LIQ-9-01-RR:IT:EC 227564 IOR
Port Director
U.S. Customs Service
Protest Section
11099 South La Cienega Boulevard
Los Angeles CA 90045
Attn: Suzanne McCarthy
RE: Application for further review of Protest No. 2720-97-100566; 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1); mistake of fact;
classification of thyristor modules; classification of
parts; ABB Power Transmission v. United States; Taban co. v.
United States; Zaki Corp. v. United States
Dear Sir:
The above-referenced protest was forwarded to this office
for further review. Our review follows a meeting held on
December 23, 1997 between counsel for protestant and the Duty and
Refund Determination Branch, and our receipt of a December 31,
1997 submission on behalf of the protestant. We have considered
the facts and issues raised, and our decision follows.
FACTS:
This protest has been filed against your denial of requests
for reliquidation of the subject entries, pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
1520(c)(1).
This protest concerns 13 entries filed by the protestant
from May 9, 1995 through September 11, 1995, in the Los Angeles
airport, covering various different items, identified on the
invoices and air waybills as fiber optic ducts, long rod
insulators, insulators, MKV capacitors, TE-connectors, spare
parts VBE & TM, optical interface, water ducts, mechanical parts,
tools, bus conductors/fittings, arrester system, fibre optics,
spare parts valve tower, screws and bolts, thyristor level test
unit, thyristor monitoring, TE-cards and spare parts module
(collectively referred to herein as "parts") and thyristor
modules. The items are classified under various subheadings,
including 8504.90.9090, 8546.20.0090 and 8532.25.0080 of the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). The
entry summaries describe the merchandise as "inductor parts,
other" under subheading 8504.90.9090, HTSUS, as well as other
items such as "ceramic insulator: other", "static converters,
other" and "other threaded articles." Of the 13 entries which
are the subject of this protest, the entry documents for six of
them, make no reference to "thyristor". Apparently three
additional entries were made at the Los Angeles seaport, and are
the subject of a protest filed at the seaport.
A decision of the Court of International Trade, in ABB Power
Transmission v. United States, 896 F. Supp. 1279, Slip op. 95-141, was issued on August 4, 1995. The decision concerned the
classification of thyristor modules. Customs had classified the
thyristor modules under subheading 8504.90.00, HTSUS, which
provided for:
8504 Electrical transformers, static
converters (for example, rectifiers) and
inductors; parts thereof:
8504.90.00 Parts....................................................3%
The court determined that thyristor modules are properly
classifiable under subheading 8541.30.00, HTSUS, which provides
for:
8541 Diodes, transistors and similar
semiconductor devices...:
8541.30.00 Thyristors, diacs and triacs,
other than photosensitive
devices..............Free
The subject entries were liquidated from September 22, 1995
through December 29, 1995. According to Customs ACS (Automated
Commercial System) records, of the thirteen entries at issue, all
but two were liquidated on bypass, that is, without review by
Customs. Of the two entries reviewed by a Customs import
specialist, Entry no. 322-xxxx213-4, dated May 9, 1995, does not
include any thyristor modules, but includes long rod insulators,
MKV capacitors and TE-connectors, and Entry no. 322-xxxx413-4,
dated July 11, 1995, consists of insulators, water ducts,
mechanical parts, tools, thyristor module and bus
conductors/fittings.
According to an import specialist familiar with the entries,
the May 9, 1995 entry was reviewed based on matters other than
the classification issues under ABB, and the entry was accepted
on June 1, 1995, according to the CF 7501. According to the
import specialist, the July 11, 1995 entry was rejected for lack
of information on the mechanical parts and tools, and upon
receipt of additional information, was accepted on August 7,
1995, three days after the decision in the ABB case was issued.
There is no information as to whether or not the import
specialist accepting the entry on August 7, 1995 was aware of the
ABB decision.
On January 29, 1996, Customs issued to the protestant a
Request for Information (CF 28), with respect to "various"
entries made on "various" dates, requesting "descriptive or
illustrative literature or information explaining what the
merchandise is, where and how it is used, and exactly how it
operates," "breakdown of component materials or ingredients by
weight and the actual cost of the components at the time of
assembly into the finished articles." The CF 28 further stated:
"The entry documentation (invoices, bills of lading, etc.) is
insufficient to establish that the merchandise is actually
"thyristor modules", as in Slip Op 95-141. Please provide
information via mail or fax ... to support the claimed
classification."
The petitions for reliquidation under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1)
were filed on September 11, 1996. A petition pertaining to
thyristors and parts, sets forth the mistake of fact alleged as
follows:
The imported merchandise which is the subject of this
request is thyristor modules and related parts. The
imported merchandise was entered under the provision
for inductor parts under subheading 8504.90.90. The
imported articles were liquidated as entered under that
provision because Customs was not aware of the true
nature of the articles.
****
The liquidation of this entry inadvertently
occurred after the decision in the ABB case when the
classification of the article was no longer in dispute.
Had the true nature of the articles been known, this
mistake of fact would not have occurred and the
articles would be classified as they have been at Los
Angeles and other ports. The articles liquidated under
subheading 8504.90.90 should be reclassified with the
thyristor modules classified under subheading
8541.30.00, HTS, and the parts under subheading
8541.90.00, HTS. Unfortunately, this entry was
liquidated before the true nature of the articles was
made known to Los Angeles Customs in our submission of
February 28, 1996. That submission cleared up the
mistake of fact as to the nature of the articles.
The petitions varied, in that they pertained to thyristor
parts only, thyristor modules only, or thyristor modules and
related parts as in the language set forth above. Some of the
520(c) petitions specifically describe the thyristor parts, for
example the petition for Entry no. 322-xxxx513-2 includes the
term "bus conductors" in parentheses after referring to
"thyristor parts."
The petitions for reliquidation were denied on October 31,
1996 on the grounds that the claims are "not correctable under
section 520(c)(1)." A protest against the denials of the 19
U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) claims was filed on January 8, 1997. The
protest alleges that the subject merchandise, the thyristor
modules and parts should have been classified, respectively,
under subheadings 8541.30.00 and 8541.90.00, HTSUS. The protest
alleges that the CF 28 dated January 29, 1996 was issued with
respect to other entries of thyristor modules made prior to the
decision in the ABB case, and liquidated after the ABB decision.
According to the instant protest, protests with respect to the
other entries were granted after the February 28, 1996 response
to the CF 28 clarified the true nature of the thyristor modules
for Customs in Los Angeles. The protestant alleges:
The liquidation of the entries involved herein
inadvertently occurred after the decision in the ABB
case when the legal classification of thyristor modules
was no longer in dispute. These liquidations occurred
before the true nature of the imported articles was
made known to Los Angeles Customs and Import Specialist
Pazzo in our submission of February 28, 1996. That
submission cleared up the misunderstanding and mistake
of fact as to the nature of the articles, the only
issue which remained open with Customs at the time of
liquidation.
Further, the protestant alleges that two requests for
reliquidation under section 1520(c) which were filed, were
approved by Customs and were reliquidated with refunds. Based on
the Customs action of approving two requests for reliquidation,
the protestant takes the position:
Obviously, the Import Specialist recognized that all
that was involved was a mistake of fact as to the true
nature of the imported merchandise or the request for
reliquidation would never have been approved on these
two entries. This is a clear recognition that all that
is involved is a mistaken factual issue as to the
nature of the merchandise. Accordingly, these two
requests for reliquidation under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)
were properly approved.
The Port Director takes the position that "if the
merchandise is the same, a mistake of fact is supported" as the
descriptive literature supplied shows the thyristor modules to be
similar to those in ABB. However, the issue of parts was not
raised in ABB and in any event the parts that were discussed in
ABB are not the same as those shown on the entry documents.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure to liquidate the subject entries under
an HTSUS subheading determined by a court decision which was made
before the dates of the subject entries, constitutes an
inadvertence or mistake of fact, correctable under 19 U.S.C.
1520(c)(1).
LAW AND ANALYSIS:
Initially we note that this protest was timely filed
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1514(c)(2)(B). The date of decisions
protested was October 31, 1996 and the protest was filed on
January 8, 1997. In addition, the refusal to reliquidate an
entry under section 1520(c)(1) is a protestable matter pursuant
to 19 U.S.C. 1514(a)(7).
19 U.S.C. 1514 sets forth the proper procedure for an
importer to protest the classification and appraisal of
merchandise when it believes the Customs Service has
misinterpreted the applicable law. A protest must be filed
within ninety days after notice of liquidation or reliquidation.
Otherwise, the tariff treatment of merchandise is final and
conclusive.
19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1) is an exception to the finality of
1514. Under section 1520(c)(1) Customs may reliquidate an entry
to correct a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other
inadvertence, not amounting to an error in the construction of a
law. The error must be adverse to the importer and manifest from
the record or established by documentary evidence and brought to
the attention of the Customs Service within one year after the
date of liquidation. The relief provided for in 19 U.S.C.
1520(c)(1) is not an alternative to the relief provided for in
the form of protests under 19 U.S.C. 1514; section 1520(c)(1)
only affords "limited relief in the situations defined therein"
(Phillips Petroleum Company v. United States, 54 CCPA 7, 11,
C.A.D. 893 (1966), quoted in Godchaux-Henderson Sugar Co., Inc.,
v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 68, 69, C.D. 4874, 496 F. Supp.
1326 (1980); see also, Computime, Inc. v. United States, 9 CIT
553, 555, 622 F. Supp. 1083 (1985), and Concentric Pumps, Ltd. v.
United States, 10 CIT 505, 508, 643 F. Supp. 623 (1986)).
For section 1520(c)(1) purposes, a mistake of fact has been
defined as "a mistake which takes place when some fact which
indeed exists is unknown, or a fact which is thought to exist, in
reality does not exist." C.J. Tower & Sons of Buffalo, Inc. v.
United States, 68 Cust. Ct. 17, 21, C.D. 4327, 336 F. Supp. 1395,
1398 (1972), aff'd, 61 CCPA 90, C.A.D. 1129, 499 F.2d 1277
(1974). Inadvertence, on the other hand, has been defined as "an
oversight or involuntary accident, or the result of inattention
or carelessness, and even as a type of mistake." Id.
Essentially the protestant's claim is that the subject
merchandise was classified under the wrong HTSUS provision. The
mistake alleged by the protestant is that Customs was unaware of
the nature of the imported merchandise. The protestant has not
alleged any inadvertence other than that "the liquidation of this
entry inadvertently occurred after the decision in the ABB case
when the classification of the article was no longer in dispute."
The protestant has satisfied the import specialist that the
thyristor modules are the same as the thyristor modules at issue
in the ABB case. With respect to the "thyristor parts", the
protestant has failed to provide any evidence that the subject
imported merchandise was incorrectly classified. "Thyristor
parts" were not at issue in the ABB case. In the ABB case, the
thyristor modules were described as consisting of "six thyristor
elements..., heatsinks, voltage divider circuits and electronic
firing' circuitry." The imported "parts" are not described as
those in the ABB case, and the protestant has presented no
evidence or allegations to support that the "parts" were
incorrectly classified. The statements of counsel regarding the
classification of the parts in the 520(c) petitions and the
December 31, 1997 submission, are not evidence. Bar Bea Truck
Leasing Co. Inc. v. United States, 5 CIT 124, 126 (1983).
Therefore, the protestant has failed to establish that any error
has occurred with respect to the thyristor parts, as is required
under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(2).
However, assuming that a classification error was made, with
respect to both the thyristor modules and the "parts" we will
address the alleged mistake of fact. The courts have
consistently taken the position that an erroneous classification
of merchandise is not a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other
inadvertence within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1), but is
an error in the construction of a law. See, Mattel Inc. v.
United States, 377 F. Supp. 955, 72 Cust. Ct. 257, C.D. 4547
(1974); and C.J. Tower & Sons of Buffalo, Inc. v. United States,
336 F.Supp. 1395, 68 Cust. Ct. 17, C.D. 4327, aff'd. 499 F.2d
1277, 61 CCPA 90 (1972). Here, the only error set forth by the
protestant is one involving the classification of the imported
merchandise. Customs has found that an exception exists and
reliquidation is proper when a Customs officer is not aware of a
classification ruling. ORR Ruling 75-0026, dated January 24,
1975. The same holds true for court decisions. ORR Ruling 75-0026 also states, however, that if an import specialist takes
note of a Headquarters ruling, and decides it is not applicable
to the merchandise, that decision is an error in the construction
of the law, excluded from relief under 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1).
The limited exception described in ORR Ruling 75-0026 does not
apply to eleven of the subject entries, as they were not reviewed
by Customs, and it does not apply to the two entries reviewed by
Customs as 1) review of one of the entries had been completed
prior to the decision in the ABB case and 2) there is no
allegation that any of the import specialists were unaware of the
ABB case.
In C.J. Tower, supra, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals found a mistake of fact existed where neither the
importer nor Customs was aware that the merchandise under
consideration was emergency war materials entitled to duty-free
entry under a separate item of the tariff schedule until after
liquidation. The court found that this mistake of fact was
correctable under section 1520(c)(1) because it was a mistake
that went to the nature of the merchandise and was the underlying
cause for its incorrect classification. See Taban Co. v. United
States, 960 F. Supp. 326 (CIT 1997) (reprinted in Customs
Bulletin, March 19, 1997, p. 43) and Zaki Corp. v. United States,
960 F. Supp. 350 (CIT 1997) (reprinted in Customs Bulletin, April
2, 1997, p.84) (wherein the U.S. Court of International Trade
(CIT) found that there was a mistake of fact, rather than one of
law, because "the exact physical properties' of the merchandise
were not known to the broker or to Customs in this case"); HQ
223524, dated February 13, 1992 (wherein we found a mistake of
fact where merchandise was classified as a wool fabric, because
it had been identified on an invoice as "chief value wool" when
in fact it was "chief value silk").
As stated above, a mistake of fact must be manifest from the
record or established by documentary evidence. The CIT has ruled
that mere assertions by a complainant without supporting evidence
will not be regarded as sufficient to overturn a Customs
official's decision. Bar Bea Truck Leasing Co., Inc. V. United
States, 5 CIT 124, 126 (1983). Further, upon an assertion that
merchandise has been wrongly classified due to a mistake of fact,
"it is incumbent on the plaintiff to show by sufficient evidence
the nature of the mistake of fact." PPG Industries, Inc. v.
United States, 4 CIT 143, 147-148 (1982), citing Hambro
Automotive Corp. v. United States, 81 Cust. Ct. 29, 31, 458 F.
Supp. 1220,1222(1978) aff'd 66 CCPA 113, C.A.D. 1231, 603 F.2d
850 (1979).
In ITT Corp. v. United States, 24 F.3d 1384, 1387 (Fed. Cir.
1994), the court found that reliquidation under 19 U.S.C.
1520(c) requires both notice and substantiation. Notice of a
clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence includes
asserting the existence of a clerical error, mistake of fact, or
other inadvertence "within the proper time and with sufficient
particularity to allow remedial action." Id. With respect to
substantiation, the court stated "[m]istakes of fact that are not
manifest from [the] record ... must be established by documentary
evidence." Id. In a footnote on p. 1389, in discussing the type
of evidence that can be considered at trial, the court referred
to a Customs assertion that a claim of mistake of fact must be
supported by evidence (testimony or other credible proof) "of the
underlying facts that demonstrate the existence of such error,"
and that the plaintiff/importer bears the burden of establishing
the mistake of fact "by demonstrating the underlying facts"
needed to prove the allegation. The plain language of the
statute requires that the error be established by documentary
evidence, if it is not manifest from the record.
In this case, unlike in C.J. Tower, Taban, and Zaki, there
is no allegation that the importer of the merchandise, or the
broker who entered the merchandise was unaware of the nature of
the merchandise. In Taban, and Zaki, the court found that "the
exact physical properties' of the merchandise were not known to
the broker or to Customs." Taban, Customs Bulletin at p. 53;
Zaki, Customs Bulletin at p. 94. The court also concluded that
the "broker and Customs were unaware [of the exact physical
properties of the merchandise] until more than ninety days after
their liquidation and therefore plaintiff's broker could not have
relayed that information to Customs for its consideration in
classifying and liquidating the merchandise at issue." Id.,
Taban at 54; Zaki at 95-96. Similarly, in C.J. Tower, neither
the importer nor Customs was aware that the merchandise was
emergency war materials entitled to duty-free entry, until after
the liquidations became final. In this case, there is no
allegation or evidence that the entries could not have been
protested within 90 days of liquidation. Moreover, the entries
were liquidated from September 22, 1995 through December 29,
1995, and the ninety days after liquidation would have run from
December 21, 1995 through March 28, 1996. At the very least,
protestant could have filed a protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514 for
at least half of the entries, after receiving the January 29,
1996 CF 28.
In its protest, protestant states that:
ABB and [protestant] are intense, head-on
competitors in the converter station market. The ABB
and [protestant's] thyristor modules, or thyristor
valves, perform exactly the same functions in the
converter stations and are composed of essentially the
same elements, the principal element of which is the
individual thyristors connected in series which are
designed for high voltage usage.
The foregoing statement was made in support of the position that
the subject merchandise is the same as that at issue in the ABB
case. The statement also belies any inclination to assume that
the protestant was unaware of the fact that its thyristor modules
were the same as the ones at issue in the ABB case, or that the
protestant was unaware of the correct classification of the
merchandise. However, the protestant's understanding of the
nature of the merchandise is not at issue, as it is not alleged
that the protestant was unaware of the nature of the merchandise.
Another dissimilarity between the facts in C.J. Tower,
Taban, and Zaki, is that in those cases, the entry documents were
not clear as to the aspect of the nature of the merchandise which
caused the incorrect classification. In C.J. Tower, the
merchandise was known to be fuel cells, but it was not known that
they were emergency war materials. In Taban and Zaki, the entry
documents were not sufficient to inform the broker and Customs as
to the nature of the merchandise to be classified correctly (the
entry documents are described as providing a "limited description
of the imports," Zaki, id. at 47; Taban, id. at 88), whereas in
this case, the invoices clearly refer to "thyristor modules"
which was the exact item in issue in ABB. There is no mistake
about the nature of the merchandise. There is no allegation that
Customs did not know that the merchandise at issue consisted of
thyristor modules, just that Customs was not aware that the
thyristor modules being entered were the same as those in ABB.
Had the import specialist considered the classification of the
thyristor modules, the decision to classify the merchandise as
entered would be a mistake of law on the part of Customs, in that
the responsible import specialist concluded that the thyristor
modules were not classified the same as the ones in the ABB case.
To find that Customs made a mistake of fact by not knowing that
the thyristor modules imported were the exact same ones as in
ABB, and therefore classifiable under the same provision, is no
different than finding that Customs did not know under which
provision to classify imported thyristor modules, which would
clearly be a mistake of law. However, in this case no decision
on the entries at issue were made by Customs, except on two, one
of which did not include any thyristor modules, and the other for
which there is no evidence that the classification of the
thyristor module was considered.
Protestant takes the position that there must have been a
mistake of fact with respect to the liquidation of the entries at
issue because two petitions under section 1520(c)(1) with respect
to the entry of similar merchandise were granted. That is
insufficient to support a finding of a mistake of fact. Each
section 1520(c) claim is reviewed on its own merits, and Customs
is not required to follow a decision pertaining to a different
entry, especially if that decision may have been in error.
With respect to the "parts," there is insufficient evidence
provided from which to determine whether there was a mistake of
fact. It is alleged that the "parts" are "thyristor parts" but
there is no evidence provided on the nature of the mistake of
fact, and a mistake of fact is not manifest from the record.
In support of its position, the protestant cites ITT Corp.
v. United States, supra, and Executone Information Systems v.
United States, 96 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In ITT, the
claimed error was a mistake of fact in the initial creation of
the broker's records for which the broker used company records
applicable to other parts to be sent to a different customer.
See, 812 F.Supp. at 216. The CIT found that the broker
understood the nature of the merchandise to be other than what it
was, thereby finding a mistake of fact. Id. It was this mistake
of fact, which was demonstrated by evidence, that resulted in the
improper classification of the merchandise upon improper
liquidation. An error that does not directly cause an improper
liquidation is not an error within the meaning of section
1520(c). In ITT, in filling out the Customs entry forms, the
importer's agent used company records applicable to parts which
were finished to a greater degree and which were to be sent to a
different customer. In this case, there is no claim that the
entry documents do not correctly reflect the merchandise entered.
In Executone Information Systems v. United States, 96 F.3d
1383 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the court made an initial inquiry of
whether the plaintiff therein, Executone, had alleged a mistake
of law or a mistake of fact. Id. 1385. In Executone, the
importer had failed to file, upon entry, the forms required for
duty-free treatment under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act (CBERA). The court found that the importer had alleged a
mistake of fact, that the importer believed, at the time of
importation, that the required forms under CBERA had been filed
when, in fact, they had not. Id. at 1386. In Executone, the
court distinguished between a mistake of
law and mistake of fact:
[M]istakes of fact occur in instances where either (1)
the facts exist, but are unknown, or (2) the facts do
not exist as they are believed to. Mistakes of law, on
the other hand, occur where the facts are known, but
their legal consequences are not known or are believed
to be different than they really are. (Emphasis
supplied)
Id. (citing Hambro Automotive Corp. v. United States, 603 F.2d
850, 855 (CCPA 1979). Secondly, the court determined whether the
importer had "sufficiently demonstrated rather than merely
alleged, a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other
inadvertence' as those terms are used in section 1520(c)(1)."
Id. at 1388. The court found that it was not manifest from the
record and the importer failed to establish that the importer's
failure to submit the required forms was due to a mistake of fact
or inadvertence. Similarly, in the instant case, the protestant
alleges a mistake of fact, that Customs did not know the nature
of the merchandise entered, however, fails to substantiate the
claim, and fails to show how such a mistake of fact resulted in
the erroneous classification.
We find that the protestant has failed to establish that the
"parts" were erroneously classified, but has established that the
thyristor modules were erroneously classified. However, with
respect to the "parts" and the thyristor modules, the protestant
has failed to meet either the notice or substantiation
requirements of section 1520(c)(1). No mistake of fact
whatsoever is alleged with respect to the "parts" and the mistake
alleged with respect to the thyristor modules is insufficient to
establish that it caused the erroneous liquidation. With respect
to the "parts" there is no alleged mistake to substantiate and
with respect to the thyristor modules, other than descriptions of
other entries for which reliquidation was granted, no documentary
evidence is provided to substantiate the alleged mistake of fact,
and no mistake of fact is manifest from the record.
Each of these entries were made after December 8, 1993, the
effective date of the NAFTA Implementation Act (Act of December
8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2057, Pub. L. 103-182) under which Congress
implemented the concept of shared responsibility between Customs
and importers. Congress amended 19 U.S.C. 1484 to require
importers to use reasonable care in classifying merchandise on
entries and allowed Customs to rely on the information submitted
by importers. See H. Rpt. 100-361, Part 1, 136 (November 5,
1993).
As pointed out above, more than one half of the invoices
describe the merchandise as thyristor modules. The protestant
claims that they are thyristor modules. If there was a mistake
in the liquidation, the evidence does not show a lack of
knowledge as to the identity of the goods. The other entries are
claimed to cover thyristor parts. For these entries, neither the
entry papers, nor any documentary evidence, show that they were
thyristor parts; that they were classified incorrectly, and that
if they were classified incorrectly, that the incorrect
classification was due to a mistake of fact or other inadvertence
not amounting to an error in the construction of a law. The
importer does not allege it was unaware of the identity of the
merchandise and by law the importer was responsible for the
classification.
HOLDING:
The protestant has not established that the liquidation of
entries under a different HTSUS subheading than that decided in a
court case is a mistake of fact in the liquidation of the subject
entries, and reliquidation of the entries is not permissible
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1520(c)(1).
Consistent with the decision set forth above, you are hereby
directed to deny the subject protest. In accordance with Section
3A(11)(b) of Customs Directive 099 3550-065, dated August 4,
1993, Subject: Revised Protest Directive, this decision should be
mailed by your office to the protestant no later than 60 days
from the date of this letter. Any reliquidation of the entry in
accordance with the decision must be accomplished prior to
mailing of the decision. Sixty days from the date of the
decision the Office of Regulations and Rulings will take steps to
make the decision available to customs personnel via the Customs
Rulings Module in ACS and the public via the Diskette
Subscription Service, Freedom of Information Act and other public
access channels.
Sincerely,
Director,
Commercial Rulings Division