42 USC 2160e - Congressional review and oversight of agreements with Iran

U.S Code last checked for updates: Nov 22, 2024

§ 2160e.

Congressional review and oversight of agreements with Iran

(a)

Transmission to Congress of nuclear agreements with Iran and verification assessment with respect to such agreements

(1)

Transmission of agreements

Not later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership—

(A)

the agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1), including all related materials and annexes;

(B)

a verification assessment report of the Secretary of State prepared under paragraph (2) with respect to the agreement; and

(C)

a certification that—

(i)

the agreement includes the appropriate terms, conditions, and duration of the agreement’s requirements with respect to Iran’s nuclear activities and provisions describing any sanctions to be waived, suspended, or otherwise reduced by the United States, and any other nation or entity, including the United Nations; and

(ii)

the President determines the agreement meets United States non-proliferation objectives, does not jeopardize the common defense and security, provides an adequate framework to ensure that Iran’s nuclear activities permitted thereunder will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and ensures that Iran’s nuclear activities permitted thereunder will not be used to further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose, including for any research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other nuclear-related military purpose.

(2)

Verification assessment report

(A)

In general

The Secretary of State shall prepare, with respect to an agreement described in paragraph (1), a report assessing—

(i)

the extent to which the Secretary will be able to verify that Iran is complying with its obligations and commitments under the agreement;

(ii)

the adequacy of the safeguards and other control mechanisms and other assurances contained in the agreement with respect to Iran’s nuclear program to ensure Iran’s activities permitted thereunder will not be used to further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose, including for any research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other nuclear-related military purpose; and

(iii)

the capacity and capability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to effectively implement the verification regime required by or related to the agreement, including whether the International Atomic Energy Agency will have sufficient access to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of covert nuclear-related activities and whether it has the required funding, manpower, and authority to undertake the verification regime required by or related to the agreement.

(B)

Assumptions

In preparing a report under subparagraph (A) with respect to an agreement described in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall assume that Iran could—

(i)

use all measures not expressly prohibited by the agreement to conceal activities that violate its obligations and commitments under the agreement; and

(ii)

alter or deviate from standard practices in order to impede efforts to verify that Iran is complying with those obligations and commitments.

(C)

Classified annex

(3)

Exception

(A)

In general

(B)

Additional requirement

(b)

Period for review by Congress of nuclear agreements with Iran

(1)

In general

(2)

Exception

(3)

Limitation on actions during initial congressional review period

(4)

Limitation on actions during presidential consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval

(5)

Limitation on actions during congressional reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval

(6)

Exception

The prohibitions under paragraphs (3) through (5) do not apply to any new deferral, waiver, or other suspension of statutory sanctions pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action if that deferral, waiver, or other suspension is made—

(A)

consistent with the law in effect on May 22, 2015; and

(B)

not later than 45 calendar days before the transmission by the President of an agreement, assessment report, and certification under subsection (a).

(7)

Definition

(c)

Effect of congressional action with respect to nuclear agreements with Iran

(1)

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—

(A)

the sanctions regime imposed on Iran by Congress is primarily responsible for bringing Iran to the table to negotiate on its nuclear program;

(B)

these negotiations are a critically important matter of national security and foreign policy for the United States and its closest allies;

(C)

this section does not require a vote by Congress for the agreement to commence;

(D)

this section provides for congressional review, including, as appropriate, for approval, disapproval, or no action on statutory sanctions relief under an agreement; and

(E)

even though the agreement may commence, because the sanctions regime was imposed by Congress and only Congress can permanently modify or eliminate that regime, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity, in an orderly and deliberative manner, to consider and, as appropriate, take action affecting the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.

(2)

In general

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, action involving any measure of statutory sanctions relief by the United States pursuant to an agreement subject to subsection (a) or the Joint Plan of Action—

(A)

may be taken, consistent with existing statutory requirements for such action, if, during the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is enacted a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress does favor the agreement;

(B)

may not be taken if, during the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is enacted a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not favor the agreement; or

(C)

may be taken, consistent with existing statutory requirements for such action, if, following the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is not enacted any such joint resolution.

(3)

Definition

(d)

Congressional oversight of Iranian compliance with nuclear agreements

(1)

In general

(2)

Potentially significant breaches and compliance incidents

(3)

Material breach report

(4)

Semi-annual report

Not later than 180 calendar days after entering into an agreement described in subsection (a), and not less frequently than once every 180 calendar days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report on Iran’s nuclear program and the compliance of Iran with the agreement during the period covered by the report, including the following elements:

(A)

Any action or failure to act by Iran that breached the agreement or is in noncompliance with the terms of the agreement.

(B)

Any delay by Iran of more than one week in providing inspectors access to facilities, people, and documents in Iran as required by the agreement.

(C)

Any progress made by Iran to resolve concerns by the International Atomic Energy Agency about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.

(D)

Any procurement by Iran of materials in violation of the agreement or which could otherwise significantly advance Iran’s ability to obtain a nuclear weapon.

(E)

Any centrifuge research and development conducted by Iran that—

(i)

is not in compliance with the agreement; or

(ii)

may substantially reduce the breakout time of acquisition of a nuclear weapon by Iran, if deployed.

(F)

Any diversion by Iran of uranium, carbon-fiber, or other materials for use in Iran’s nuclear program in violation of the agreement.

(G)

Any covert nuclear activities undertaken by Iran, including any covert nuclear weapons-related or covert fissile material activities or research and development.

(H)

An assessment of whether any Iranian financial institutions are engaged in money laundering or terrorist finance activities, including names of specific financial institutions if applicable.

(I)

Iran’s advances in its ballistic missile program, including developments related to its long-range and inter-continental ballistic missile programs.

(J)

An assessment of—

(i)

whether Iran directly supported, financed, planned, or carried out an act of terrorism against the United States or a United States person anywhere in the world;

(ii)

whether, and the extent to which, Iran supported acts of terrorism, including acts of terrorism against the United States or a United States person anywhere in the world;

(iii)

all actions, including in international fora, being taken by the United States to stop, counter, and condemn acts by Iran to directly or indirectly carry out acts of terrorism against the United States and United States persons;

(iv)

the impact on the national security of the United States and the safety of United States citizens as a result of any Iranian actions reported under this paragraph; and

(v)

all of the sanctions relief provided to Iran, pursuant to the agreement, and a description of the relationship between each sanction waived, suspended, or deferred and Iran’s nuclear weapon’s program.

(K)

An assessment of whether violations of internationally recognized human rights in Iran have changed, increased, or decreased, as compared to the prior 180-day period.

(5)

Additional reports and information

(A)

Agency reports

(B)

Provision of information on nuclear initiatives with Iran

(6)

Compliance certification

After the review period provided in subsection (b), the President shall, not less than every 90 calendar days—

(A)

determine whether the President is able to certify that—

(i)

Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement, including all related technical or additional agreements;

(ii)

Iran has not committed a material breach with respect to the agreement or, if Iran has committed a material breach, Iran has cured the material breach;

(iii)

Iran has not taken any action, including covert activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program; and

(iv)

suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to the agreement is—

(I)

appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program; and

(II)

vital to the national security interests of the United States; and

(B)

if the President determines he is able to make the certification described in subparagraph (A), make such certification to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership.

(7)

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that—

(A)

United States sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under an agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1);

(B)

issues not addressed by an agreement on the nuclear program of Iran, including fair and appropriate compensation for Americans who were terrorized and subjected to torture while held in captivity for 444 days after the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, in 1979 and their families, the freedom of Americans held in Iran, the human rights abuses of the Government of Iran against its own people, and the continued support of terrorism worldwide by the Government of Iran, are matters critical to ensure justice and the national security of the United States, and should be expeditiously addressed;

(C)

the President should determine the agreement in no way compromises the commitment of the United States to Israel’s security, nor its support for Israel’s right to exist; and

(D)

in order to responsibly implement any long-term agreement reached between the P5+1 countries and Iran, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity to review any agreement and, as necessary, take action to modify the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.

(e)

Expedited consideration of legislation

(1)

Initiation

(A)

In general

(B)

Definition

(2)

Qualifying legislation defined

For purposes of this subsection, the term “qualifying legislation” means only a bill of either House of Congress—

(A)

the title of which is as follows: “A bill reinstating statutory sanctions imposed with respect to Iran.”; and

(B)

the matter after the enacting clause of which is: “Any statutory sanctions imposed with respect to Iran pursuant to ______ that were waived, suspended, reduced, or otherwise relieved pursuant to an agreement submitted pursuant to section 135(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 are hereby reinstated and any action by the United States Government to facilitate the release of funds or assets to Iran pursuant to such agreement, or provide any further waiver, suspension, reduction, or other relief pursuant to such agreement is hereby prohibited.”, with the blank space being filled in with the law or laws under which sanctions are to be reinstated.

(3)

Introduction

During the 60-calendar day period provided for in paragraph (1), qualifying legislation may be introduced—

(A)

in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader or the minority leader; and

(B)

in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority leader’s designee) or the minority leader (or the minority leader’s designee).

(4)

Floor consideration in House of Representatives

(A)

Reporting and discharge

(B)

Proceeding to consideration

(C)

Consideration

(5)

Consideration in the Senate

(A)

Committee referral

(B)

Reporting and discharge

(C)

Proceeding to consideration

(D)

Debate

(E)

Vote on passage

(F)

Rulings of the Chair on procedure

(G)

Consideration of veto messages

(6)

Rules relating to Senate and House of Representatives

(A)

Coordination with action by other House

If, before the passage by one House of qualifying legislation of that House, that House receives qualifying legislation from the other House, then the following procedures shall apply:

(i)

The qualifying legislation of the other House shall not be referred to a committee.

(ii)

With respect to qualifying legislation of the House receiving the legislation—

(I)

the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no qualifying legislation had been received from the other House; but

(II)

the vote on passage shall be on the qualifying legislation of the other House.

(B)

Treatment of a bill of other House

(C)

Treatment of companion measures

(D)

Application to revenue measures

(f)

Rules of House of Representatives and Senate

Subsection (e) is enacted by Congress—

(1)

as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such are deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of legislation described in those sections, and supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such rules; and

(2)

with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

(g)

Rules of construction

Nothing in the section shall be construed as—

(1)

modifying, or having any other impact on, the President’s authority to negotiate, enter into, or implement appropriate executive agreements, other than the restrictions on implementation of the agreements specifically covered by this section;

(2)

allowing any new waiver, suspension, reduction, or other relief from statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law, or allowing the President to refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection (a) during the period for review provided in subsection (b);

(3)

revoking or terminating any statutory sanctions imposed on Iran; or

(4)

authorizing the use of military force against Iran.

(h)

Definitions

In this section:

(1)

Agreement

(2)

Appropriate congressional committees

(3)

Appropriate congressional committees and leadership

(4)

Iranian financial institution

(5)

Joint Plan of Action

(6)

EU-Iran Joint Statement

(7)

Material breach

The term “material breach” means, with respect to an agreement described in subsection (a), any breach of the agreement, or in the case of non-binding commitments, any failure to perform those commitments, that substantially—

(A)

benefits Iran’s nuclear program;

(B)

decreases the amount of time required by Iran to achieve a nuclear weapon; or

(C)

deviates from or undermines the purposes of such agreement.

(8)

Noncompliance defined

(9)

P5+1 countries

(10)

United States person

(Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, title I, § 135, as added Pub. L. 114–17, § 2, May 22, 2015, 129 Stat. 201.)

cite as: 42 USC 2160e