(a) The Investigative Files of the Inspector General (NARA-23) and the Insider Threat Program Records (NARA-45) systems of records are eligible for exemption under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) because these record systems contain investigatory material of actual, potential, or alleged criminal, civil, or administrative violations, compiled for law enforcement purposes other than within the scope of subsection (j)(2) of 5 U.S.C. 552a. If you are denied any right, privilege, or benefit to which you would otherwise be entitled by Federal law, or for which you would otherwise be eligible, as a result of the record, NARA will make the record available to you, except for any information in the record that would disclose the identity of a confidential source as described in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).

(b) The systems described in paragraph (a) of this section are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1) and (e)(4), (G) and (H), and (f). Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:

(1) From subsection (c)(3) of 5 U.S.C. 552a because releasing disclosure accounting could alert the subject of an investigation about the alleged violations, about the existence of the investigation, and about the fact that they are being investigated by the Office of Inspector General (OIG), the Insider Threat Office, or another agency. Releasing these records could provide significant information concerning the nature of the investigation and result in tampering with or destroying evidence, influencing witnesses, endangering individuals involved, and other activities that could impede or compromise the investigation.

(2) From the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) of 5 U.S.C. 552a because access to the information contained in these systems of records could inform the subject of an investigation about an actual or potential criminal, civil, or administrative violation; about the existence of that investigation; about the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained on the person's activities; about the identity of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel; and about information that may enable the person to avoid being detected or apprehended. These factors present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement when they prevent investigators from successfully completing the investigation, endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, or lead to improperly influencing witnesses, destroying evidence, or fabricating testimony. In addition, granting access to such records could disclose security-sensitive or confidential business information or information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Amending these records could allow the subject to avoid being detected or apprehended and interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities.

(3) From subsection (e)(1) of 5 U.S.C. 552a because applying this provision could impair investigations and interfere with the law enforcement responsibilities of the OIG, the Insider Threat Office, or another agency for the following reasons:

(i) It is not possible to detect relevance or need for specific information in the early stages of an investigation, case, or matter. After the investigators evaluate the information, they may establish its relevance and need.

(ii) During an investigation, the investigating office may obtain information about other actual or potential criminal, civil, or administrative violations, including those outside the scope of its jurisdiction. The office should retain this information, as it may help establish patterns of inappropriate activity, and can provide valuable leads for Federal and other law enforcement agencies.

(iii) When interviewing individuals or obtaining other forms of evidence during an investigation, the investigator may receive information that relates to matters incidental to the primary purpose of the investigation but which may also relate to matters under the investigative jurisdiction of another office or agency. The investigator cannot readily segregate such information.

(4) From subsection (e)(4)(G) and (H) of 5 U.S.C. 552a because these systems are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d), pursuant to subsection (k)(2) of the Privacy Act.

(5) From subsection (f) of 5 U.S.C. 552a because these systems are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) of 5 U.S.C. 552a,pursuant.