PRO 2
H298167 SMS
OT:RR:CTF:ER

Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Port of Chicago
5600 Pearl Street
Rosemont, IL 60018

Attn: Jeremy Jackson, Supervisory Import Specialist

RE: Application for Further Review of Protest Number 3901-2018-100274; Concerning Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipes from the People’s Republic of China subject to Antidumping Order 570-910 and Countervailing Order 570-911; timeliness of protest Dear Port Director:

The following is our decision regarding the Application for Further Review (“AFR”) of Protest Number 3901-2018-100274, filed on behalf of Mercury Products Corp. (“MPC”) on March 2, 2018, which contests the antidumping and countervailing duties assessed on its entry of circular welded pipes (“CWP”).

FACTS:

On September 27, 2016, MPC imported CWP from the People’s Republic of China (“China”), manufactured by Guangdong Zhida Precision Tube MFR, under entry number xxx-xxxx2451. MPC entered the merchandise as an “01 free and dutiable” consumption entry. Subsequently, on August 4, 2017, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) notified MPC that its entry of CWP was subject to antidumping duties (“ADD”), under AD case number A-570-910, changed the entry to “03 Antidumping/Countervailing (AD/CVD),” and suspended liquidation pending instructions from the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”). See Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Affirmative Final Determination of Critical Circumstances: Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from People’s Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 31,970 (June 5, 2008). After receiving Commerce instructions on September 29, 2017, CBP liquidated the entry on January 19, 2018, and MPC was assessed antidumping duties (“ADD”), under AD case number A-570-910, and issued a bill by CBP. See Commerce Message Number 7272309 (Sept. 29, 2017).

On March 2, 2018, MPC protested the assessment of ADD, including interest. MPC asserted that the CWP it entered is expressly out of the scope of AD case number A-570-910. MPC describes its imported merchandise as “rounded welded pipe produced at American Society for Testing and Materials (“ASTM”) Standard A-513, the Standard Specification for Electric-Resistance- Welded Carbon and Alloy Steel Mechanical Tubing . . . [with] an outside diameter of between 20 and 25 mm, and a wall thickness of 2.1 mm.” In support of its protest MPC provided the commercial invoice which describes the standard grade of the merchandise as ASTM A 513. Additionally, the Bill of Lading and Packing list described the merchandise as “round welded pipe.” Lastly, at the request of Regulations and Rulings, MPC provided mill certificates for its pipes, on March 10, 2019. Based on these descriptions, MPC asserts that the CWP it entered is expressly out of the scope of AD case number 570-910 and CVD case number 570-911.

On March 9, 2018, the entry was reliquidated and MPC was assessed countervailing duties (“CVD”), per case number C-570-911, and issued a second bill. See Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. 31,966 (June 5, 2008), see also Commerce Message Number 7275318 (Oct. 2, 2017). On April 27, 2018, the entry was “mistakenly” automatically re-liquidated and MPC was issued a refund of all the ADD charged on January 19, 2018. On May 23, 2018, the Port of Baltimore denied MPC’s protest, indicating ADD was refunded. On July 18, 2018, MPC attempted to amend its March 2, 2018, protest, to dispute the assessment of CVD on the entry and to request a refund of the interest paid on their deposit of ADD.

ISSUES:

Whether the protest and “supplement” filed thereto, is sufficient under the regulations. Whether CBP properly liquidated MPC’s entry of circular welded pipes.

LAW AND ANAYLSIS:

Whether the protest and “supplement” filed thereto, is sufficient under the regulations. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514, CBP decisions are final unless a protest is timely filed against that decision in accordance with § 1514(c). See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). A protest made under § 1514 (a), must be filed in writing, or transmitted electronically through a data interchange system, in accordance with regulations, and “clearly labeled ‘Protest’.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(1); 19 C.F.R § 174.12. Additionally, only one protest may be filed for each entry of merchandise, except that where the entry covers merchandise of different categories, a separate protest may be filed for each category. Id at § 1514(c)(1)(d). Specifically, a protest must be filed within 180 days from the date of liquidation or reliquidation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3)(A); 19 C.F.R. § 174.12(e). Additionally, pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 174.12(f), the date on which a protest is received by the CBP officer, with whom it is required to be filed, is deemed the date on which it is filed. Furthermore, protests may be amended at any time prior to the expiration of the period within which the protest may be filed. See 19 C.F.R. §174.14(a). “The amendment may assert additional claims pertaining to the administrative decision that is the subject of the protest, or may challenge an additional administrative decision relating to the same category of merchandise that is the subject of the protest.” Id. “For the presentation of additional grounds or arguments in support of a valid protest after the applicable protest period set forth in § 174.12(e) has expired, see § 174.28.” Id. Pursuant to § 174.28, “a reviewing officer may consider alternative claims and additional grounds or arguments submitted in writing by the protesting party with respect to any decision which is the subject of a valid protest at any time prior to disposition of the protest.” 19 C.F.R. §174.28. In Headquarters Ruling (“HQ”) H173819, dated September 12, 2014, CBP extensively discussed the calculation of statutory deadlines; we explained that CBP has consistently calculated statutory deadlines starting the day after the triggering event and including the entirety of the deadline day. Furthermore, this calculation standard is consistent with the U.S. Court of International Trade’s (“CIT”) and United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (“USCAFC”) interpretation of statutory limitations. See Rule 6 of the CIT and Rule 26 of the Rules of Practice of the USCAFC (when computing any time period specified in any statute, that does not specify a method of computing time, when the period is stated in days, exclude the day of the event that triggers the period; count every day, including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next business day). HQ H173819 (Sept. 12, 2014). As previously explained in H173819, CBP and both courts have near identical rules with respect to the computation of time. These rules apply to any statute that does not expressly specify a method of computing time, as is the case with 19 U.S.C. §1514(c). In line with this understanding, the first liquidation of entry number xxx-xxxx2451 occurred on Friday, January 19, 2018, as such, the 180-day statutory deadline clock started the day after, on January 20, 2018, and includes the entirety of the deadline date, Wednesday, July 18, 2018. Thus, the protest was required to be filed and any amendments must have been received by the end of July 18, 2018. In this instance, on January 19, 2018, CBP assessed ADD and interest on MPC’s entry of CWP. MPC submitted its timely protest on March 2, 2018, and its amendment on July 18, 2019, both within 180 days of the original January 19, 2018, liquidation of entry number xxx-xxxx2451. Additionally, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1501, a liquidation or reliquidation, may be reliquidated in any respect by CBP, notwithstanding the filing of a protest, within ninety days from the date of the original liquidation. CBP regulations illuminate this provision under 19 C.F.R. § 173.3, which provides that within ninety days from the date notice of the original liquidation, “[a] voluntary reliquidation may be made even though a protest has been filed, and whether the error is discovered by the Center director or is brought to his attention by an interested party.” 19 C.F.R. § 173.3(a). This entry was voluntarily reliquidated by CBP on March 9, 2018, within the statutory requirement of ninety days from the first liquidation on January 19, 2018, and CBP issued a bill to MPC assessing CVD and interest. Again, on April 27, 2018, CBP voluntarily reliquidated entry number xxx-xxxx2451, and issued MPC a refund of the total amount of ADD paid. This liquidation too was within the statutory requirement of ninety days from the liquidation on March 9, 2018. On May 23, 2018, the Port of Baltimore denied Protest Number 3901-2018-100274, wherein MPC protested the assessment of ADD because it asserted, the CWP was out of the scope of the AD order (case number A-570-910). In its denial, the port indicated a refund of ADD was already issued. On July 18, 2018, MPC submitted supplemental claims to its original protest, by uploading a document entitled “Amendment to Protest 3901-2018-100274” to the Automated Commercial Environment (“ACE”) at 10:10 am, opposing the assessment of CVD on entry number xxx-xxxx2451, and requesting the refund of its interest paid on ADD. While, MPC amended its protest within the regulatory allotted period within which the protest may be filed, i.e., protests may be amended at any time prior to the expiration of the period within which the protest may be filed (see 19 C.F.R. §174.14(a)), the amendment cannot be considered by CBP. Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 174.28, CBP may consider “additional grounds or arguments submitted . . . prior to disposition of the protest”, which occurred upon the Port’s denial of the protest. See 19 C.F.R. § 174.28. Moreover, the Federal Circuit Court has held that “a supplemental claim must challenge the same ‘decisions’ as those challenged in the original protest.” See Fujitsu General America, Inc. v. U.S., 283 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). See also HQ 229767 (Mar. 8, 2005) and HQ 225087 (June 6, 1994) (protestant’s submission of an argument regarding the assessment of the harbor maintenance fee was a new ground and not an additional argument for a protest filed on the assessment of interest, and thus not allowed under 19 C.F.R. § 174.28). In this instance, since the port denied the protest on May 23, 2018, that is the date of disposition, which occurred weeks prior to MPC’s amendment submission. First, on March 2, 2018, MPC submitted its original protest to obtain a refund of the January 19, 2018 assessment of ADD plus interest. On July 18, 2018, MPC supplemented its original protest, to among other things, again request a refund of interest paid on ADD. While the assessment of interest of ADD is in connection with the arguments made in the original protest, the Port had already issued a disposition of the original protest on May 23, 2018, denying the protest as the ADD had been refunded on April 27, 2018. Accordingly, pursuant to 19 C.F.R. §§ 174.14 and 174.28, the supplemental claim, in regards to a refund on interest paid, was submitted untimely and could not be considered by CBP. Secondly, on July 18, 2018, MPC also submitted an objection to the March 9, 2018, reliquidation of entry number xxx-xxxx2451, with the assessment of CVD. In this instance MPC’s argument relating to the reliquidation of the entry to assess CVD is a separate issue from the arguments presented in the protest dated March 2, 2018. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(5) (the reliquidation of an entry is protestable). It was not until March 9, 2018, a week after the original protest was filed, that CBP assessed CVD; thus, this reliquidation is a separate “decision” by CBP under the law. See 19 U.S.C. §1514. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §1514, a protest must be filed in writing, or transmitted electronically through a data interchange system, and “clearly labeled ‘Protest’.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(1); 19 C.F.R § 174.12. Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that technical precision is not required of a protest, as long as objections are distinct, specific, and sufficient to bring to CBP’s attention the importer’s intent and relief sought. See Davies v. Arthur, 96 U.S. 148, 151 (1878); see also, F. W. Myers & Co. on behalf of General Motors Corp. v. United States, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 299, 300 (1983); and HQ 966932 (Mar. 10, 2004). Accordingly, we find that MPC’s submission, which was submitted through ACE electronically and specifically labeled “Protest”, was properly made within the requirements under the law with regard to the March 9, 2018, re-liquidation. Additionally, we note that 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(1)(d) provides that only one protest may be filed for each entry of merchandise. The Courts have frequently interpreted the requirement that only one protest is permitted for each entry of merchandise. See, e.g., F. W. Myers & Co., Inc. v. United States, 6 CIT 299 (1983); Russ Togs, Inc. v. United States, 79 Cust. Ct. 119, C.D. 4722 (1977). In Russ Togs, the Court reviewed the legislative background to this provision and concluded that it was to avoid piecemeal administrative processing and subsequent litigation of different issues pertaining to the same entry of merchandise. “The filing of multiple protests challenging different administrative decisions in a liquidation (viz., classification, appraisement, etc.) regarding the same category of merchandise in a single entry is plainly inimical to the objective of the statute seeking to streamline the administrative and judicial review of [C]ustoms decisions.” Russ Togs, Inc. v. United States, 79 Cust. Ct. 119, 122; see also, HQ 225393 (Sept. 30, 1994). CBP has applied this provision to deny redundant protests filed with regard to a particular entry. In HQ 226218, dated March 19, 1996, two protests were filed for the same entry when CBP’s processing of the initial protest was delayed by more than three months. In the ruling, we noted that after denying the first protest on the substantive issues, the second protest could be dismissed as a procedural matter consistent with the requirement that only one protest may be filed for a particular entry of merchandise. However, the prohibition against the allowance of subsequent protests on identical entries is not absolute. See e.g., HQ H018936 (Feb. 11, 2008). While only one protest is allowed per entry, unless the entry covers merchandise of different categories; unlike in the above cited cases, in this instance the original protest filed by MPC was based on one liquidation, whereas the subsequent submission is in protest of a second and separate liquidation of the same entry. If not allowed to protest this new liquidation, which occurred subsequent to submission of the original protest, MPC would be denied any administrative avenue for relief, which we find is contrary to the intent of 19 U.S.C. § 1514. Accordingly, the July 18, 2018, submission opposing CVD is an invalid amendment, as it is not an additional argument in support of the challenge in the original protest. However, as the submission was clearly labeled as a protest and specifically requested a refund of CVD, the facts here are distinct from those in Fujitsu General America, Inc., 283 F.3d 1364 and HQ 225087, and the protest of the reliquidation of the entry number xxx-xxxx2451 should have been treated as a new protest appropriately submitted under section 19 U.S.C. §1514(a)(5) and not as a mere supplemental claim under 19 C.F.R.§§ 174.14 and 174.28. Because MPC submitted its second protest on July 18, 2018, within 180 days of the March 9, 2018, reliquidation of entry number xxx-xxxx2451, the protest is timely, regardless of the fact that the Port denied the original protest. Accordingly, the second protest submission and MPC’s challenge to CBP’s additional liquidation and assessment of CVD on entry number xxx-xxxx2451 is timely and valid, and will be considered below. Whether CBP properly liquidated MPC’s entry of circular welded pipes. Generally, assessed antidumping duties properly applied by CBP are not protestable. It is well settled that when assessing and collecting antidumping duties, CBP follows Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) instructions. “Customs has a merely ministerial role in liquidating antidumping duties.” Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. v. United States, 44 F.3d 973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The courts have consistently held that CBP’s role in the antidumping process is simply to follow Commerce’s instructions in collecting deposits of estimated duties and in assessing antidumping duties, together with interest, at the time of liquidation. See Fujitsu Ten Corporation of America v. United States, 21 C.I.T. 104, 107 (1997); and American Hi-Fi International, Inc. v United States, 19 C.I.T. 1340, 1342-43 (1995). However, “Customs, incident to its ‘ministerial’ function of fixing the amount of duties chargeable, must make factual findings to determine ‘what the merchandise is, and whether it is described in an order’ and must decide whether to apply the order to the merchandise.” LDA Incorporado v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1339 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015). Pursuant to its ministerial function, however, CBP cannot “affect the scope of the order.” Id. “[W]here the importer claims that Customs erred as a matter of fact by including its goods within the scope of the order, Customs’ determination is the proper subject for a protest. LDA Incorporado v. United States, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1367 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014) (citing Xerox Corp. v. United States, 289 F.3d 792, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2002). On the other hand, if the scope of the order is unambiguous and CBP follows Commerce’s instructions, there is no decision that is made by CBP that would be protestable. See Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 44 F.3d 973, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that CBP “cannot modify Commerce’s determinations, their underlying facts, or their enforcement”); HQ H258302 (Sept. 3, 2015) (finding that “because the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders was clear and CBP acted in accordance with Commerce’s instructions, CBP acted in its ministerial capacity when it liquidated its entries” and the protest “failed to raise a protestable issue”). See also H284348 (Aug. 10, 2017). Accordingly, “where CBP can conclude that a product falls within the words of the order, both the affirmative scope language and any exclusions, CBP properly requires an importer to enter its goods as subject to an order.” Sunpreme, Inc. v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1202 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016). The inquiry “comes down to whether CBP can determine that merchandise falls within the common meaning of the scope language based upon observable physical characteristics.” Id. If the importer believes that CBP has made a mistake of fact and does not want its goods to be covered by the order, the remedy is to seek a scope ruling. See LDA Incorporado, 79 F. Supp. 3d at1342 n.12. On June 5, 2008, Commerce published its final determination in the CVD investigation of circular welded carbon quality steel pipes from China. See Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. 31,966 (June 5, 2008). This determination was amended on July 22, 2008. Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China: Notice of Amended Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Notice of Countervailing Duty Order, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,545 (July 22, 2008) (“CVD Order”). The scope of the CVD order described the covered merchandise as follows: The scope of this order covers certain welded carbon quality steel pipes and tubes, of circular cross–section, and with an outside diameter of 0.372 inches (9.45 mm) or more, but not more than 16 inches (406.4 mm), whether or not stenciled, regardless of wall thickness, surface finish (e.g., black, galvanized, or painted), end finish (e.g., plain end, beveled end, grooved, threaded, or threaded and coupled), or industry specification (e.g., ASTM, proprietary, or other), generally known as standard pipe and structural pipe (they may also be referred to as circular, structural, or mechanical tubing). . . .The scope of this order does not include: (a) pipe suitable for use in boilers, superheaters, heat exchangers, condensers, refining furnaces and feedwater heaters, whether or not cold drawn; (b) mechanical tubing, whether or not cold–drawn; (c) finished electrical conduit; (d) finished scaffolding; (e) tube and pipe hollows for redrawing; (f) oil country tubular goods produced to API specifications; and (g) line pipe produced to only API specifications. 73 Fed. Reg. 42,546 (emphasis added). With regard to entry number xxx-xxxx2451, MPC asserts that because the CVD order explicitly excludes “mechanical tubing, whether or not cold-drawn” and “1) MPC Mechanical Tube is produced to ASTM Standard A-513, 2) tubing produced to ASTM Standard A-513 is properly considered to be ‘mechanical tubing’ in the context of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations, as described by Commerce and the CIT,” CBP erred in its assessment of CVD. MPC cites to Maquilacero S.A. De C.V. v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2017), in support of its contention that the CIT held that circular tubing produced to ASTM-513 standards are mechanical tubing and properly excluded from the CVD order. In Maquilacero S.A. De C.V., the scope of the antidumping order on Certain Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe from Brazil, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Venezuela, 57 Fed. Reg. 49, 453 (Nov. 2, 1992) (“the Mexico AD order”) was at issue. The Mexico AD order excluded mechanical tubing imported from the listed countries, from the order. See id. Specifically, the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) determined that mechanical tubing from Mexico was not causing a domestic injury and specifically removed the reference to mechanical tubing from the paragraph describing the subject merchandise. Id. at 1298; 57 Fed. Reg. 49,453. Subsequently, Prolamsa, Inc., sought a scope ruling confirming that its tubing was excluded from the Mexico AD order. In this scope determination, Commerce found that the mechanical tubes excluded from the scope of the Mexico AD order were black, stenciled as ASTM A-513, meet the ASTM A-513 specifications, as well as contained specific diameter, wall thickness, carbon contents, elongation, and did not undergo hydrostatically testing. Id. at 1299. Similarly, Maquilacero sought a scope ruling for its tubing, produced at the ASTM A-513 standard, arguing that it had the same physical and chemical characteristics as the tubing in the Prolamsa ruling, except it lacked the stenciling. Maquilacero S.A. De C.V., at 1303. The CIT found that because Commerce and the ITC had previously recognized ASTM A-513 as a standard for mechanical tubing specifications, it could not find the mere stenciling of the tube a requirement, but an expansion of the scope of the Mexico AD order. Id. Here, MPC has sought no scope ruling with Commerce, but merely relies on previous determinations, which have recognized the ASTM A-513 standard as mechanical tubing, in regards to a distinct AD order. However, the language of the scope under protest is not identical to the language of the order relied upon by MPC and discussed in Maquilacero S.A. De C.V. In the Mexico AD order, the ITC unequivocally removed the words mechanical tubing from the paragraph describing the subject merchandise, whereas as in the CVD order at issue, the term mechanical tubing remains in the description of the subject merchandise. See 73 Fed. Reg. 42,546 (The scope of this order covers certain welded carbon quality steel pipes and tubes . . . generally known as standard pipe and structural pipe (they may also be referred to as circular, structural, or mechanical tubing) (emphasis added). Additionally, as discussed in detail in Maquilacero S.A. De C.V., there are many factors that Commerce used in determining if certain pipes were considered excluded from the scope of the Mexico AD order. Commerce issued its scope ruling based on an analysis of several factors including ASTM standard, width, diameter, color, length, labeling, and the lack of hydrostatically testing. See Maquilacero S.A. De C.V. v. United States 256 F. Supp. 3d 1294. Lastly, the CIT and ITC went to great length to discuss that the specific countries involved in the Mexico AD order did not pose a threat to the domestic mechanical tubing industry, which has not been similarly established for China. Accordingly, we do not find that the scope rulings and exceptions pertaining to the Mexico AD order can similarly be treated as identical to the CVD order and subject merchandise at hand. MPC merely relies on its commercial invoice for support to conclude that its tubes should be excluded from the CVD order. MPC does not factually argue that its CWPs are specifically excluded. Rather, MPC argues they are similar to pipes that Commerce has determined to be outside the scope in another order and seeks that CBP apply the same analysis to its CWP entering the United States. The mere fact that an invoice indicates a tube is ASTM A-513 standard is only one piece of Commerce’s analysis and does not factually determine that the CWP that MPC entered are specifically excluded from the scope of the CVD order under protest. Such analysis by CBP of the numerous factors applied by Commerce as sought by MPC, would infringe upon Commerce’s authority to determine that a particular type of merchandise is within the class or kind of merchandise described in an existing order, and would potentially cause CBP to impermissibly alter the scope. See Sandvik v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 276 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997), aff'd 164 F.3d 596, 598 (Fed. Cir. 1998). To do so would exceed CBP’s ministerial authority to factually determine whether based on observable physical characteristics MPC’s CWP fall outside the CVD Order. Accordingly, because CBP has not erred as a matter of fact in determining that the CWP falls under the language of the CVD order and CBP followed Commerce’s instructions, CBP properly assessed countervailing duties on MPC entries of CWP. Lastly, as CBP’s liquidation of entry number xxx-xxxx2451 is not final, as it was timely protested in accordance with 19 U.S.C. §1514(c), CBP may re-liquidate the entry properly with the assessment of both ADD and CVD. If MPC continues to believe that CBP has erred as a matter of fact, it must seek a scope ruling request from Commerce to determine whether the specific pipes at issue are outside of the scope of the ADD and CVD Orders. HOLDING:

Based on the above discussion, the supplemental claims to Protest 3901-2018-100274 may not be considered. See 19 C.F.R. §§174.14(a) and 174.28. However, MPC’s protest of CBP’s assessment of CVD is valid, but based on the foregoing, CBP properly assessed CVD and interest on the entries of CWP under the CVD order. Additionally, CBP may also reassess ADD on entry number xxx-xxxx2451 pursuant to Commerce Message Number 7272309. Accordingly, protest number 3901-2018-100274 and MPC’s subsequent challenges to CBP’s additional liquidations of entry number xxx-xxxx2451should be DENIED. Sixty days from the date of the decision, the Office of Trade, Regulations and Rulings will make the decision available to CBP personnel, and to the public on the Customs Rulings Online Search System (CROSS) at https://rulings.cbp.gov/ which can be found on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection website at http://www.cbp.gov and other methods of public distribution.

Sincerely,

for Craig T. Clark, Director
Commercial and Trade Facilitation Division