” has any significant control or financial interest, direct or indirect. In this case, the failure of the “party in interest” or its affiliate to provide a bonding service as part of its general business operations raises the posibility of less than an arm's length business relationship between the plan and the agent, broker, surety or other company since the objectivity of either the plan or the agent, broker or surety may be influenced by the “party in interest”.
(c) The application of the principles discussed in this section is illustrated by the following examples:
Example 1.B, a broker, renders actuarial and consultant service to plan P. B has also procured a group life insurance policy for plan P. B may also place a bond for P with surety company S, provided that neither B nor P has any significant control or financial interest, direct or indirect, in S and provided that neither P nor any other “party in interest” in P, e.g., an officer of the plan, has any significant control or financial interest, direct or indirect, in B or S.
Example 2.I, a life insurance company, has provided a group life insurance policy for plan P. I is affiliated with S, a surety company, and has a significant financial interest or control in S. P is not prohibited from obtaining a bond from S since I's affiliation with S does not ordinarily, in and of itself, affect the objectivity of P in procuring the bond or the objectivity of S in bonding P's personnel. However, if any other “party in interest” as defined in section 3(13) of the Act, such as the employer whose employees are covered by P, should have a significant financial interest or control in S, S could not write the bond for P, since the employer's interest affects the objectivity of P and S.
source: 28 FR 14403, Dec. 27, 1963, unless otherwise noted. Redesignated at 50 FR 26706, June 28, 1985.
cite as: 29 CFR 2580.412-36