PRO-2-01
OT:RR:CTF:ER H023872 GGK
Carlos Bogran, Jr.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Vessel Repair Unit
1515 Poydras Street, Suite 1700
New Orleans, LA 70112
RE: Internal advice regarding sufficiency of protest
Dear Mr. Bogran:
This is in response to your request for internal advice regarding two protests filed by counsel on behalf of Puerto Rico Towing & Barge Co. (“P.R. Towing”).
FACTS:
The Punta Borinquen is a tug vessel that operates primarily in and around Puerto Rico. The vessel is owned and operated by P.R. Towing. On August 9, 2003, the vessel was dry docked in Las Calderas, Dominican Republic for repairs and maintenance. Subsequently, on September 2, 2003, the vessel departed the Dominican Republic. On or about September 4, 2003, the vessel arrived at the Port of San Juan, Puerto Rico. Thereafter, P.R. Towing filed vessel repair entry xxx-xxxx250-8 with Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) on September 17, 2003, at the Port of New Orleans, Louisiana (“Port”), for the vessel repairs and maintenance performed in the Dominican Republic.
After reviewing the vessel repair entry and the attached invoice, the Port: 1) assessed duties in the amount of $71,287.35 and 2) issued a bill to P.R. Towing on September 28, 2007. See Bill Number 449064784. The Port determined that the vessel repairs were subject to duty because the single-paged invoice filed with the vessel repair entry failed to provide sufficient information regarding the cost of labor, parts, materials, and equipment used when repairing the vessel. Consequently, based on the information provided, the Port could not verify whether the vessel repairs were eligible for preferential treatment under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (“CBERA”). Therefore, the Port made a duty determination concerning vessel repair entry xxx-xxxx250-8 that denied duty-free treatment under CBERA.
1. P.R. Towing’s requests for reconsideration.
Upon receiving the bill from CBP on September 28, 2007, counsel for P.R. Towing submitted a letter dated December 12, 2007 (“December 12, 2007 letter”), by email, to the Vessel Repair Unit (“VRU”). The December 12, 2007 letter requested reconsideration of the duty assessment and indicated that supplemental information would be submitted in support of the request for reconsideration. In addition, the December 12, 2007 letter asserted that the vessel repair entry at issue in this case is similar to the situation presented in Headquarters Ruling Letter HQ H006055 (Sept. 26, 2007). In response to the request for reconsideration, the VRU, on December 13, 2007, informed counsel that in order for CBP to reconsider the duty assessment, P.R. Towing must file a protest with supporting evidence to demonstrate that 35% of the shipyard costs were products of a CBERA beneficiary country.
On December 17, 2007, counsel again contacted the VRU via email and attached a second letter (“December 17, 2007 letter”) that requested reconsideration of the duty determination. In the December 17, 2007 letter, counsel stated that he was requesting reconsideration “in the hopes that we can avoid the necessity of preparing a very exhaustive protest.” In addition, attached to the December 17, 2007 letter was a copy of two invoices issued by Ciramar, a Dominican Republic shipyard. The two Ciramar invoices included detailed breakdowns for the cost of labor and parts. According to counsel, in HQ H006055 CBP reviewed the Ciramar invoices and determined that they provided sufficient details to establish preferential treatment under CBERA. Moreover, counsel asserted that the Ciramar invoices are comparable to the invoice submitted with the vessel repair entry at issue in this case. The VRU responded to counsel’s second request for reconsideration on the same day—December 17, 2007. In the response, the VRU informed counsel that unlike the detailed Ciramar invoices, the shipyard invoice submitted for the vessel repair entry at issue was a single-paged document. Moreover, that single-paged invoice failed to break down the actual cost of labor and parts. Finally, the VRU again advised counsel to file a protest if he believed his argument had merit.
2. Protest A
On January 10, 2008, counsel mailed a letter directly to the New Orleans’ Port Director (“January 10, 2008 letter”). In that letter, counsel asserted that P.R. Towing had 180 days from the date of duty determination to file a protest. Moreover, the January 10, 2008 letter states:
The importer has until March 26, 2008 to file a protest for the referenced entry in the Hartford’s letter based on the September 28, 2007 liquidation date. We shall be filing a protest before the filing deadline expires. The importer is well within the time limit to file the required protest and no action must be taken by Customs at this time. Therefore, we respectfully request that Customs take no action against the customs broker and/or the importer. Also, we respectfully request that Customs make no formal demands upon the surety to allow the importer to exhaust its administrative remedies pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3).
Subsequently, on January 28, 2008, P.R. Towing filed Protest number 2002-08-100071 (“Protest A”). On January 29, 2008, the Port denied Protest A as untimely under the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004 because it was filed more than 90 days after the date of duty determination.
3. Protest B
After CBP denied its first protest as untimely, P.R. Towing filed Protest number 2002-08-100080 (“Protest B”) on February 8, 2008. Both Protest A and Protest B address the same vessel repair entry and contest CBP’s September 28, 2007 duty assessment. In addition, Protest B asserts that there was a mistake of fact pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) as an alternative ground for relief.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the filing of Protest A was proper.
2. Whether the filing of Protest B was proper.
3. Whether the denial of duty-free treatment for the vessel repair entry should be reconsidered pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1).
4. Whether a protest may be deemed granted by operation of law.
LAW AND ANALYSIS:
On February 26, 2008, we received your request for internal advice on the issue of timeliness and the second protest filed by P.R. Towing. In addition, you later requested that we address P.R. Towing’s request for reconsideration pursuant to section 520 of the Tariff Act of 1930, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1), and counsel’s assertion that the protests should be “constructively approved” because more than two years have elapsed since the protests were filed.
1. Whether the filing of Protest A was proper.
As an initial matter, we note that the Port properly denied Protest A as untimely. Generally, a claimant may protest the amount of duties assessed by CBP pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(2). In order for CBP to consider the merits of a protest, the protest must be filed within the statutory timeframe. On December 3, 2004, the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004 (“2004 Trade Act”) was enacted to extend the period for filing protests from 90 days to 180 days. The 180-day period is not retroactive, however, and only applies to merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after December 18, 2004. See 19 U.S.C. § 1401 note (2006); Pub. L. No. 108-429, § 2108, 118 Stat. 2434, 2598 (2004).
In this case, P.R. Towing filed the vessel repair entry on September 17, 2003, which is prior to the December 18, 2004 effective date of the 2004 Trade Act. Therefore, the 90-day protest filing deadline is applicable to P.R. Towing’s protest. Consequently, P.R. Towing was required to file its protest within 90 days after the date of duty determination or else CBP’s decision becomes final pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a), (c)(3). See Juice Farms v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that liquidations are subject to the timely protest requirement; however, in the absence of a timely protest, all liquidations become final and conclusive pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514).
Based on the facts of the case, P.R. Towing failed to file a protest within the applicable protest filing period. Specifically, the Port made a duty determination with respect to the vessel repair entry on September 28, 2007. Once duty was determined, P.R. Towing had 90 days, or until December 27, 2007, to file its protest. On December 13, 2007, the VRU informed counsel by email that a protest with proper evidentiary support was required to dispute the duty determination concerning the entry. Although counsel indicated in his December 17, 2007 letter that he wanted to “avoid the necessity of preparing a very exhaustive protest,” the VRU again reiterated the need for a protest filing in her emailed reply. Rather than file a protest on or before December 27, 2007, however, counsel sent his January 10, 2008 letter, which specifically instructed CPB to halt all actions with regards to the vessel repair entry because a protest was forthcoming. Thereafter, counsel filed Protest A on January 28, 2008, which is 122 days after determination of duties concerning the vessel repair entry on September 28, 2007. It is noted that by the time counsel sent the January 10, 2008 letter, the protest filing deadline was already expired and CPB was barred from considering the merits of any future protest filed in this case. Thus, because Protest A was filed more than 90 days after determination of duties, the Port properly denied Protest A as untimely.
When a protest or application for further review is denied, a party may elect to file a request to set aside the denial of the application for further review or to void the denial of the protest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1515(c) and (d). In this case, P.R. Towing did not request reconsideration pursuant to one of these administrative review procedures. Rather, counsel for P.R. Towing filed a second protest, Protest B, on February 8, 2008.
2. Whether the filing of Protest B was proper.
Under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(1), only one protest may be filed for each entry. See Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1375 n.2 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004) (holding that 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(1) precludes the filing of two protests relating to the same entries and the same category of merchandise, therefore, only the first protest received by Customs for filing may practicably be treated as valid). Protest B was filed 133 days after the September 28, 2007 duty determination date. Moreover, counsel filed Protest B after CBP denied Protest A as untimely. Therefore, Protest B is denied as untimely and because P.R. Towing already filed a previous protest on the same transaction.
Even if Protest B was proper and timely filed, however, the arguments contained in that protest are without merit. We note that in Protest B, counsel alleges, for the first time, that the December 12, 2007 letter emailed to the VRU constitutes the filing of a timely protest and that the December 17, 2007 letter constitutes an amendment to that protest. The content of counsel’s email communications and the improper filing of the email communications, however, do not support counsel’s position.
In asserting that the emailed letters are valid protest filings, counsel relies on two cases, Labay Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 83 Cust. Ct. 152 (1979), and Mattel, Inc. v. United States, 377 F.Supp. 955 (Cust. Ct. 1974). In Mattel, the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) summarized the traditional position taken by courts when construing the sufficiency of protests. As a general rule, “however cryptic, inartistic, or poorly drawn a communication may be, it is sufficient as a protest for purposes of section 514 if it conveys enough information to appraise knowledgeable officials of the importer’s intent and the relief sought.” Mattel, 377 F.Supp. at 960. See, generally, United States v. M. Rice & Co., 257 U.S. 536, 539-40 (1922) (holding that a Customs protest must be distinct and specific enough to show that the objection taken at the hearing or trial was at the time of filing the protest in the mind of the importer and sufficient to notify the collector of its true nature and character to the end that he might then ascertain the precise facts and have adequate opportunity to correct mistakes and cure defects). Although the courts favor the position that letters should be liberally construed to satisfy protest requirements, there are limitations to the rule.
One such limitation is the significance of a party’s actual intent when submitting a letter that is later claimed to be a protest. The U.S. Customs Court addressed the importance of a party’s intent in the case Continental Ore Corp. v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 1060 (Cust. Ct. 1971). In that case, an experienced customs broker mailed a letter to the Customs Collector on behalf of the importer. Continental Ore, 331 F. Supp. at 1062. The letter stated that the liquidated duties were being paid by the importer under protest and that formal protests would be filed to contest the liquidation. Id. Like counsel in the instant case, the customs broker in Continental Ore argued that the letter constituted a valid protest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514 after the formal protests were denied as untimely. In rejecting the broker’s claim, the Customs Court warned that:
A customhouse broker experienced in filing protests, who writes a letter which puts the collector in the equivocal position of guessing how he should consider the letter under section 514, must do so at the peril that the collector will not consider the letter as a protest. If the collector does not consider the letter as a protest under section 514 then, in our opinion, for the plaintiff to prevail there must be some showing that in the sense conveyed by the letter and the circumstances attending its delivery by the customhouse broker the letter was intended as a protest under section 514.
Continental Ore, 331 F. Supp. at 1064. Furthermore, the Customs Court concluded that the wording of the broker’s letter only placed the collector on notice that protests would be filed and conveyed a sense of inaction to the collector pending the filing of formal protests. 331 F. Supp. at 1064. Compare Mattel, 377 F.Supp. at 957 (demonstrating that the language contained in the letters filed by the protesting party specified an official request to correct the classification of goods); and Labay, 83 Cust. Ct. at 153 (showing that the letter filed by the protesting party included language making an official request for Customs to reliquidate the entry), with Continental Ore, 331 F. Supp. at 1064 (noting that the letter objected to the duty assessed but also stated that formal protests would be filed at a later date regarding the liquidation of the entries).
Reminiscent of the broker’s letter in Continental Ore, counsel’s December 2007 email communications and his January 10, 2008 letter simply placed the VRU on notice that a formal protest would be filed to contest the duty determination. For instance, counsel indicated in his December 17, 2007 letter that he wished to “avoid the necessity of preparing a very exhaustive protest.” Moreover, counsel’s January 10, 2008 letter specifically instructed CBP to cease all action with regards to the vessel repair entry because P.R. Towing intended to file a protest. Such language conveys a sense of inaction to the VRU in anticipation of P.R. Towing filing a formal protest. Consequently, we find that counsel, an experienced customs attorney, never intended his letters dated December 12, and 17, 2007, to constitute a formal protest or protest amendment. Therefore, in accordance with the holding in Continental Ore, these communications will not be treated as a protest and protest amendment pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514.
3. Whether the denial of duty-free treatment for the vessel repair entry should be reconsidered pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1).
Although Protest B is untimely pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514 and must be denied procedurally, we recognize that P.R. Towing’s counsel raised a 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) mistake of fact claim within Protest B. We therefore review P.R. Towing’s 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) claim independently of Protest B and consider whether the denial of duty-free treatment for vessel repair entry xxx-xxxx250-8 should be reconsidered due to mistake of fact. Initially, we determine that P.R. Towing may assert an argument to reconsider pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1). Although the 2004 Trade Act repealed § 1520(c) in its entirety, the repeal did not apply to merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption before December 18, 2004. See 19 U.S.C. § 1401 note (2006); Pub. L. No. 108-429, § 2108, 118 Stat. 2434, 2598 (2004). Consequently, because the Entry xxx-xxxx250-8 was filed before the effective date of the 2004 Trade Act, P.R. Towing retains the option to file a claim under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c).
Next, 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) allows parties to file a claim alleging a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence provided that the claim was filed one year after the date of liquidation or exaction. See 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) (2003); 19 C.F.R. § 173.4 (2010). Because P.R. Towing raised its § 1520(c)(1) mistake of fact claim as a part of Protest B, filed on February 8, 2008, the one-year deadline for making a claim is satisfied.
Although timely, we determine that P.R. Towing’s § 1520(c)(1) claim must be denied. According to § 1520(c)(1) (2004), CBP may reconsider a duty determination for an entry when there is
[A] clerical error, mistake of fact, or otherwise inadvertence, whether or not resulting from or contained in electronic transmission, not amounting to an error in the construction of a law, adverse to the importer and manifest from the record or established by documentary evidence, in any entry, liquidation, or other customs transaction. . .
Stated differently, to prevail on a reconsideration request pursuant to § 1520(c)(1), the claimant must satisfy a two-pronged test and prove 1) that the error is a clerical error, mistake of fact or an inadvertence, and 2) that the error does not amount to a misconstruction of the law. See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. United States (“Esso II”), 559 F.3d 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
In making its § 1520(c)(1) claim, P.R. Towing asserts that under CBERA, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707, vessel repairs performed in CBERA beneficiary countries are eligible for duty-free treatment provided that such repairs meet the statutory requirements of the program. According to P.R. Towing, the vessel repairs at issue in this case qualify for duty-free treatment under CBERA because they were carried out in the Dominican Republic. Moreover, P.R. Towing asserts that CBP was aware that duty-free treatment was requested for the vessel repair entry at issue. Therefore, P.R. Towing believes that CBP’s alleged failure to “implement the law to function as it should” was a mistake of fact, an inadvertence or both under § 1520(c)(1). No other allegation of clerical error, mistake of fact or inadvertence was asserted.
We agree with P.R. Towing that CBP knew of the request for duty-free treatment under CBERA for the vessel repair entry. However, a request for duty-free treatment under CBERA does not guarantee that the entry will be assessed free of duty if statutory requirements are not satisfied. As evidenced from the facts of this case, the VRU applied the requirements for duty-free treatment under CBERA to the evidence supplied by P.R. Towing. Based on the information contained in the vessel repair entry and invoice, however, the VRU could not verify whether 35% of the total cost and value of materials used for the repairs were products of the Dominican Republic. Consequently, duty was assessed on the vessel repair.
The question of whether CBP accurately applied the CBERA statute to the vessel repairs is not an action within the scope of review of § 1520(c)(1). Under the first test of § 1520(c)(1), a clerical error is described as an error made by “a subordinate acting contrary to binding instructions.” Ford, 157 F.3d at 860. A mistake of fact occurs when facts exist but are unknown or facts do not exist as they are believed to exist. Esso II, 559 F.3d at 1307 (internal citations omitted). Compare G & R Produce Co., 381 F.3d at 1333 (ignorance of the correct botanical designation for Persian limes resulting in misclassification constitutes a mistake of fact), with Hambro Auto. Corp. v. United States, 603 F.2d 850, 855 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (accountants’ misunderstanding of Customs’ ruling instructions, which resulted in errors when compiling the cost of production value, is not a mistake of fact or inadvertence). An inadvertence is described as “an oversight or involuntary accident, or the result of inattention or carelessness,” but does not encompass “intentional or negligent inaction” or “an advertent misunderstanding of the law.” Esso II, 559 F.3d at 1306-07 (internal citations omitted). Compare Aviall of Texas, Inc. v. United States, 70 F.3d 1248, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (forgetting to renew blanket certification until notice was received constitutes manifest inadvertence), with Century Importers, Inc. v. United States, 205 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (repeated failures to provide notice of duty arrangements constitute an advertent misunderstanding of the law rather than inadvertence). Once it is proven that a clerical error, mistake of fact or an inadvertence exist, the claimant must then demonstrate that the error does not amount to a misconstruction of law. An error becomes a misconstruction of law when “the facts are known, but the legal significance of those facts is not appreciated.” Esso II, 559 F.3d at 1308.
P.R. Towing asserts that CBP failed to properly implement existing law when making its duty determination for the vessel repair entry at issue. This alleged failure constitutes the sole basis of P.R. Towing’s mistake of fact or inadvertence claim. In making its claim, P.R. Towing relies solely on the Court of International Trade’s ruling in Esso Standard Oil v. United States (“Esso I”), 31 C.I.T. 1848 (2007). In Esso I, the CIT held that CBP’s failure to amend its regulations to reflect a change in law resulted in the Plaintiff’s incorrect entries of merchandise and erroneous payments of Harbor Maintenance Taxes (“HMT”). 31 C.I.T. at 1852-53. The Plaintiff was also ignorant of the changes in law and relied on the outdated regulations. Id. The Esso I court noted that CBP “did not implement the law it clearly knew was applicable and it took no steps which would permit the law to function as it should.” 31 C.I.T. at 1853. Therefore, the Esso I court concluded that CBP’s error constituted an inadvertence under § 1520(c)(1). 31 C.I.T. at 1852.
Esso I, however, was overturned in 2009 by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Esso II. In Esso II, the appellate court held that CBP’s failure to update its regulations to reflect current law falls under the category of negligent inaction rather than a inadvertence correctable under § 1520(c)(1). See 559 F.3d at 1306-07. Moreover, the Federal Circuit concluded that even if the error satisfied the first prong of the § 1520(c)(1) test, it still amounted to an error in the construction of law under the second prong. Esso II, 559 F.3d at 1308. Specifically, the Plaintiff-Appellant correctly understood all facts necessary to apply the law but failed to appreciate the legal consequences of those facts under the correct version of the law. Esso II, 559 F.3d at 1308. Thus, based on Esso II, ignorance of the law does not qualify as an inadvertence under § 1520(c)(1).
In accordance with Esso II, assuming arguendo that CBP erred in applying CBERA to the vessel repairs at issue, such an error would amount to an ignorance of the law, which does not qualify as a proper basis for a claim under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1). The factual evidence submitted to CBP by P.R. Towing is not alleged to constitute a mistake of fact. Moreover, both CBP and P.R. Towing understood the facts necessary to apply CBERA regulations. The only allegation of error is P.R. Towing’s assertion that CBP failed to accurately apply the law to the facts available. Assuming that counsel’s allegation had merit, then CBP would have simply failed to appreciate the legal consequences of the facts under CBERA. Thus, any error would be due to the construction of a law and not suitable for correction under § 1520(c)(1).
Finally, we note that the purpose of § 1520(c)(1) is to allow for corrections of errors and mistakes that cannot be corrected under existing law. See Degussa Canada Ltd. v. United States, 87 F.3d 1301, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that an importer that missed the deadline for filing a protest under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 cannot subsequently attempt to correct the protestable error by submitting a claim pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1)). In this case, P.R. Towing should have followed the existing laws governing protest procedure to seek reconsideration of the September 28, 2007 duty assessment. Having failed to file a protest within ninety days, P.R. Towing cannot use § 1520(c)(1) as a means to circumvent the deadline to file a protest prescribed under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3).
4. Whether a protest may be deemed granted by operation of law.
As a final matter, we note P.R. Towing’s counsel sent numerous letters to CBP requesting resolution of the protests filed in this case. In several letters, including one dated April 13, 2010, counsel alleges that the protests are “constructively approved” because more than two years had elapsed since the filing of the protests. Moreover, counsel asserts that 19 U.S.C. § 1515(a) supports his assertion.
Generally, § 1515(a) and 19 C.F.R. § 174.21(a) state that the appropriate customs officer, or port director, shall review and act on a protest filed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1514 within two years from the date the protest was filed. The CIT has addressed this issue in a recent case. In Hitachi Home Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010), the CIT reiterated the long established conclusion that the two-year deadline under § 1515(a) is not mandatory and does not deprive CBP of the power to act on a protest after the two-year period expires. See Hitachi at 1319 (citing Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 364, 367 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1988)). Moreover, Hitachi restated the fact that neither the statute nor CBP regulations specify any consequences for CBP’s failure to deny or allow a protest within the two-year period. 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1319. Therefore, there is no basis for the conclusion that a protest is allowed simply because CBP failed to act upon the protest with the two-year timeframe under § 1515(a). Hitachi, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1320.
In light of the clear and long established conclusion that the two-year timeframe, contained in § 1515(a) and § 174.21(a), is not mandatory and has no specific consequences attached, there is no basis to support counsel’s claim that a “constructive approval” process exist pursuant to statutory language. Moreover, § 1515(a) and § 174.21(a) only apply to valid protests that are filed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1514. Here, P.R. Towing failed to satisfy the filing deadline stipulated in 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3) when filing the two protests. Since the protests do not comply with § 1514 requirements, the two-year timeframe noted in § 1515(a) and § 174.21(a) are inapplicable.
HOLDING:
Both Protest 2002-08-100080 and Protest 2002-08-100071 were filed more than ninety days from the date of duty determination. Therefore, both protests are untimely. In addition, P.R. Towing’s 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) claim must be denied because no clerical error, mistake of fact or inadvertence is alleged that would not also amount to a misconstruction of the law.
Sixty days from the date of this letter, Regulations and Rulings will make the decision available to CBP personnel, and to the public on the CBP Home Page on the World Wide Web at www.CBP.gov, by means of the Freedom of Information Act, and other public methods of distribution.
Sincerely,
Myles B. Harmon, Director Commercial and Trade Facilitation Division