References in Text
Section 101(3)(A) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008, referred to in subsec. (b)(2), is [section 101(3)(A) of Pub. L. 110–422], Oct. 15, 2008, [122 Stat. 4783], which was not classified to the Code.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Transition Authorization Act of 2017, referred to in subsec. (c)(1), (2)(E), (G), is [Pub. L. 115–10], Mar. 21, 2017, [131 Stat. 18]. Section 2 of the Act is set out as a note under section 10101 of this title, section 301(b)(2) of the Act is set out in a note under this section, and section 432 of the Act is set out in a note under section 20302 of this title.
Amendments
2022—Subsec. (c)(2). [Pub. L. 117–167, § 10815(e)(1)], substituted “2028” for “2023” in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (c)(2)(J). [Pub. L. 117–167, § 10815(e)(2)], substituted “2030” for “2028” in introductory provisions.
2017—Subsec. (c). [Pub. L. 115–10] added subsec. (c).
Maximizing Utilization of ISS
[Pub. L. 115–10, title III], §§ 301–303, Mar. 21, 2017, [131 Stat. 22–26], provided that:“SEC. 301.
OPERATION OF THE ISS.
“(a)
Sense of Congress.—
It is the sense of Congress that—
“(1)
after 15 years of continuous human presence in low-Earth orbit, the ISS continues to overcome challenges and operate safely;
“(2)
the ISS is a unique testbed for future space exploration systems development, including long-duration space travel;
“(3)
the expansion of partnerships, scientific research, and commercial applications of the ISS is essential to ensuring the greatest return on investments made by the United States and its international space partners in the development, assembly, and operations of that unique facility;
“(4)
utilization of the ISS will sustain United States leadership and progress in human space exploration by—
“(A)
facilitating the commercialization and economic development of low-Earth orbit;
“(B)
serving as a testbed for technologies and a platform for scientific research and development; and
“(C)
serving as an orbital facility enabling research upon—
“(i)
the health, well-being, and performance of humans in space; and
“(ii)
the development of in-space systems enabling human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit; and
“(5)
the ISS provides a platform for fundamental, microgravity, discovery-based space life and physical sciences research that is critical for enabling space exploration, protecting humans in space, increasing pathways for commercial space development that depend on advances in basic research, and contributes to advancing science, technology, engineering, and mathematics research.
“(b)
Objectives.—
The primary objectives of the ISS program shall be—
“(1)
to achieve the long term goal and objectives under section 202 of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (
42 U.S.C. 18312); and
“(2)
to pursue a research program that advances knowledge and provides other benefits to the Nation.
“(c)
Continuation of the ISS.—
“SEC. 302.
TRANSPORTATION TO ISS.
“(a)
Findings.—
Congress finds that reliance on foreign carriers for United States crew transfer is unacceptable, and the Nation’s human space flight program must acquire the capability to launch United States government astronauts on vehicles using United States rockets from United States soil as soon as is safe, reliable, and affordable to do so.
“(b)
Sense of Congress on Commercial Crew Program and Commercial Resupply Services Program.—
It is the sense of Congress that—
“(1)
once developed and certified to meet the Administration’s safety and reliability requirements, United States commercially provided crew transportation systems can serve as the primary means of transporting United States government astronauts and international partner astronauts to and from the ISS and serving as ISS crew rescue vehicles;
“(2)
previous budgetary assumptions used by the Administration in its planning for the Commercial Crew Program assumed significantly higher funding levels than were authorized and appropriated by Congress;
“(3)
credibility in the Administration’s budgetary estimates for the Commercial Crew Program can be enhanced by an independently developed cost estimate;
“(4)
such credibility in budgetary estimates is an important factor in understanding program risk;
“(5)
United States access to low-Earth orbit is paramount to the continued success of the ISS and ISS National Laboratory;
“(6)
a stable and successful Commercial Resupply Services Program and Commercial Crew Program are critical to ensuring timely provisioning of the ISS and to reestablishing the capability to launch United States government astronauts from United States soil into orbit, ending reliance upon Russian transport of United States government astronauts to the ISS which has not been possible since the retirement of the Space Shuttle program in 2011;
“(7)
NASA should build upon the success of the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Program and Commercial Resupply Services Program that have allowed private sector companies to partner with NASA to deliver cargo and scientific experiments to the ISS since 2012;
“(8)
the 21st Century Launch Complex Program has enabled significant modernization and infrastructure improvements at launch sites across the United States to support NASA’s Commercial Resupply Services Program and other civil and commercial space flight missions; and
“(9)
the 21st Century Launch Complex Program should be continued in a manner that leverages State and private investments to achieve the goals of that program.
“(c)
Reaffirmation.—
Congress reaffirms—
“(1)
its commitment to the use of a commercially developed, private sector launch and delivery system to the ISS for crew missions as expressed in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005 (
[Public Law 109–155];
[119 Stat. 2895]) [see Tables for classification], the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008 (
[Public Law 110–422];
[122 Stat. 4779]) [see Tables for classification], and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (
42 U.S.C. 18301 et seq.); and
“(2)
the requirement under
section 50111(b)(1)(A) of title 51, United States Code, that the Administration shall make use of United States commercially provided ISS crew transfer and crew rescue services to the maximum extent practicable.
“(d)
Use of Non-United States Human Space Flight Transportation Capabilities.—
“(e)
Commercial Crew Program.—
“(1)
Objective.—
The objective of the Commercial Crew Program shall be to assist in the development and certification of commercially provided transportation that—
“(A)
can carry United States government astronauts safely, reliably, and affordably to and from the ISS;
“(B)
can serve as a crew rescue vehicle; and
“(C)
can accomplish subparagraphs (A) and (B) as soon as practicable.
“(2)
Primary consideration.—
The objective described in paragraph (1) shall be the primary consideration in the acquisition strategy for the Commercial Crew Program.
“(3)
Safety.—
“(A)
In general.—
The Administrator shall protect the safety of government astronauts by ensuring that each commercially provided transportation system under this subsection meets all applicable human rating requirements in accordance with section 403(b)(1) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (
42 U.S.C. 18342(b)(1)).
“(B)
Lessons learned.—
Consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, the Administration shall ensure that safety and the minimization of the probability of loss of crew are the critical priorities of the Commercial Crew Program.
“(4)
Cost minimization.—
The Administrator shall strive through the competitive selection process to minimize the life cycle cost to the Administration through the planned period of commercially provided crew transportation services.
“(f)
Commercial Cargo Program.—
“(g)
Competition.—
It is the policy of the United States that, to foster the competitive development, operation, improvement, and commercial availability of space transportation services, and to minimize the life cycle cost to the Administration, the Administrator shall procure services for Federal Government access to and return from the ISS, whenever practicable, via fair and open competition for well-defined, milestone-based, Federal Acquisition Regulation-based contracts under section 201(a) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (
42 U.S.C. 18311(a)).
“(h)
Transparency.—
“(1)
Sense of congress.—
It is the sense of Congress that cost transparency and schedule transparency aid in effective program management and risk assessment.
“(2)
In general.—
The Administrator shall, to the greatest extent practicable and in a manner that does not add costs or schedule delays to the program, ensure all Commercial Crew Program and Commercial Resupply Services Program providers provide evidence-based support for their costs and schedules.
“(i)
ISS Cargo Resupply Services Lessons Learned.—
Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act [Mar. 21, 2017], the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that—
“(1)
identifies the lessons learned to date from previous and existing Commercial Resupply Services contracts;
“(2)
indicates whether changes are needed to the manner in which the Administration procures and manages similar services prior to the issuance of future Commercial Resupply Services procurement opportunities; and
“(3)
identifies any lessons learned from the Commercial Resupply Services contracts that should be applied to the procurement and management of commercially provided crew transfer services to and from the ISS or to other future procurements.
“SEC. 303.
ISS TRANSITION PLAN.
“(a)
Findings.—
Congress finds that—
“(1)
NASA has been both the primary supplier and consumer of human space flight capabilities and services of the ISS and in low-Earth orbit; and
“(2)
according to the National Research Council report ‘Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration’ extending ISS beyond 2020 to 2024 or 2028 will have significant negative impacts on the schedule of crewed missions to Mars, without significant increases in funding.
“(b)
Sense of Congress.—
It is the sense of Congress that—
“(1)
an orderly transition for United States human space flight activities in low-Earth orbit from the current regime, that relies heavily on NASA sponsorship, to a regime where NASA is one of many customers of a low-Earth orbit commercial human space flight enterprise may be necessary; and
“(2)
decisions about the long-term future of the ISS impact the ability to conduct future deep space exploration activities, and that such decisions regarding the ISS should be considered in the context of the human exploration roadmap under section 432 of this Act [set out in a note under
section 20302 of this title].
[For definitions of terms used in sections 301 to 303 of [Pub. L. 115–10], set out above, see [section 2 of Pub. L. 115–10], set out as a note under section 10101 of this title.]